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THE  HISTORY 

OF    THE 

Italian-Turkish  War 

September  29,   1911   to  October  18,   1912. 

BY 

COMMODORE  W.  H.  BEEHLER 

UNITED    STATES   NAVY 


FORMERLY  NAVAL  ATTACHE  TO  THE 
UNITED  STATES  EMBASSIES  IN  BERLIN, 
ROME  AND  VIENNA  ::  ::  ::  ::  ::  ::  :: 


Reprinted  from  Proceedings  of  the  United  States  Naval  Institute,  with 

additions.     Compiled  from  semi-official  publications  of  the 

Naval  Ministries  of  Germany,  Italy  and  Austria, 

and  other  thoroughly  reliable  sources. 


COPYRIGHT,  1913. 

WILLIAM  H.  BEEHLKR, 

ANNAPOLIS,  MD. 


PBINTHD  BY 

THE    ADVBRTISBR-RRPUBLICAN. 

ANMAPOI.IS,    MD. 


vr 


PREFACE. 


This  history  was  compiled  from  the  semi-official  publications 
of  the  Naval  Ministries  of  Germany,  Italy  and  Austria,  viz.: 
Marine  Rundschau,  Rivista  Marittima,  and  Mittheilungen  aus 
dem  Gebiete  des  Seewesens,  corroborated  by  the  facts  as  de- 
scribed in  other  foreign  publications  such  as  Le  Yacht,  the  Brit- 
ish Army  and  Navy  weeklies,  the  London  Illustrated  News  and 
Graphic,  besides  Ueberall,  the  organ  of  the  German  navy  league. 
In  this  compilation  conflicting  or  doubtful  statements  were  elim- 
inated and  only  such  details  that  are  thoroughly  reliable  are 
given. 

The  writer  served  for  a  period  of  three  years  and  nine  months 
as  Naval  Attache  to  the  United  States  Embassies  in  Berlin, 
Rome  and  Vienna,  and  he  knows  that  these  semi-official  publica- 
tions are  thoroughly  reliable  and  therefore  he  claims  that  the 
facts  herein  recorded  are  true. 

The  account  was  primarily  compiled  for  the  information  of 
the  United  States  Navy  and  was  submitted  by  the  writer  to  the 
Board  of  Control  of  the  Naval  Institute  for  revision.  This  waa 
thereupon  published  in  a  series  of  four  articles  in  the  current 
quarterly  Proceedings  of  the  Naval  Institute  for  June,  Septem- 
ber and  December,  1912,  and  March,  1913.  The  type  of  these 
articles  was  distributed  and  in  order  to  preserve  the  data  in  book 
form  the  four  series  of  articles  were  reprinted  in  a  limited  edi- 
tion for  general  circulation. 

The  book  contains  the  four  articles  that  were  published  with 
considerable  additional  data,  such  as  the  complete  account  of  the 
defences  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus  taken  from  the  Jour- 
nal of  the  Royal  Artillery  for  January,  1913,  embodying  the 
translation  from  the  Russian  Artillery  Journal  by  Lieutenant 
J.  K.  L.  Fitzwilliams,  Royal  Horse  Artillery  on  The  Coast  De- 
fences of  Turkey.  The  Honorable  Philander  Knox,  Secretary 
of  State,  "Washington,  D.  C.,  also  kindly  sent  the  writer  the  full 
text  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  Lausanne  with  the  decree  of  the 
King  of  Italy  and  the  Firman  of  the  Sultan  of  Turkey.  This 
treaty  and  accompanying  documents  are  embodied  in  the  ap- 
pendix. 

This  war  demonstrated  the  thorough  preparedness  of  the  Ital- 
ian Government  for  the  war,  not  only  in  regard  to  the  efficient 
training  of  the  Italian  Army  and  Navy  and  their  armament  and 


3080961 


equipment,  but  the  financial  economy  of  administration  that 
enabled  Italy  to  acquire  the  coveted  African  Provinces  without 
levying  any  extra  war  taxes  upon  the  people. 

The  Italian  Navy  proved  to  be  thoroughly  equal  to  all  de- 
mands that  were  made  upon  its  personnel  and  materiel.  The 
history  of  this  war  is  a  glorious  tribute  to  the  Italian  Navy  and 
the  facts  herein  recorded  express  recognition  of  the  efficiency  of 
the  Italian  Navy  in  the  highest  possible  degree. 

The  Italian  Navy  suffered  no  losses  of  materiel  and  the  loss  of 
life  was  wholly  due  to  losses  in  engagements  upon  landing  on 
the  enemy's  shores,  in  which  the  Italian  Naval  Brigades  invari- 
ably led  and  took  possession  of  the  shores  until  relieved  by  the 
army  which  they  assisted  to  disembark  from  the  transports  by 
their  own  boats  and  lighters  and  other  craft  they  brought  with 
each  convoy. 

The  Turkish  Navy  was  inefficient.  They  had  not  been  effi- 
ciently trained  and  in  all  the  engagements  the  Turkish  great 
gun  fire  was  ineffective  and  in  efforts  to  repel  the  Italian  naval 
attacks  the  Turks  never  inflicted  any  damage  to  any  vessels  of 
the  Italian  Navy  and  rarely  scored  a  single  hit.  The  lack  of 
trained  gun  pointers  in  the  Turkish  Army  and  Navy  was  evi- 
dent in  every  engagement. 

The  lesson  of  the  war  emphasizes  the  absolute  necessity  of  an 
adequate,  thoroughly  trained  and  efficient  navy.  The  exemption 
of  defenceless  coast  towns  from  bombardment  in  time  of  war  is 
clearly  shown  by  the  incidents  of  this  war  to  be  unfounded.  In 
war  it  is  the  duty  of  a  naval  commander  to  act  promptly  and  do 
his  utmost  to  compel  the  enemy  to  yield  to  the  demands  of  his 
government,  and  in  every  case  where  the  bombardment  of  a  de 
fenceless  port  might  produce  that  result  and  decide  the  war,  or 
contribute  largely  to  the  result  of  the  war,  the  fact  that  a  port 
is  defenceless  will  not  protect  it  from  bombardment. 

An  adequate,  efficient  navy  is  the  only  reliable  defence  with 
command  of  the  sea.  The  Italian  ports  were  never  exposed  to  a 
bombardment  by  a  Turkish  fleet  because  the  Italian  Navy  had 
command  of  the  sea. 

The  writer  desires  to  express  his  thanks  for  kind  assistance 
and  advice  of  brother  officers,  especially  Lieutenant  Commander 
Ralph  Earle,  the  Secretary  and  Treasurer  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  In- 
stitute and  Editor  of  the  Proceedings. 

W.  H.  BEEHLER, 
Commodore  U.  8.  Navy. 


ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR 


Italy  declared  war  against  Turkey  for  commercial  reasons  and 
to  provide  a  neighboring  colony  for  her  surplus  population.  The 
Italians  believe  the  prediction  of  the  great  African  Explorer, 
Gerhard  Rohly,  who,  twenty  years  ago,  declared  that  the  power 
that  rules  Tripoli  will  dominate  the  Soudan.  The  proximity  of 
Tripoli  to  Italy  makes  its  possession  desirable. 

The  importance  of  the  region  was  recognized  by  the  ancient 
Romans.  Cyrenaica  was  very  important.  The  five  great  com- 
mercial ports  were  known  as  the  Lybian  Pentapolis,  and  existing 
ruins  of  great  works,  aqueducts,  dams,  and  large  buildings  reveal 
its  ancient  prosperity.  Sallust  states  that  Leptis  alone  annually 
exported  forty  million  bushels  of  grain  and  paid  a  war  tax  of 
twenty-five  thousand  gallons  of  olive  oil.  The  Mediterranean 
climate  prevails,  and  though  the  great  Saharan  Desert  ap- 
proaches close  to  the  coast  there  are  large  oases  and  fertile  tracts 
of  land  that  would  enable  the  country  to  support  a  population  of 
twelve  million  inhabitants,  whereas  it  now  has  but  one  million. 

This  coast  has  a  number  of  naturally  fine  harbors  that  have 
been  filled  up  with  sand  and  ruined  by  neglect,  but  which  could 
easily  be  reclaimed.  Such  are  Tripoli,  Lebda,  Misrata,  Benghasi, 
Derna,  Mersa,  Bomba  and  Tobruk.  The  trend  of  the  coast  brings 
the  Tripolitan  ports  three  hundred  miles  nearer  the  trade  centers 
of  points  around  Sahara,  and  the  trade  routes  converge  towards 
Tripoli. 

Ever  since  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  was  united  Italy  has  coveted 
the  opposite  coast  of  North  Africa.  Forty  years  ago  Bismarck 
wrote  to  Mazzini:  "The  Mediterranean  is  indisputably  Italy's 
sphere  of  interest.  The  control  of  the  Mediterranean  should  be 
the  constant  goal  and  the  controlling  principle  of  Italian  states- 
men!" England  had  long  possessed  Malta  and  Gibraltar.  In 


6  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAB. 

1878  she  acquired  Cyprus  while  Austria  took  Bosnia.  At  the 
Berlin  Congress  Bismarck  and  Beaconsfield  offered  Italy 
Mityleni,  Tunis  and  Tripoli ;  but  Cairoli  declined,  stating  that  he 
wished  to  leave  the  Congress  with  clean  hands.  Other  nations, 
however,  stepped  in  and  took  forcible  possession.  France  inau- 
gurated her  Algerian  imperial  policy  and  acquired  Senegal, 
Tschad,  and  Tunis.  France  fortified  Biserta  on  the  Tunisian 
coast  and  is  now  proceeding  to  peaceably  acquire  Morocco.  Dur- 
ing the  Russo-Turkish  war  England  offered  to  form  a  league 
with  Italy,  Austria  and  Greece  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the 
Mediterranean,  but  Italy  declined  because  she  did  not  wish  to 
disturb  her  friendly  relations  with  other  nations.  In  1881,  when 
France  seized  Tunis  and  broke  the  status  quo,  Italy  claimed  to 
be  too  weak  to  make  any  serious  protest,  but,  at  the  renewal  of 
the  triple  alliance  in  1886,  Italy  complained  that  Germany  and 
Austria  did  not  protect  Italy  from  French  encroachments  in  the 
Mediterranean.  Bismarck  then  is  said  to  have  negotiated  a 
secret  treaty  with  England  stipulating  that  Italy's  interests  in 
the  Mediterranean  should  be  preserved.  In  1889,  however, 
England  negotiated  the  Soudan  treaty  with  France  defining 
boundaries  that  encroached  still  further  on  the  borders  of  the 
Tripolitan  hinterland.  In  a  secret  treaty  in  1902,  England  and 
France  recognized  Italy's  claims  to  Tripoli.  In  1904  France 
definitely  proclaimed  Italy's  prior  right  to  take  possession  of 
Tripoli  under  certain  contingencies.  During  the  Bosnia-Bul- 
garian crisis  Italy  was  supposed  to  take  definite  action,  but  Italy 
hesitated  because  of  England's  relations  with  the  Young  Turk 
government,  but  since  England's  attitude  has  cooled  somewhat, 
Italy  has  finally  acted  to  be  no  longer  reproached  for  neglecting 
her  opportunities.  These  diplomatic  incidents  explain  the  neu- 
trality of  European  powers  during  the  war. 

The  Turks  had  possesison  of  Tripoli  since  1835,  and  the  in- 
habitants regarded  Turkish  rule  as  a  blessing;  they  enjoyed 
greater  freedom  and  were  subjected  to  much  less  burdensome 
taxation  than  before.  The  protectorate  of  Tripoli  was  an  ex- 
pense rather  than  a  source  of  revenue  for  Turkey.  The  expenses 
of  administration  were  greater  than  the  revenue  from  harbor 
dues  and  agriculture.  The  Turks  relieved  the  people  of  military 
service  at  first,  but  in  1901  universal  compulsory  military  service 
was  re-established  and  occasioned  some  opposition,  but  this  was 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAB.  7 

long  since  settled  as  a  necessary  feature  of  the  government.  The 
alleged  Italian  claim  that  the  country  was  misgoverned  and  that 
intolerable  conditions  existed  was  not  well  founded. 

The  Berbers  were  the  original  inhabitants  of  the  entire  North 
African  Coast  as  far  as  Morocco.  These  were  joined  by  a  large 
emigration  of  Jews  after  the  Babylonian  captivity.  The  Jews 
number  about  20,000  or  one-fiftieth  of  the  estimated  population 
of  one  million.  These  Jews  live  in  the  cities  and  are  the  leading 
merchants ;  a  few  carry  on  small  industries  in  the  interior.  The 
Arabs  invaded,  not  in  great  hordes,  but  by  single  tribes,  from 
time  to  time,  when  compelled  by  famine  to  leave  their  former 
abodes.  These  tribes  captured  places  from  the  numerically  su- 
perior Berbers  who  were  scattered,  and  gradually  they  have 
amalgamated  so  that  it  is  rare  to  find  either  pure  Berbers  or 
pure  Arabs  in  the  country.  The  negro  population  is  estimated 
at  50,000.  There  are  15,000  Spaniards;  50,000  Turks,  Armen- 
ians and  Albanians;  3,000  Maltese,  and  only  1,000  Italians;  the 
rest  are  Berber- Arabs. 

The  Turks  were  chiefly  officials  or  in  the  army.  The  Armen- 
ians and  Maltese  competed  with  the  Jews  in  the  trade.  The 
Italians  were  far  behind  all  other  traders.  They  had  a  flour  mill, 
an  oil  mill,  one  soap  factory  and  an  asparagus  press,  which  were 
supported  by  the  Bank  of  Rome  at  a  loss.  The  export  trade  with 
Italy  was  valued  at  $600,000,  while  the  imports  from  Italy  only 
amounted  to  $400,000  per  annum.  England  had  the  bulk  of  the 
commerce. 

The  population  was  extremely  fanatical  and  bitterly  opposed 
to  the  Italians.  The  All-Islam  propaganda  aroused  the  religious 
fanatics,  who  are  so  extremely  bigoted  that  they  do  not  regard 
the  Turks  as  true  Moslems,  and  some  of  the  opposition  to  the 
Turkish  rule  was  because  the  Turks  are  not  orthodox  Mahome- 
dans.  The  fact  might  be  used  to  favor  the  Italians  if  managed 
with  a  delicate  diplomacy,  but  the  conciliation  of  the  people  is  a 
very  difficult  task. 

The  country  is  agricultural  and  can  only  be  made  profitable 
by  developing  its  agricultural  resources.  Tobacco,  cotton,  silk, 
olives,  wine  and  dates  could  be  profitably  cultivated,  but  such 
can  hardly  be  expected  of  the  Italians,  who  have  failed  to  develop 
Italy  agriculturally,  and  in  all  countries  to  which  Italians  have 
emigrated  they  are  rarely  found  to  be  successful  agriculturists. 


8  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

The  negro  is  much  better  qualified  for  this  development,  and 
even  more  so  are  the  Berber-Fellaheens,  who  are  acclimated  and 
familiar  with  conditions  of  the  soil. 

Tripoli  is  important  because  of  the  possibilities  of  its  hinter- 
[/  \  land,  though  much  of  the  important  trade  that  would  have  its 
natural  outlet  through  Tripoli  has  been  secured  by  France 
through  Algiers  and  by  England  through  Egypt.  The  bound- 
aries of  the  English  and  French  spheres  of  influence  in  the 
Soudan  and  around  the  hinterland  of  Tripoli  limit  its  import- 
ance to  the  coast. 

Italy  has  a  precarious  problem  in  the  conquest  of  this  hinter- 
land. France  has  operated  under  most  favorable  conditions  to 
develop  her  Algerian  policy  and  in  the  last  ten  years  after  inde- 
fatigable labor  France  has  succeeded.  How  Italy  will  manage 
is  problematical.  Italy  has  a  most  formidable  foe  in  the  tribe  of 
Fessans,  who,  though  numerically  inferior  and  provided  with 
inferior  weapons,  are  thoroughly  accustomed  to  the  hot,  dry 
climate,  are  a  warlike  race,  very  mobile,  and  possess  a  knowledge 
of  the  country  that  will  outweigh  the  superiority  in  numbers  and 
equipment  of  the  Italians.  Racial  sympathy  and  the  fanatical 
religious  zeal  will  add  to  make  them  almost  invincible  in  the  de- 
fence of  their  native  land.  Guerilla  warfare  will  probably 
prolong  the  war  after  the  Italian  armies  overcome  the  organized 
defence  so  that  the  peaceful  agricultural  development  must  be 
long  deferred.  Finally,  trade  relations  with  the  interior  will 
cause  friction  in  Italian  competition  with  the  English  and 
French ;  and  influence  relations  of  the  European  powers. 

England,  with  her  chain  of  naval  bases  at  Gibraltar,  Malta, 
and  Suez  Canal  communications,  has  regarded  the  Mediter- 
ranean in  a  measure  as  a  Mare  Clausum  and  she  cannot  favor 
the  establishment  of  formidable  ports  on  the  other  flank  of  this 
line.  The  British  Mediterranean  fleet  has  of  late  years  been  re- 
duced and  greater  attention  been  given  to  the  North  Sea,  where- 
as now  the  Mediterranean  will  require  more  attention.  England 
and  France  will  increase  their  Mediterranean  naval  forces  while 
Italy  will  lean  more  than  ever  upon  the  Central  European  pow- 
ers and  the  triple  alliance,  in  which  Germany  is  so  much  inter- 
ested, will  be  strengthened. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  9 

ITALY'S  AVAILABLE  NAVAL  FORCES  WHEN  WAR  WAS  DECLARED. 

THE  SEA-GOING  FLEET,  VICE-ADMIRAL  AUBRY, 

COMMANDING. 

IST   SQUADRON,  VICE-ADMIRAL  AUBRY,  ORGANIZED  FOB  WA». 
1ST  DIVISION. 

Battleship,  Vittorio  Emanuele,  flagship. 

"  Regina  Elena,  joined  Oct.  5,  1911. 

' '  Roma. 

Napoli. 

2D   DIVISION,   REAR-ADMIRAL    PRESBITERO. 

Armored  cruiser,  Pisa,  flagship. 

"  Amalfi. 

"  San   Marco,  joined   Oct.   1,  1911. 

"  San  Giorgio,  repairing  in  Spring,  1912. 

Torpedo  ship,  Agordat 

Minelayer,  Partenope. 

2o  SQUADRON,  VICE-ADMIRAL  FARVELLI,  COMMANDING. 
3o  DIVISION. 

Battleship,  Benedetto  Brin,  flagship. 

"  Regina  Margherita,  joined  Oct.  5,  1911. 

' '  St.  Bon,  subsequently  transferred. 

"  Emanuele  Filiberto,  ready  Sept.  30,  1911. 

4TH  DIVISION,  REAR-ADMIRAL  THAON  DI  REVEL. 

Armored  cruiser,  Garibaldi,  flagship. 

' '  Varese. 

' '  Ferrucio. 

' '  Marco  Polo,  subsequently  transferred. 

Torpedo  ship,         Coatit. 
Minelayer,  Minerva. 

DIVISION  OF  TORPEDO  BOAT  INSPECTOR. 
REAR-ADMIRAL,  DUKE  OF  ABRUZZIA,  COMMANDING  FOR  WAR. 

Armored  cruiser,  Vettor  Pisani,  flagship. 
Battleship,  St.  Bon,  transferred  from  3d  division. 

Armored  cruiser,  Marco  Polo,  transferred  from  3d  division. 
Prot.  cruiser,        Lombardia,  submarine's  mothership. 
Destroyer,  Artigliere,  from  destroyer  flotilla. 

"  Fuciliere, 

Corazziere,      ' '  "  " 

Alpino, 

"  Zeffiro,  "  "  " 

High  sea  torpedo  boats,  four  to  eight,  from  destroyer  flotilla. 


10 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAS. 

TORPEDO  FLOTILLAS  OP  THE  SQUADRON. 

320  tons,  Ostro,  first  division. 

"  Freccia,  "  " 

"  Lampo,  "  " 

"  Euro,  "  " 

330  tone,  Nembo,         second  division. 

"  Turbine,  "  " 

"  Aquilone,  "  " 

"  Borea,  "  " 

416  tons,  Alpino,  third  division. 

"  Pontiere,  "  " 

"  Carabiniere,  "  " 

"  Fuciliere,  " 

400  tons,  Bersagliere,  fourth  division. 

"  Granatiere,  "  " 

"  Garabaldino,  "  " 

"  Lanciere,  "  " 


DESTROYERS  IN  RESERVE. 

330  tons,  Zeffiro,  at  Spezia. 

"          Espero,  "       " 

400  tons,  Artigliere,  at  Tarento. 

' '          Corazziere,  "       " 

320  tons,  Strale,  at  Venice. 

"          Dardo,  "       " 

300  tons,  Fulmine,  at  Leghorn,  schoolship. 

28  high  sea  torpedo  boats. 

TRAINING  SHIP  DIVISION,  REAR-ADMIRAL  BOREA-RICCI,  COMMANDING. 

Battleship,  Sicilia,  flagship. 

' '  Sardegna. 

"  Re  Umberto. 

Armored  cruiser,  Carlo  Alberto. 


OTHER  AVAILABLE  NAVAL  VESSELS. 


Coast  defence  ship,  Dandolo, 

"         "          "  ItaUa, 

"         "  "  Lepanto, 

Protected  cruiser,  Elba, 

"  "  Puglia, 

"  "  Etna, 

"  "  Liguria, 

"  "  Piemonte, 


Gunboat, 


forming  a  fifth  division. 


Red  Sea. 


Governolo, 

Gal.  Galilei,     station,  Constantinople. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  11 

Minelayer,  Tripoli,  at  Venice. 

11  Goito,  "       " 

"  Montebello,  "       " 

Torpedo  ship,  Urania,  at  Naples  and  Speiia. 

"  "  Iride,  "       "         "         " 

Caprera,  "       " 

Coast  torpedo  boats,  about  60  in  all. 
Submarines,                5  at  Brindisi,  2  at  Spezia  and  Venice. 

AUXILIARIES. 

Collier,  Bronte. 

' '  Sterope. 

Transport,  Citta  di   Milano. 

' '  Carigliano. 

' <  Volta. 

Repair  ship,  Vulcano,  at  naval  base,  Augusta. 

SHIPS  STATIONED  ABROAD. 

Gunboat,  Arethusa,    in  the  Red  Sea. 

Volturno,     "    "     "      " 
Survey  ship,         Stafetta,      "    "     "     " 
Prot.  cruiser,       Calabria,     in  East  Asiatic  waters. 
"         "  Etruria,      in  American  waters. 

TURKEY'S  AVAILABLE  NAVAL  FORCES  ON  SEPTEMBER  15,  1911. 
BATTLESHIP  DIVISION. 

Battleship,  Babarossa  Heireddin,  (91)       10,060  tons 

"  Torgut  Reiss,  (91)       10,060  tons 

CRUISING  SQUADRON. 

Prot.  cruiser,         Hamidje,  (03)  3800  ton* 

"         "  Medjidje,  (03)  3200  tons 

TORPEDO  BOAT  FLOTILLA. 

Destroyer,  Jadighiar-i-Millet,  (09)  620  tons 

"  Nemune-i-Hamie,  (09)  "     " 

'*  Muavenet-i-Millije,  (09)  "     " 

"  Taschos,  (08)  305  tone 

"  Basra,  (08)  "     " 

"  Samsum,  (08)  "     " 

"  Yar  Hissar,  (08)  "     " 

Torpedo  mother,    Tir-i-Mugguian,  4052  tons 


12 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 


RESERVE  DIVISION. 


Battleship, 
Coast  defence, 


Destroyer, 


Mesaudije, 

Assar-i-Tewfik, 

Feth-i-Buelend, 

Awn-Illah, 

Pelenghi  Deria, 

Berc-i-Sawet, 

Gairet-i-Watanije, 


(74) 
(68) 
(71) 
(69) 


DETACHED  TORPEDO  BOATS. 


Anatalia, 

Takat, 

Ursa, 

Ankara, 

Dratz, 

Kutahia, 

Mussul, 

Alpagot, 

Al  Hissar, 

Abdul  Medjid, 

Junus, 

Hamid  Abad, 

Sivri  Hissar, 

Sultan  Hissar, 

Timur  Hissar, 


(03) 
(99) 
(07) 
(07) 
(94) 
(07) 
(09) 


(06) 

(06) 

(06) 

(06) 

(06) 

(06) 

(06) 

(04) 

(04) 

(01) 

(01) 

(08)' 

(08) 

(08) 

(08) 


9250  tons 

5700  tons 

2800  tons 

2400  tons 

900  tons 

750  tons 

620  tons 


160  tons 


145  tons 

U          ({ 

97  tons 


STATIONED  IN  HARBORS. 

Coast  defence  ship,  Muin-i-Zafer,  (71)    (07)  2800  tons,  Beirut. 
Destroyer,  Peik-i-Sehewket,  (07)  750  tons,  at  Hodeida. 
24  gunboats  of  200  to  650  tons. 
20  coast  torpedo  boats  of  40  to  85  tons. 
6  special  ships  of  180  to  2300  tons. 


THE  TURKISH  GARRISONS  IN  TRIPOLI  AND  CYRENAIOA. 

The  Turkish  Army  stationed  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  was 
composed  of  the  42d  division,  consisting  of,  viz. : 

4  regiments  of  infantry,  of  4  battalions  of  600  each. 

1  battalion  of  chasseurs. 

2  regiments  of  cavalry  each  of  10  squadrons  of  80  to  120  horses. 

1  regiment  of  field  artillery  each  of  6  batteries  of  4  to  6  field  guns  of  3-inch 

caliber. 

4:  companies  of  engineers. 
."•  companies  of   fortress   artillery. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  18 

The  complement  was  12,000,  but  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
the  trained  troops  numbered  about  5000  infantry  and  400  cav- 
alry with  about  2500  to  3000  raw  recruits. 

The  garrison  of  the  city  of  Tripoli  consisted  of : 

6  battalions  of  infantry  with  two  machine  gun  companies. 

1  battalion  of  chasseurs. 
6  field  batteries. 

4  squadrons  of  cavalry. 

2  companies  of  fortress  artillery. 

This  organization  called  for  6000  troops,  but  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  there  were  but  3000  trained  troops  with  about  2000 
raw  recruits. 

The  garrisons  in  other  parts  of  the  province  were  distributed 
in  small  detachments.  It  is  reported  that  just  before  the  war 
Benghasi  had  400;  Derna,  70;  Tobruk,  30;  Solum,  25,  and  Cy- 
rene  10  men. 

In  addition  to  these  regular  troops  the  territorial  troops  were 
organized  in  30  battalions  of  infantry  and  60  squadrons  of  cav- 
alry with  a  total  strength  of  20,000. 

These  combined  gave  a  total  strength  of  the  Turkish  forces  at 
28,000  men. 

The  regular  infantry  was  formerly  armed  with  an  old 
model  of  Mauser  rifles,  but  recently  they  have  been  supplied  with 
the  latest  model  of  Martini  rifles,  and  the  Mauser  rifles  have 
been  given  to  the  irregular  troops.  During  the  latter  part  of 
September  about  10,000  of  these  old  Mauser  rifles  were  sent  into 
the  interior  for  the  territorial  troops.  The  Turks  had  50,000 
rifles  and  ample  ammunition. 

THE  DEFENCES  OF  THE  CITY  OF  TRIPOLI. 

The  defences  consisted  of  five  old  coast  fortifications  and  some 
newer  earthworks  on  the  land  front.  On  the  west  side  Fort  Sul- 
tanje  and  Fort  Gargaresch  comprised  a  group  of  three  old  earth- 
works carrying  modern  Krupp  guns.  Italian  reports  state  that 
these  included  some  8-inch  howitzers.  Fort  Sultan je  protected 
the  cable  landing  from  Malta.  There  was  a  group  of  old  stone 
forts  near  the  town  on  the  north,  these  consisting  of:  (1)  The 
Lighthouse  Fort,  whose  walls  were  mounted  with  three  old  6-inch 


14  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

guns  with  the  lighthouse  built  on  the  same  wall;  (2)  The  Span- 
ish Fort  on  the  harbor  mole,  and  (3)  Fort  Rosso,  west  of  the 
Lighthouse  Fort  (so-called  because  of  its  red  walls).  Forts  2 
and  3  were  armed  with  old  small-caliber  guns. 

Fort  Hamidije  or  Scharaschat  is  about  6000  yards  east  of  the 
city  on  a  bluff  fifty  feet  above  the  sea  level,  an  old  earthwork 
that  commands  the  outer  roadstead  and  the  harbor.  The  four 
modern  guns  which  were  formerly  mounted  in  this  fort  were 
taken  to  Yemen  in  1905  and  replaced  by  four  old  howitzers. 
Latest  reports  state  that  the  Italians  found  one  9.4-inch,  one 
6-inch  and  one  3.6-iiich  guns  in  this  fort.  Field  Marshal  von 
der  Goltz  states  that  in  1911  the  defences  of  Tripoli  had  no  guns 
larger  than  6-inch,  made  in  1870. 

A  wall  25  feet  high,  built  in  the  16th  century,  encloses  the  in- 
ner city.  The  land  forts  encircle  the  town  in  a  series  of  earth- 
works commanding  the  roads  leading  into  the  country. 

THE  MILITARY  CONDITIONS  AT  TRIPOLI. 

The  lack  of  heavily  armed  modern  fortifications  and  the  weak- 
ness of  the  garrison,  with  the  easily  interrupted  line  of  commu- 
nication with  Turkey,  rendered  any  attempt  to  defend  the  city 
from  an  oversea  attack  by  the  Italians  hopeless  at  Tripoli,  and 
even  more  so  at  the  other  ports. 

The  defence  was  still  further  hampered  by  lack  of  food.  The 
Turkish-Tripolitau  troops  had  long  been  subsisted  by  commis- 
sary stores  from  Constantinople.  The  failure  of  the  crops  in 
recent  years  was  such  that  the  Turkish  government  was  also 
obliged  to  subsist  the  poor  people.  The  starving  people  were 
supplied  with  rations  from  two  large  tents  at  the  gates  of  the 
city. 

The  Egyptian  railroad  only  extended  about  200  miles  west  of 
Alexandria  with  its  terminus  at  Mersah  Matruh,  which  is  about 
800  miles  from  the  city  of  Tripoli,  so  that  the  Turkish  request 
of  England  for  permission  to  send  Turkish  troops  to  Tripoli 
through  Egypt  was  not  of  much  practical  value. 

It  would  have  been  better  to  have  organized  Turkish  defence 
against  the  Italian  invasion  back  from  the  coast.  Field  Marshal 
von  der  Goltz  claims  that  the  real  defence  of  Tripoli  was  in  the 
interior.  The  regular  forces,  being  few  in  number,  were  insuffi- 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  15 

cient.  The  resistance  depended  chiefly  on  the  native  population, 
especially  the  support  of  the  Shiek  Sidi-es-Senoussi,  who  had 
been  recognized  as  the  ruler  of  Djarabul,  on  the  borders  of 
Barka.  The  Shiek  of  Senoussi  at  first  hesitated  to  oppose  the 
Italians. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  ITALJAN-TRIPOLITAN  EXPEDITIONARY  CORPS. 

The  partial  mobilization  of  the  Italian  army  for  the  Tripolitan 
expedition  was  with  the  7th  and  12th  Italian  army  corps,  chiefly 
from  the  cities  of  Palermo,  Rome,  Naples,  Florence,  Verona, 
Milan,  and  Turin.  Entire  regiments  were  taken  from  these 
cities,  and  volunteers  increased  the  regimental  strength  to  the 
war  footing  of  2600  men.  The  standing  army  was  reinforced 
by  calling  out  the  category  of  reserves  of  1888.  Eighty  thousand 
reserves  were  thus  added  to  the  army  stationed  at  home. 

The  expeditionary  corps  consisted  of  the  following: 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  :    LT.-GENERAL  CANEVA  DI  SALASCO. 

CHIEF  OF  STAFF:     MAJOR  GENERAL  GASTALDELLO. 
FIRST  DIVISION  OF  INFANTRY,  LT.-GENERAL  COUNT  PECORI  GKKALDI. 

1st  brigade.  2nd  brigade. 

82d  infantry.  6th  infantry. 

84th  infantry.  40th  infantry. 

3   squadrons  of  cavalry.  6  batteries  field  artillery. 

SECOND  INFANTRY  DIVISION,  LT.-GENERAL  BRICCOLA. 

3d  brigade.  4tJi  brigade. 
22d  infantry.  4th  infantry. 

68th  infantry.  63d  infantry. 

3  squadrons  of  cavalry.  6  batteries  field  artillery. 

Under  direct  command  of  expedition  commander: 

The  8th  regiment  Bersaglieres.       1  battery  mountain  artillery. 
The  llth  regiment  Bersaglieres.     Several  batteries  field  artillery. 
One  battalion  of  engineers.  One  telegraph  company. 

One  machine  gun  detachment.  Wireless  telegraph  personnel. 

A  company  of  infantry  has  about  200  men,  so  that  the  total 
force  was  about  40,000  men.  They  had  11  flying  machines  of 
French  types.  The  Italian  infantry  had  a  2.5-inch  repeating 


16  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

gun  of  Mannlicher-Careano  type  M-91.  Each  soldier  carried  162 
cartridges,  besides  which  the  transports  had  24  cartridges  per 
man  additional.  Each  company  carried  105  intrenching  tools, 
of  which  80  were  spades.  The  transports  had  144  intrenching 
tools  per  battalion  additional. 

The  Italian  field  artillery  had  3-inch  Krupp  guns  M-1906.  The 
troops  had  a  special  grayish-green  uniform.  After  September 
27th  the  Italian  railroads  were  crowded  with  troops  assembling 
for  the  expedition.  Smaller  detachments  of  troops  were  em- 
barked in  the  transports  at  Naples,  Syracuse  and  Augusta  on 
September  26,  to  be  ready  for  emergency. 

DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AND  NOTICE  TO  NEUTRALS. 

At  2.30  p.  m.,  September  28,  the  Italian  Charge  d 'Affaires  in 
Constantinople  presented  the  Italian  Ultimatum  to  the  Turkish 
government.  This  declared  that  in  order  to  terminate  the  disor- 
ders and  neglect  caused  by  the  Turkish  government  in  Tripoli, 
and  Cyrenaica,  the  Italian  government  demanded  that  Turkey 
should,  within  24  hours,  consent  to  Italy's  military  occupation 
of  those  provinces.  The  Turkish  government  refused  and  at  3 
p.  m.,  September  29,  the  Italian  government  declared  war  be- 
tween Italy  and  Turkey. 

The  Italian  government  proclaimed  its  purpose  to  take  prompt 
measures  for  the  protection  of  Italians  and  all  foreigners  in  Tri- 
poli and  Cyrenaica. 

Neutral  powers  were  notified  that  the  Tripolitan  and  Cyrenai- 
can  coasts  were  blockaded. 

Within  a  few  days  France,  Russia,  Belgium,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Servia,  Bulgaria,  England  and  Japan  issued  neutrality  procla- 
mations. 

The  French  declaration  of  neutrality  stated  that  it  comprised 
the  French  protectorates  including  Crete.  The  English  and  Rus- 
sian governments  endorsed  the  French  proclamation,  and  Italy 
was  relieved  of  the  protection  of  the  Island  of  Crete. 

The  orders  of  the  Turkish  government  to  extinguish  the  coast 
lights  and  remove  sea  marks  on  the  coast  of  Crete  were  annulled 
by  the  united  action  of  all  consuls  in  Crete  before  the  neutrality 
proclamations. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  17 

England  declared  the  island  of  Cyprus  neutral,  and  issued 
orders  for  all  British  subjects  not  to  serve  in  the  armies  of  the 
belligerents.  In  the  middle  of  October  Italy  recognized  the 
neutrality  of  the  island  of  Samos. 

THE  ITALIAN  NAVAL  PROBLEM. 

Before  the  war  began  Italy  notified  her  ministers  to  the  Balkan 
states  that  Italy's  only  object  was  to  take  possession  of  Tripoli 
and  Cyrenaica,  and  she  would  avoid  any  attack  upon  any  other 
Turkish  territory.  The  destruction  of  Turkey's  naval  and  mili- 
tary forces  was  only  contemplated  in  as  far  as  they  opposed 
Italy's  conquest  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica. 

The  Italian  naval  task  was  to  secure  such  a  command  of  the 
sea  that  the  expedition  corps  might  safely  be  transported  and 
landed  on  the  African  coast  and  communication  with  Italy  be 
undisturbed. 

This  task  furnished  three  fields  of  operations: 

1.  The  Tripolitan  waters,  by  which  the  expedition  corps  would 
land.    The  bulk  of  the  navy  was  employed  there. 

2.  The    eastern    Mediterranean,   especially   the   Aegean   sea 
where  the  Turkish  fleet  had  assembled  and  which  must  be  pre- 
vented from  interfering  with  the  landing  of  the  Italian  forces. 
For  this  purpose  light  scouting  vessels  were  used. 

3.  The  Albanian  coast,  where  a  number  of  Turkish  torpedo- 
boats  should  be  held  in  check.     For  this  some  older  armored 
cruisers  and  several  destroyers  were  used. 

EVENTS  ON  THE  TRIPOLITAN  COAST  AFTER  DECLARATION  OF  WAR 
UNTIL  THE  ARRIVAL  OF  THE  EXPEDITIONARY  CORPS. 

The  Italian  government  declared  a  blockade  of  the  coast  of 
Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  extending  from  the  Egyptian  to  the  Tuni- 
sian borders.  Violations  of  the  blockade  were  prosecuted  accord- 
ing to  International  law  and  Italian  treaties  with  other  powers. 

The  blockade  of  the  coast,  700  nautical  miles,  was  made  ef- 
fective by  seven  battleships  and  a  number  of  destroyers  and 
special  ships.  Ships  of  the  blockade  replenished  fuel  supply  by 
going  to  Augusta  singly  as  necessary.  At  the  outbreak  of  war 
Italy  had  stored  14,000  tons  of  coal  at  the  naval  base  at  Au- 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR  19 

gusta.    The  naval  repair  ship  Vulcano  was  stationed  at  Augusta. 

After  some  discussion  the  Turkish  forces  at  Tripoli  decided  to 
evacuate  the  city  with  the  exception  of  150  coast  artillery  sta- 
tioned in  the  forts.  The  troops  began  the  evacuation  September 
27,  and  quietly  proceeded  to  intrench  in  the  hills  south  of  the 
ijity  and  two  days'  march  distant.  The  Italians  were  kept  in- 
formed of  all  that  transpired  in  the  city  through  the  Mayor, 
Prince  Hassuna  Karamanli,  who  had  declared  his  adhesion  to 
Italy. 

September  30  the  Italians  demanded  the  city  should  be  sur- 
rendered on  October  2,  but  this  was  still  further  postponed  until 
October  3,  at  noon.  No  reply  havng  been  received,  Vice- Admiral 
Faravelli,  in  command  of  the  naval  forces,  opened  fire  on  the 
forts. 

The  Benedetto  Brin  and  the  training  ship  division,  with  two 
transports  and  several  torpedo-boats  arrived  and  relieved  the 
Roma,  Pisa,  Napoli  and  Amalfi  that  had  been  blockading  Tripoli, 
and  which  left  to  join  the  flagship  to  the  eastward. 

THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  TRIPOLI,  OCTOBER  3  AND  4,  1911. 

In  the  bombardment,  the  Sicilia,  Sardegna,  and  Re  Umberto 
were  assigned  to  engage  Fort  Sultanje  on  the  west;  the  Bene- 
detto Brin,  Carlo  Alberto,  and  Emanuele  Filberto  engaged  the 
three  old  stone  forts  in  the  center  on  the  mole  on  north  side  of 
the  town;  and  the  Garibaldi  and  Ferrucio  engaged  Fort  Ham- 
idje  to  the  eastward. 

The  Varese,  Coatit,  and  16  destroyers  and  four  auxiliaries 
were  stationed  to  the  rear  and  on  the  flanks  to  prevent  any  sur- 
prise from  seaward. 

Fire  was  opened  at  3.15  at  a  range  of  7000  yards,  by  the  flag- 
ship. The  forts  replied  immediately,  but  all  their  shots  fell  short. 
The  Italians  fired  chiefly  with  the  6  and  8-inch  guns,  and  they 
soon  proved  effective.  The  heavy  guns  were  not  used,  probably 
to  preserve  them  and  avoid  too  much  expenditure  of  ammuni- 
tion. The  hits  were  few  and  the  fire  very  slow,  many  shells 
failed  to  explode  and  were  subsequently  picked  up  several  thou- 
sand yards  beyond  in  the  suburbs. 

The  old  stone  forts  ceased  firing  at  5  p.  m.,  but  the  two  outer 
forts  continued  firing  until  sunset,  at  6  p.  m. 


20  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

Though  the  buildings  in  the  city  were  avoided,  fires  were 
started  in  several,  and  the  governor's  palace  was  hit  a  number 
of  times.  The  new  lighthouse  was  completely  destroyed.  After 
dark  the  ships  got  under  way  and  cruised  in  the  offing  with 
screened  lights. 

At  6  a.  m.  the  bombardment  was  resumed  with  greater  vigor, 
and  the  other  forts  were  silenced  in  the  following  hour.  Fort 
Sultanje  made  the  greatest  resistance.  Ten  dead  were  found  in 
that  fort  subsequently. 

OCCUPATION  OP  TRIPOLI  BY  THE  NAVAL  LANDING  FORCE. 

While  the  mob  in  the  city  sacked  the  government  buildings, 
the  garrison  evacuated  the  forts,  taking  their  light  guns  to  the 
heights  in  the  southern  suburbs,  from  which  they  reopened  fire 
but  were  soon  silenced  by  shrapnel  from  the  ships.  The  ships 
ceased  firing  at  11  a.  m.  The  Garibaldi  was  the  first  ship  to  en- 
ter close  in  and  she  landed  a  detachment  with  two  officers  in 
Fort  Hamidje  that  had  been  evacuated  by  the  Turks.  They  ren- 
dered the  breech  mechanisms  of  the  guns  therein  useless  and  re- 
turned on  board. 

At  the  same  time  a  torpedo-boat  searched  for  the  cable  of 
mines  laid  out  in  the  harbor  but  could  not  find  it. 

All  the  coast  forts  were  severely  damaged  and  their  guns 
partly  dismounted.  According  to  Turkish  reports,  their  garrison 
lost  12  men  killed  and  23  severely  wounded.  Seven  civilians 
were  killed  in  the  city,  but  DO  Europeans.  The  Italian  ships  suf- 
fered no  losses  nor  any  damage  from  the  Turkish  fire. 

At  noon,  October  4,  the  large  ships  anchored  in  the  offiug  and 
smaller  ships  entered  the  harbor.  October  5,  a  landing  force  of 
1200  men  under  command  of  the  captain  of  the  Sicilia  occupied 
Forts  Sultanje,  Hamidje  and  the  Lighthouse  Fort,  as  well  as  the 
consulate  and  other  important  places  without  any  opposition. 
The  Italian  flag  was  hoisted  on  Fort  Sultanje  at  noon  and  sa- 
luted by  the  fleet.  Shortly  after  this  Fort  Hamidje 's  magazine 
blew  up  and  that  store  of  Turkish  ammunition  was  destroyed. 
It  is  not  known  if  this  was  done  by  the  Italians  or  by  the  Turks. 

The  landing  force  immediately  arranged  for  the  defence  of  the 
city  and  established  its  government.  Bear- Admiral  Borea-Ricci 
was  appointed  provisional  governor,  and  the  former  mayor,  Has- 
suna  Karamanli,  was  appointed  vice-governor. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  21 

They  proceeded  to  substitute  a  temporary  lighthouse  for  that 
which  they  had  destroyed.  The  cable  to  Malta  was  repaired  and 
preparations  were  begun  to  provide  quarters  for  the  expedition 
corps  that  was  expected  to  arrive  October  11. 

A  native  police  was  established,  and  by  offering  payment  some 
of  the  natives  were  induced  to  surrender  the  arms,  which  the 
Turkish  officials  had  supplied  them.  Within  a  few  hours  1500 
Mauser  rifles  were  deposited  with  the  Italian  officers,  and  by 
October  12,  3250  rifles  had  been  delivered. 

During  the  next  day  when  the  Garibaldi,  Varese,  and  Ferrucio 
had  departed  for  Augusta  to  coal,  the  landing  party  ashore  had 
several  skirmishes  with  the  Turks.  October  8  they  repulsed  an 
attack  at  Behare,  and  October  19  another  attack  at  Bu  Meliana 
Wells,  about  1.5  miles  southwest  of  Tripoli.  As  Fort  Sultanje 
was  much  exposed,  the  Italians  abondoned  it  and  it  was  blown 
up.  The  ships  supported  the  troops  during  these  engagements 
and  bombarded  the  Turkish  forts  used  as  bases  beyond  the  sub- 
urbs. The  Turkish  forces  assembled  at  Gharian  in  the  hills,  two 
days'  march  from  Tripoli.  General  Munir  Pasha  was  relieved 
by  Colonel  Neschat  in  command  during  the  middle  of  October, 
who  gathered  all  the  forces  of  the  province.  At  first  he  had  a 
force  of  about  10,000  regulars  and  10,000  territorial  irregulars, 
the  latter  volunteering  for  the  war. 

Tobruk,  on  the  Cyrenaiea  coast,  a  fine  natural  harbor,  was  at- 
tacked by  the  first  squadron  on  October  4.  A  force  of  400  men 
landed  and  soon  overcame  the  brave  resistance  of  the  garrison  of 
25  men.  The  Italians  took  possession  and  established  an  Italian 
municipal  administration.  Single  ships  of  the  first  squadron  al- 
ternately remained  at  anchor  in  that  harbor.  October  10  the  first 
detachment  of  the  expeditionary  army  landed  at  Tobruk.  This 
was  the  first  battalion  of  the  40th  Infantry,  with  some  coast  ar- 
tillery and  engineers — about  1000  in  all.  They  had  sailed  from 
Naples  October  6. 

Derna  was  bombarded  October  8,  and  40  Italian  citizens  who 
were  confined  there  were  released.  The  place  was  bombarded 
because  they  had  fired  upon  the  Italian  boat  with  flag  of  truce. 

EVENTS  ON  THE  ALBANIAN  COAST. 

Before  the  war  six  new  Turkish  torpedo  boats  were  at  Prevesa, 
Gomenitza  and  Durazzo  to  prevent  smuggling.  They  had  not 


22  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

received  the  orders  of  the  Turkish  Naval  Minister  to  take  refuge 
in  Austrian  ports  when  they  were  attacked  by  the  destroyers  of 
the  Duke  of  Abruzzia's  command. 

At  4  p.  m.,  September  29,  one  hour  after  war  had  been  de- 
clared, the  Italians  sighted  the  two  Turkish  torpedo-boats,  Takat 
and  Anatolia,  at  sea  between  Corfu  and  Prevesa,  steering  north- 
westward. The  Italians  opened  fire,  to  which  the  Turkish  boats 
replied  feebly.  The  Takat  steered  north,  followed  by  three  de- 
stroyers, while  the  Anatolia  steered  south,  chased  by  two  de- 
stroyers. The  Takat  was  hit  fifteen  times,  and,  on  fire  she  ran 
on  the  beach  near  Nikopolis  and  was  totally  destroyed.  Her  com- 
mander and  eight  men  were  killed  or  drowned.  The  Anatolia 
escaped  to  Prevesa  uninjured.  The  Italian  destroyers  were  not 
damaged  in  this  action.  They  fired  100  shots  from  3-inch  guns. 

September  30  the  Italian  destroyers  Artigliere  and  Corazziere 
attacked  the  Turkish  torpedo-boats  Alpagot  and  Hamid-Abad 
lying  at  anchor  at  Prevesa,  and  sank  them.  An  officer  from  the 
Corazziere  having  landed  the  night  before  had  definitely  ascer- 
tained their  positions.  The  Turkish  crews,  excepting  one  man, 
escaped.  The  destroyers  then  entered  the  harbor.  The  mob  on 
shore  fired  on  the  Corazziere  as  she  proceeded  to  take  the  steam 
yacht  Tetied  out.  The  Corazziere  fired  at  the  mob  and  both  de- 
stroyers left  with  the  steam  yacht  in  tow. 

The  fort  at  Prevesa  is  an  old  stone  fort  built  during  the  Vene- 
tian period,  but  armed  with  20  modern  field  guns  and  five  6-inch 
Krupp  guns.  This  fort  did  not  fire  on  the  Italians,  though  the 
latter  fired  76  shells  during  the  engagement  that  lasted  45  min- 
utes. The  garrison  was  surprised. 

This  gave  rise  to  exaggerated  rumors  of  an  attack  and  landing 
of  Italians  at  Prevesa,  which  the  Italian  government  denied  and 
repeated  the  orders  to  avoid  landing  on  any  Turkish  territory  in 
Europe.  The  Duke  of  Abruzzia  was  directed  to  revoke  his  threat 
of  a  bombardment  of  Prevesa  within  24  hours,  on  October  3,  if 
the  gunboat  and  two  torpedo-boats  in  Prevesa  were  not  delivered 
to  him.  At  the  request  of  the  Austrian  government  the  Italians 
recalled  the  Duke  of  Abruzzia  with  all  the  Italian  ships  from 
that  coast. 

October  5  a  motor  boat  of  the  destroyer  Artigliere,  that  had 
been  searching  an  Austrian  mail  steamer  in  the  harbor  of  San 
Giovanni,  was  fired  on  by  some  field  guns  in  an  earthwork  at  that 


THE    TTALIAN-TUBKI8H    WAE.  23 

place.  The  Artigliere  had  not  yet  received  the  orders  to  re- 
turn to  Tarento  and  she  opened  fire  on  the  earthwork,  and 
in  the  course  of  45  minutes  expended  all  her  ammunition.  She 
silenced  the  fort  and  injured  a  number  of  buildings  in  the  city. 
The  Artigliere  was  slightly  damaged  and  her  commander  was 
wounded.  In  the  meanwhile  the  Carabiniere  arrived  and  opened 
fire  on  the  earthworks,  and  left  after  firing  for  a  period  of  20 
minutes.  After  these  events  the  Italian  government  again  de- 
clared that  every  possible  precaution  should  be  taken  hereafter 
to  avoid  all  warlike  operations  in  the  Adriatic  sea. 

October  7  the  Duke  of  Abruzzia's  squadron  again  proceeded  to 
blockade  the  Turkish  torpedo-boats  in  their  ports  on  the  Al- 
banian coast. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  AEGEAN  SEA. 

The  Italians  sent  but  small  naval  forces  to  the  Aegean  sea, 
chiefly  scouting  torpedo  vessels.  September  30  a  panic  was  cre- 
ated at  Smyrna,  Salonica  and  Mityleni  by  the  appearance  of 
passing  Italian  warships.  Probably  the  Vittorio-Emanuele, 
Roma  and  Pisa  on  a  cruise,  searching  for  the  Turkish  practice 
squadron. 

In  Constantinople  fears  were  entertained  for  the  safety  of  the 
Turkish  practice  squadron  that  had  sailed  from  Beirut  at  10  a. 
m.,  September  28,  for  the  Dardanelles.  This  squadron  was  com- 
posed of  two  battleships,  two  cruisers,  nine  destroyers  and  a  tor- 
pedo-boat mothership.  They  had  no  knowledge  of  war  having 
been  declared.  The  squadron  steamed  at  economical  speed  to 
the  southwest  coast  of  Cyprus,  practicing  evolutions  en  route. 
Near  the  island  of  Kos,  at  4  p.  m.,  October  1,  a  Turkish  govern- 
ment steamer  informed  them  of  the  declaration  of  war.  The 
British  officers  in  the  squadron  then  decided  to  remain  on  board 
until  their  arrival  at  the  Dardanelles.  The  squadron  then  pro- 
ceeded at  full  speed  between  Mityleni  and  the  mainland,  and 
safely  anchored  at  Nagara  in  the  Dardanelles  that  evening. 

Vice-Admiral  Williams,  of  the  British  navy,  and  other  British 
officers  left  the  squadron.  On  October  4  the  squadron  made  a 
short  cruise  out  of  the  Dardanelles,  but  returned  the  next  day 
and  anchored  off  Constantinople  and  remained  there  until  Octo- 
ber 16.  In  the  meantime  the  harbors  of  Salonica,  Smyrna, 


24  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

Beirut,  and  the  approaches  to  the  Dardenelles  were  mined. 
Single  Italian  cruisers  were  seen  in  the  Aegean  sea  on  October 
4  and  6.  Three  Italian  destroyers  appeared  off  Mityleni  on 
October  15. 

THE  TRANSPORTATION  OP  THE  ITALIAN  EXPEDITION  CORPS. 

The  Italian  Navy  Department  collected  60  steamers  of  1300 
to  9200  gross  tonnage  at  Naples,  Palermo  and  Genoa.  A  naval 
officer  was  in  command  of  each  transport  with  25  sailors  of  the 
navy.  Those  transports  that  were  subventioned  as  auxiliaries 
for  war  were  armed.  All  the  details  of  embarkation,  loading  and 
routes  for  the  single  transports  or  in  a  fleet  were  successfully 
kept  profound  secret.  The  expedition  corps  was  divided  into 
two  divisions.  The  first  division  was  sent  to  Tripoli  and  the 
second  to  the  ports  of  Cyrenaica.  The  van  sailed  in  five  trans- 
ports from  Genoa,  via  Naples,  on  October  6  for  Tobruk  with 
some  troops  and  material  of  the  second  division,  and  arrived 
October  10: 

October  9,  62  transports  sailed  from  different  Italian  ports. 
Twelve  transports  with  the  staff  of  the  expeditionary  corps  and 
the  first  division  with  nine  additional  transports  sailed  from 
Palermo  for  Tripoli.  Within  Italian  waters  the  fleet  steamed 
in  single  column  of  vessels,  with  cruisers  and  torpedo  boats 
ahead  and  on  the  flanks.  After  leaving  the  Sicilian  coast  they 
formed  double  column,  and  in  two  groups,  the  first  group  of  19 
transports  and  the  second  of  14  transports.  Speed  was  10  knots. 
Two  battleships  and  several  destroyers  were  in  the  van,  and  like- 
wise two  battleships  in  the  rear  with  more  torpedo  destroyers. 

Destroyers  also  were  disposed  to  form  a  chain  of  outposts 
along  the  course  between  Tripoli  and  Augusta,  the  naval  base. 
The  first  squadron  was  stationed  in  the  passages  from  the  Aegean 
sea  to  the  Mediterranean  to  prevent  any  interference  by  the 
enemy's  squadron.  The  naval  commander-in-chief  was,  at  the 
departure  of  the  convoy,  at  Augusta. 

Good  weather  was  experienced  and  the  first  group  arrived  at 
Tripoli  October  12 ;  the  second  group  arrived  October  15.  These 
were  preceded  by  the  Varese  convoying  two  transports  and  a 
hospital  ship. 

The  disembarking  was  accomplished  by  means  of  the  ships' 
boats  with  a  large  number  of  large  fishing  smacks  from  the  island 


THE    ITALIAN-TUBKISH   WAR.  25 

of  Lampedusa.  The  landing  proceeded  at  Tripoli  without  inter- 
ruption. The  troops  from  the  first  group  were  all  landed  by 
October  15,  and  those  of  the  second  group  by  October  18,  a  total 
of  20,000  men  being  landed  from  the  two  groups. 

Immediately  upon  landing  the  army  took  the  positions  held  by 
the  naval  landing  parties,  and  especially  the  entrenchments  at 
the  14  wells  of  Bu  Meliana,  which  had  been  the  repeated  object 
of  attack  by  the  Turks.  The  engineers  immediately  began  to 
build  entrenchments  around  the  city.  The  army  was  promptly 
engaged  with  the  Turks,  who  made  night  attacks  on  Bu  Meliana 
on  October  15,  16  and  18,  both  sides  suffering  losses  in  killed  and 
wounded. 

October  13,  20  transports  sailed  from  Naples  with  the  second 
division,  about  9000  men,  and  arrived  off  Benghasi  October  18, 
having  experienced  bad  weather  on  the  passage.  This  convoy  was 
escorted  by  four  battleships  of  the  first  division,  three  cruisers, 
one  destroyer  and  the  two  seagoing  torpedo-boat  divisions.  This 
group  was  followed  by  transports  that  left  Naples  between  Octo- 
ber 15  and  20  with  the  rest  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division, 
about  6000  men.  With  these  the  transportation  of  the  expedi- 
tion corps  was  practically  completed. 

EVENTS  IN  THE  RED  SEA  AND  VICINITY  OP  SUEZ  CANAL. 

For  the  protection  of  the  Italian  colony  of  Erythrea,  the  Are- 
tusa,  Volturna  and  Staff  eta  were  cruising  in  the  Red  Sea  and,  on 
October  2,  1911,  engaged  the  Turkish  destroyer  Prik-i-Schewket 
which  fled  into  the  harbor  of  Hodeida,  the  Italians  then  engaged 
the  ships  and  forts  and  withdrew  after  sinking  a  custom  house 
motor  boat.  The  Italian  garrison  in  Erythrea  was  reinforced 
from  the  3700  Italian  regulars  to  10,000  men  by  recruiting  na- 
tives. The  cruiser  Puglia  landed  5  and  6-inch  guns  that  were 
mounted  on  the  works  at  Massowah. 

September  30  the  Turkish  armored  coast  defence  ship  Muin-i- 
Zafer  that  had  been  stationed  at  Beirut  arrived  at  Port  Said 
and  the  Turkish  transport  Kaiseri  with  700  Turkish  troops  came 
from  Hodeida.  Several  days  later  a  Russian  transport  also  ar- 
rived from  Hodeida  with  800  Turkish  troops.  As  the  Turkish 
vessels  did  not  leave  within  24  hours  the  Italian  and  British  con- 
suls protested  and  the  Turkish  troops  were  landed  and  taken  to 
the  hospital  because  of  the  prevalence  of  cholera.  The  troops 


26 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAE. 


were  subsequently  sent  under  Egyptian  escort  to  Palestine. 

The  Muin-i-Zafer  and  an  old  Turkish  gunboat  were  disarmed, 
their  guns  and  ammunition  being  landed  at  Port  Said. 
CHART  OP  RED  SEA. 


Jo* 


THE  CRUISER  WAR. 

When  war  was  declared  both  belligerents  proceeded  to  seize 
unarmed  vessels  of  the  enemy.  The  Italians  began  by  seizing 
two  steamers  carrying  small  detachments  of  Turkish  troops  off 
the  Albanian  coast,  and  the  Turks  seized  an  Italian  steamer  in 
the  Dardanelles  loaded  with  grain  and  lumber.  Subsequently, 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  27 

large  vessels  were  not  seized,  and  prizes  were  limited  to  smaller 
craft. 

The  Hague  Convention  and  London  Conference  on  Interna- 
tional Law  were  proclaimed  by  both  belligerents  to  be  respected, 
though  neither  had  ratified  the  Hague  Convention  which  had 
been  signed  by  their  representatives.  The  Turks  were  not  even 
represented  at  the  London  Conference. 

The  Italian  government  proclaimed  that  contraband  of  war  in- 
cluded guns  and  weapons  of  all  description,  ammunition  and  all 
material  that  may  be  used  in  war  or  be  directly  serviceable  for 
the  land  and  naval  forces.  The  Turkish  government  issued  a 
similar  proclamation.  To  avoid  conflict  with  Russia  theJTjuridsh 
government  agreed  to  permit  neutral  vessels  to  pass  throughTtEe 
Dardanelles  from  Black  Sea  ports,  provided  they  did  not  take 
contraband  of  war  and  even  permitted  neutral  ships  to  pass 
bound  for  Italian  ports  in  case  their  cargoes  were  not  consigned 
to  the  Italian  government  or  to  be  of  service  for  the  military  or 
naval  forces  of  Italy. 

Prize  courts  were  established  by  both  belligerents  during  Oc^ 
tober. 

THE  OCCUPATION  OP  BENGHASI. 

The  official  report  of  Lieutenant-General  Briccola  gives  the 
following  details  of  the  operations  at  Benghasi : 

On  October  18^  a  fleet  of  eight  transports  convoyed  by  the 
Vittorio  Emanuele,  Regina  Elena,  Roma,  Napoli,  Piemonte 
Liguria  and  Etruria  with  five  destroyers  and  seven  high-sea  tor- 
pedo boats  arrived  off  Benghasi  with  the  staff  and  half  of  the 
Second  Infantry  Division.  Admiral  Aubry's  demand  for  the 
surrender  of  the  city  was  refused  by  Chakir  Bey,  who  had  a  force 
of  400  regulars  and  2500  irregular  troops  with  two  rapid  fire 
batteries. 

The  Italians  opened  fire  the  next  morning  at  a  range  of  1000 
meters  on  the  entrenchments  at  Berca  to  the  southward,  and  on 
the  lighthouse  and  magazine  to  the  northward.  At  the  same 
time,  8  a.  m.,  the  squadron  landing  force  of  800  men  and  four 
guns  disembarked,  followed  by  the  troops  disembarking  by 
means  of  the  ships'  boats,  13  pontoon  floats  and  lighters  from 
Tripoli. 

The  first  sailor  company  landed  at  8.50  on  the  Guiliana  beach 


28 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR 


2000  yards  south  of  the  city.  One  detachment  went  along  the 
beach  and  occupied  the  Christian  cemetery  on  a  sand  dune  10 
meters  high.  Pioneers  followed  the  first  landing  party  and  fa- 
cilitated landing  by  five  pontoon  landing  stages.  Major-General 
Ameglio  landed  and  took  command.  The  Turkish  troops  sta- 
tioned north  of  the  city,  to  oppose  landing  there,  rapidly  rein- 


MAP  OF  BENGHASI. 


forced  those  at  Berca  and  vigorously  attacked  the  center  and 
right  flank  of  the  Italians.  The  ships  bombarded  the  Turkish 
position,  but  the  sailors  in  the  cemetery  were  exposed  to  a  heavy 
fire  and  also  in  danger  of  the  shells  from  the  fleet,  so  that  they 
were  obliged  to  temporarily  abandon  the  cemetery.  The  torpedo 
boat  Orsa  with  several  armed  ships'  boats  proceeded  to  the  cus- 
tom house  wharf  to  see  if  the  Turkish  troops  had  evacuated  the 


THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  29 

city,  but  they  were  met  with  such  a  heavy  fire  from  the  troops 
concealed  there  that  they  withdrew.  The  fleet  then  directed  a 
heavy  fire  on  the  custom  house,  which  was  completely  demol- 
ished. 

At  11.30  General  Ameglio  occupied  the  sand  dunes  back  of 
Buscaiba  Point  with  the  sailors  and  two  companies  of  infantry. 

The  landing  of  the  fourth  and  sixty-third  infantry  regiments 
was  delayed  by  the  heavy  seas  until  3  p.  m.  At  3.30  these  troops 
proceeded  to  attack  the  Berca  barracks,  supported  by  fire  from 
the  ships.  General  Briccola  landed  and  took  command,  the 
troops  fighting  until  sunset  against  the  Turks  intrenched  at  the 
barracks.  The  little  town  of  Sidi  Daub  was  obstinately  defend- 
ed, and  a  house  to  house  resistance  was  encountered  in  the 
streets  of  the  village. 

The  Turks  were  obliged  to  retreat  to  the  city  towards  evening 
while  the  Italians,  for  lack  of  ammunition,  remained  intrenched 
at  Berca.  During  the  night  the  Italians  landed  more  of  the 
troops  so  that  their  total  force  ashore  amounted  to  6000  men. 

At  the  urgent  request  of  General  Briccola  the  ships  opened 
fire  on  the  southern  portion  of  the  city  of  Benghasi,  the  Euro- 
pean quarter,  using  searchlights.  The.  b^mj2aj^ment_lasted_2p 
minutes  and  drove  the  Turkish  troops  out  of  the  city  ;  but  it  also 
destroyed  many  buildings,  including  the  British  and  Italian 
consulates,  and  killed  many  citizens,  including  12  Europeans, 
mostly  British  subjects.  Admiral  Aubry  bombarded  the  city 
only  after  repeated  and  urgent  appeals  from  General  Briccola, 
as  he  had  declared  before  beginning  hostilities  that  the  fleet 
would  not  bombard  the  city. 

October  29  the  Turks  evacuated  the  city,  which  was  at  once 
occupied  by  the  Italians.  The  Turks  withdrew  to  the  elevated 
plateau  east  of  the  city  and  established  headquarters  at  Bu 
Marian,  about  20  miles  from  the  coast. 

The  sailor  landing  parties  re-embarked,  but  left  their  guns 
ashore  to  reinforce  the  field  artillery.  The  Italians^  reported  a 
loss  of  oG  killed  and  S8  wounded,  and  estimated  the  Turkish  loss 
;tt  200  killed  and  v 


A  few  days  later  the  fourth  infantry  brigade  at  Benghasi  was 
reinforced  by  the  68th  regiment  of  the  second  brigade.  The 
Arabs  along  the  coast  of  Benghasi  joined  the  Italians,  while  the 
Arabs  from  the  interior  reinforced  the  Turkish  troops. 


30  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

Enver  Bey,  formerly  military  attache  at  Berlin,  commanded 
the  Turkish  forces.  Frequent  skirmishes  followed,  hut  without 
decisive  results.  The  Turks  were  usually  repulsed  hy  the  shell 
fire  from  the  ships. 

THE  OCCUPATION  OF  DERNA. 

The  Pisa,  Amalfi,  San  Marco,  Napoli,  Agordat  and  Coatit, 
with  three  destroyers  and  several  transports  with  troops,  arrived 
off  Derna,  October  15,  and  negotiations  for  the  surrender  of  the 
town  failed.  The  Pisa  then  bombarded  the  town  for  45  minutes. 
The  fire  was  directed  against  the  barracks  and  a  small  fort  with 
two  light  guns.  The  fire  was  slow  at  rate  of  one  shot  per  minute. 
As  this  was  not  answered  a  boat  with  flag  of  truce  was  sent  in, 
but  was  met  with  a  volley  of  rifle  fire.  The  four  armored  cruisers 
then  opened  fire  on  the  town  with  6-inch  and  7.6-inch  guns  and 
in  the  course  of  30  minutes  completely  destroyed  it.  A  landing 
party  of  500  men,  escorted  by  the  destroyers,  attempted  to  land 
at  2  p.  m.,  but  owing  to  the  rough  sea  and  heavy  infantry  fire 
from  the  Turks  intrenched  on  the  beach  this  attempt  was  re- 
pulsed. The  ships  then  shelled  the  beach  until  4  p.  in.  The  next 
day  a  strong  northeast  wind  and  heavy  seas  prevented  any  at- 
tempt to  land. 

October  18  the  Turks  evacuated  the  place  and  1500  men  of  the 
Alpine  chasseurs  with  pioneers  and  field  artillery  took  posses- 
sion. 

After  this  there  were  daily  skirmishes  and  the  Turks  gave  the 
Italians  no  rest.  The  Arabs  from  the  interior  reinforced  the 
Turks  daily,  and  on  October  25  the  Italians  were  reinforced  by 
the  22d  infantry  regiment. 

October  28  the  Turks  succeeded  in  capturing  several  guns  and 
ammunition  in  an  attack  upon  the  Italians,  but  the  fire  of  the 
ships  drove  them  back  and  the  Italians  were  not  dislodged. 

THE  OCCUPATIC.;   IF  HOMS. 

October  16  the  Varese,  Arpi  and  four  transports  with  the 
eighth  Bersaglieri  regiment  having  six  field  guns  were  sent  from 
Tripoli  to  take  possession  of  Horns.  The  Turkish  commander  re- 
fused to  surrender  and  as  heavy  seas  and  bad  weather  prevented 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR  31 

landing  during  the  first  three  days  the  Varese  and  Marco  Polo 
that  arrived  on  the  17th,  bombarded  the  castle  and  intrench- 
ments  on  its  flanks.  The  Italians  estimated  the  Turks  at  500 
regular  and  1000  irregular  troops.  The  weather  moderated  on 
October  21  and  the  Italians  landed  after  overcoming  a  stubborn 
resistance.  Two  Italian  boats  capsized.  The  Turks  subsequently 
frequently  attacked  the  Italians,  but  were,  as  usual,  repulsed  by 
fire  from  the  ships. 

THE  ITALIAN  MILITARY  POSITION  AT  TRIPOLI  IN  OCTOBER,  1911. 

The  first  corps  of  the  Italians  were  intrenched  around  the  city 
of  Tripoli  from  Fort  Gagaresch  2  kilometers  west  of  the  city  to 
Scharaschat  3  kilometers  east.  The  right  flank  extended  from 
Gagaresch  to  Bu  Meliana  and  was  held  by  the  63d  regiment. 
The  82d  and  80th  regiments  held  the  center  from  Bu  Meliana  to 
the  village  Henni,  they  occupied  the  cavalry  barracks  and  Fort 
Mesri.  The  llth  Bersaglieri  regiment  occupied  the  left  flank 
from  Henni  to  Scharaschat.  Serving  as  reserves,  in  rear,  at  the 
extreme  flanks,  the  naval  landing  brigades  from  the  training 
ships  squadron  and  a  part  of  the  4th  infantry  were  stationed. 

The  desert  afforded  unobstructed  view  of  the  approaches  on 
the  right  flank,  so  that  the  Turks  were  there  exposed  to  the  gun 
fire  from  the  ships.  The  center  was  opposite  the  edge  of  the 
oasis  and  the  left  flank  faced  the  oasis  where  elevations,  trees, 
garden  walls  and  buildings  obstructed  the  view  of  the  country 
beyond. 

It  was  difficult  to  reconnoiter  this  country  and  the  Italians 
used  aeroplanes,  three  aeroplanes  at  Benghasi  and  six  at  Tripoli. 
The  first  aeroplane  was  used  on  November  1,  from  which  hand 
grenades  were  thrown  upon  the  Turkish  camp  at  Ain  Zara. 

The  Italians  used  a  hand  grenade  invented  by  Lieutenant  Ci- 
pelli,  of  the  navy,  who  was  killed  by  an  explosion  of  one  of  these 
grenades.  These  Cipelli  grenades  are  made  at  Spezia.  They  are 
formed  of  a  steel  shell,  about  the  size  of  an  orange,  filled  with 
picrate  acid.  A  cap  is  inserted  just  before  the  grenade  is  to  be 
used.  It  is  exploded  by  a  steel  ball  that  is  withheld  in  position 
by  means  of  a  safety  pin  that  is  removed  immediately  before  the 
hand  grenade  is  thrown.  The  steel  ball  is  held  in  place  after  the 
removal  of  the  safety  pin  by  pressure  of  the  hand.  In  case  the 


#•'•    .,!•      ,  '"'/x^ 

'V-'  >^ 


34  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

aviator  is  alone  in  his  flight  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  use  one 
hand  on  the  steering  gear  while  he  holds  the  grenade  between  his 
knees  to  remove  the  safety  pin  with  the  other  hand.  The  use  of 
the  aeroplanes  at  Tripoli  was  much  limited  by  the  winds  and 
dust  from  the  sandy  desert. 

The  Italians  suffered  for  lack  of  water,  as  the  available  wells 
were  not  sufficient  to  supply  them  with  water.  Naval  waterboats 
were  in  constant  service  transporting  water  from  Sicily  to  Tri- 
poli. 

Cholera  prevailed,  and  during  the  first  weeks  the  Italian  army 
suffered  a  loss  of  25  to  30  men  daily,  who  died  from  cholera.  The 
mortality  among  the  civilians  in  Tripoli  was  much  greater. 

THE  TURKISH  POSITION  AROUND  TRIPOLI. 

The  Turkish  garrison  of  2870  men  withdrew  to  Ain  Zara, 
about  five  miles  south  of  Tripoli,  with  their  main  body  at  Zan- 
zur,  12  miles  southwest  of  the  city.  Their  outposts  were  close  to 
the  Italian  lines.  By  strenuous  work  the  Turkish  commander, 
Colonel  Neschat  Bey,  organized  an  effective  force,  which  he  re- 
cruited from  the  natives  by  volunteers,  to  20,000  men  by  Novem- 
ber 1,  and  which  was  being  daily  reinforced.  These  volunteers 
were  good  riflemen  and  marksmen,  but  undisciplined.  The  chief 
bases  for  recruits  were  at  Aziziah,  Kasr  Gharian,  and  Kasr  Vef- 
fren,  from  40  to  75  miles  south  of  Tripoli. 

ENGAGEMENTS  AT  TRIPOLI  DURING  NOVEMBER,  1911. 

A  series  of  attacks  on  the  Italians  were  made  in  force  by  the 
Turks  with  6000  men  on  October  23-26,  chiefly  against  the  Ital- 
ian center  and  left  flank.  These  attacks  were  supported  by  a 
revolt  of  the  people  in  the  city  that  was  suppressed  with  great 
loss  by  the  llth  Bersaglieri  regiment.  The  Sicilia  and  Sardegna 
participated  in  the  defence  of  positions  on  the  left  flank  by  shell- 
ing the  Turks.  The  Turks  were  finally  repulsed,  but  they  gained 
position  by  captui'ing  Bu  Meliana,  Henni  and  Fort  Mesri  with 
several  field  guns,  machine  guns  and  other  war  material,  to- 
gether with  about  100  prisoners. 

The  Italians  were  obliged  to  take  up  a  new  position  that  ex- 
tended from  the  right  flank  to  Feschlum  and  Schara  Zaniet.  The 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  35 

Turks  took  possession  of  the  forts  around  the  city,  and,  on  Octo- 
ber 31,  they  began  to  bombard  the  city  from  Fort  Hamidje.  They 
were  soon  silenced  by  the  gun  fire  of  the  Carlo  Alberto  and 
Lampo. 

In  the  battles  of  October  23  and  26  the  Italians  lost  382  killed 
and  1158  wounded.  The  Italians  estimated  the  Turks  lost  1000. 

The  civilians  who  participated  in  the  revolt  were  arrested  and 
about  100  were  convicted  and  shot.  It  was  reported  that  a  much 
larger  number  of  civilians  were  executed,  some  stating  over  400, 
but  this  has  not  been  verified  and  was  denied  by  the  Italian  gov- 
ernment. It  was  reported  that  some  of  the  irregular  Arab  troops, 
who  had  expended  their  ammunition  and  surrendered,  were 
shot.  In  consequence  of  these  reports  the  Turkish  government 
protested  against  the  inhumanity  of  the  Italians  to  the  Hague 
court.  The  Italians  claim  that  the  native  population  were  only 
treated  as  absolutely  necessary  for  self-defence.  General  Caneva 
then  sent  3000  of  the  citizens  as  prisoners  of  war  to  Gaeta  and 
the  Islands  of  Ustica  and  Tremiti.  He  also  compulsorily  dis- 
armed all  the  natives. 

The  Italians  were  reinforced  by  fresh  troops  from  Italy  to  the 
number  of  30,000  men  by  November  7,  after  which  they  began  to 
retake  the  positions  formerly  occupied.  The  fifth  brigade  of  in- 
fantry that  had  just  arrived  recaptured  Fort  Hamidje  with  dif- 
ficulty. The  training  ship  division  shelled  Fort  A-Sultanje,  and 
C-Fort  Gargaresch.  Two  battalions  made  a  reconnoissance  in 
force  towards  Ain  Zara  and  Zansur. 

The  Turks  made  a  series  of  attacks  after  November  9,  but 
were  repulsed  by  shell  fire  from  the  ships  Liguria,  Carlo  Alberto, 
Partenope  and  Cigno. .  The  hotly  contested  entrenchments  at  Bu 
Meliana  were  recaptured,  but  had  to  be  abandoned  again  be- 
cause the  heavy  rains  had  flooded  the  neighborhood.  In  the  eon- 
fusion  of  the  flood  the  Turks  made  a  vigorous  attack  on  Novem- 
ber 17  and  captured  several  Italian  guns.  The  rainy  season 
deferred  extensive  invasion  into  the  interior. 

November  5,  1911,  the  King  of  Italy  proclaimed  the  annexa- 
tion of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  and  under  the  complete  sover- 
eignty of  the  King  of  Italy. 


36  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

REINFORCEMENTS  FOR  THE  ITALIAN  TROOPS. 

A  second  expedition  corps  was  formed  and  transported  in  de- 
tachments to  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  during  the  early  part  of 
November.  The  organizations  were  as  follows : 

THIED  INFANTRY   DIVISION,   LIEUT. -GENERAL  DE  CHAURAND. 

6th  brigade.  6th  brigade. 

18th   regiment   infantry.  52d  regiment  infantry. 

93d  regiment  infantry.  23d  regiment  infantry. 

1  regiment  field  artillery,  6  batteries. 
3  squadrons  cavalry. 

FOURTH    INFANTRY    DIVISION,    L1EUT.-GENERAL   COUNT    TROMBI. 

7th  brigade.  8tl\  brigade. 

20th  regiment  infantry.  37th  regiment  infantry. 

79th  regiment  infantry.  50th  regiment  infantry. 

1  regiment  field  artillery,  6  batteries. 
3  squadrons  cavalry. 

By  November  20,  1911,  Italy  had  sent  the  following: 

16  regiments    of    infantry 48,000 

3  regiments  Bersaglieri    9,000 

3  battalions  Grenadiers 3,000 

4  battalions  Alpine  Chasseurs 4,000 

4  regiments  combination  field  artillery 6,000 

3  battalions  pioneers  3,000 

2  battalions  engineers  1,000 

12  squadrons  cavalry 2,400 

3  squadrons  Carabineers  600 

6  detachments  gensdarmes  service   1,000 

Train    7,000 

85,000 
Exclusive  of  a  detachment  of  special  troops. 

The  troops  sent  to  Italy  included  some  of  the  men  on  reserve 
lists  and  were  not  exclusively  those  belonging  to  the  active  army. 

Additional  reserves  were  called  out  to  replace  these  men  to 
number  about  90,000  additional  reserves. 

As  there  was  a  lack  of  officers  trained  as  aviators,  ten  civilian 
aviators  volunteered  with  a  corps  of  artificer  mechanics  and  60 
engineer  soldiers.  One-half  of  these  were  sent  to  Derna  and  To- 
bruk  and  the  others  to  Tripoli. 


THE    ITALIAN-TUBKISH    WAR.  37 

THE  ACTIVITY  OF  THE  ITALIAN  NAVY. 

The  co-operation  of  the  navy,  after  the  landing  of  the  first 
expedition  corps,  was  to  accomplish  the  following  objects : 

1.  The  support  of  the  land  forces  in  engagements  on  shore 
was  assigned  to  the  Sicilia,  Carlo  Alberto,  Sardegna  and  Marco 
Polo  off  Tripoli  and  Horns. 

2.  The  blockade  of  the  Tripolitan  coast,  that  was  first  con- 
ducted by  the  cruisers  and  torpedo  vessels,  was  assigned  after 
November  10  to  the  four  new  Italian  mail  steamers  that  for- 
merly plied  between  Naples  and  Palermo  and  which  were  each 
armed  with  six  6-inch  guns. 

3.  The  Turkish  coasts  of  Albania,  Syria  and  the  Aegean  Sea 
were  reconnoitered  by  a  division  of  four  destroyers  in  each  re- 
gion. 

4.  The  passages  between  Crete  and  the  mainland  were  guarded 
by  several  ships  and  destroyers  of  the  Duke  of  Abruzzia's  com- 
mand.   As  the  transports  conveying  troops  were  constantly  go- 
ing to  and  from  Tripoli  and  Italy  without  convoy  it  was  neces- 
sary to  guard  these  passages  strictly. 

Early  in  November  several  cruisers  and  torpedo  boats  bom- 
barded the  small  Tripolitan  coast  ports  at  Zuara  and  Adjita 
near  the  Tunisian  frontier  in  order  to  destroy  the  contrabrand 
stores  that  had  been  collected  there  from  across  the  Tunisian 
border. 

The  ships  of  the  first  two  squadrons  left  October  24  for  Au- 
gusta, Tarento  and  Naples  to  replenish  stores  and  fuel,  and 
prepare  for  a  new  series  of  operations  that  were  rumored  to  be 
contemplated  against  the  Turkish  forces  in  the  Aegean  Sea. 

Tobruk  was  established  as  a  naval  base  and  some  of  the  fleet 
replenished  store  and  fuel  there. 

The  Turkish  squadron  remained  off  Constantinople  and  rarely 
left  the  Dardanelles.  In  expectation  of  an  attack  by  the  Italian 
fleet,  the  Turkish  troops  on  all  the  islands  of  the  Aegean  Sea 
were  reinforced,  especially  at  Lemnos,  Mythelene,  Chios  and 
Rhodes. 


38  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

*THE  DEFENCES  OF  THE  DARDANELLES  AND  BOSPHORUS. 
GENERAL  REMARKS. 

The  Coast  Defences  and  fortified  sites  of  Turkey  are  few  in 
number,  and,  generally  speaking,  do  not  merit  serious  attention, 
as  they  do  not  answer  the  modern  requirements  of  defence  either 
from  an  engineering  or  an  artillery  point  of  view.  The  excep- 
tions are  those  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus,  which  were 
considerably  improved  in  1887  and  are  still  in  a  fairly  satisfac- 
tory condition.  The  land  defences,  especially  at  the  approaches 
to  Constantinople  at  the  Tchatalga  line,  have  been  much  im- 
proved of  late  years  and  consist  of  a  regular  system  of  separate 
forts  connected  by  batteries. 

In  these  days  of  high  explosive  shells  and  rapid  firing  batter- 
ies long  and  narrow  straits  require  a  special  form  of  coast  de- 
fence. Guns  do  not  require  to  be  of  particularly  long  range 
provided  the  batteries  are  carefully  located  to  suit  the  terrain 
and  are  capable  of  bringing  a  heavy  volume  of  fire  on  the  re- 
quired objective. 

The  guns  used  by  Turkey  along  the  coasts  were  nearly  all 
made  by  Krupp,  while  the  naval  guns  were  mostly  supplied  by 
the  British  firms,  Armstrong  and  Elswick. 

THE  DARDANELLES  DEFENCES. 

The  Straits  of  the  Dardanelles  (or  the  Hellespont,  as  they  used 
to  be  called),  connect  the  Aegean  Sea  with  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
They  have  a  total  length  of  42  miles,  a  width  varying  from  1400 
yards  to  8200  yards  and  a  depth  of  from  70  to  350  feet.  A 
strong  current  flows  through  to  the  Aegean  Sea  that  impedes 
progress  of  vessels  that  enter  from  the  Aegean  Sea.  There  are 
two  important  islands  in  the  Aegean  Sea  near  the  entrance  to 
the  Straits  named  Imbos  and  Tenedos. 

Besika  Bay  is  opposite  Tenedos.  This  is  a  good  roadstead  and 
is  often  visited  by  European  squadrons,  to  whom  entrance 


"I'liiH  account  of  the  Defences  of  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus  is 
taken  from  the  Journal  of  the  Royal  Artillery  for  January,  1913,  and  is  a 
translation  from  the  Russian  Artillery  Journal  of  August,  1912,  by  Lieut. 
J.  K.  L.  Kit/.uilliHiiis.  R.  H.  A.,  and  is  the  latest  and  most  reliable  informa- 
tion on  this  subject. 


THE    ITALIAN-TUKKISH    WAR.  39 

through  the  Straits  is  forbidden.  There  is  a  modern  fort  and  a 
wireless  station  at  Besika  Bay. 

The  defences  of  the  Straits  have  been  strengthened  during  the 
past  25  years.  Batteries  have  been  constructed  to  command  the 
narrower  portions  of  the  Straits. 

The  southern  entrance  is  guarded  by  the  batteries  at  Kum- 
Kale  on  the  Asiatic  and  Seddil-Bahr  on  the  European  Shore. 
These  are  separated  by  a  distance  of  4060  yards  and  are  built 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  ancient  castles  of  the  same 
names  erected  by  Mahomet  IV  in  1659. 

The  defences  are  as  follows,  starting  from  the  Aegean  Sea  to 
the  Sea  of  Marmora: 

A — ON  THE  EUROPEAN  SHORE. 

1.  Ertrogrul  Battery — This  is  east  of  Cape  Challas  on  the 
edge  of  a  small  bay  and  is  armed  with  eight  9.4-inch  guns. 

2.  Seddil-Bahr  Battery — This  was  constructed  in  1886  at  the 
extremity  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsular  on  the  Aegean  Sea  near 
the  ancient  stone  castle  of  Seddil-Bahr.    This  is  square  shaped 
with  large  low  towers  at  each  corner,  and  is  now  used  as  an  ar- 
senal and  powder  magazine.     The  battery  is  armed  with  six 
Krupp  11.2-inch,  10.2-ineh  and  9.4-inch  guns.    There  are  also  six 
field  guns. 

3.  Souan-Dere-Tabia  Battery — This  is  armed  with  three  47- 
mm.  Nordenfeldt  guns  and  covers  the  mine  area  between  Souan- 
Dere  and  Cephas. 

4.  Ildiz-Tabia  Battery— This  is  built  on  a  hill  300  feet  above 
sea  level  and  is  designed  to  operate  against  the  ships,  which  from 
a  position  in  Sare-Siglarosk  Bay  might  flank  the  batteries  Ka- 
midie  and  Chemenlek  on  the  Asiastic  shore.     It  is  armed  with 
fourteen  8.3-inch  and  5.9-inch  guns. 

5.  Nordenfeldt-Tabia  Battery — Situated  a  little  to  the  right 
and  lower  than  the  Ildiz-Tabia  Battery,  is  armed  with  seven 
47-mm.  Nordenfeldt  guns. 

6.  Kamidie  Battery — Near   Cape  Kidil-Bahr,   is  armed  with 
two  14-inch,  three  Nordenfeldts  and  one  field  gun. 

7.  Namazie  Battery — Situated  at  the  narrowest  part  of  the 
Straits,  is  semicular  and  has  sixteen  guns  of  from  10.2  to  8.3-inch 
caliber,  besides  one  field  gun.     This  is  the  most  important  fort 


40  THE   ITALIAN-TUEKISH   WAR. 

on  the  European  side  of  the  Straits  and  is  35  feet  above  the  sea 
level.  It  is  near  an  ancient  stone  fort  built  in  14-70  by  Mahomet 
II.  The  narrowest  part  of  the  Straits  is  between  Kidil-Bahr  and 
the  town  Chanak.  The  current  here  flows  at  a  rate  of  5.25  miles 
per  hour.  The  width  is  1400  yards. 

8.  Medjid  Battery — Is  armed  with  six  9-ineh  and  one  field 
gun. 

9.  Kamidie-Mouavin-Tabia  Battery — Is  slightly  higher  than 
Medjid  Battery  and  is  armed  with  six  field  guns. 

10.  Konidje-Su-Tabia  Battery — Possesses   four    5.9-inch    and 
8.3-inch  howitzers. 

11.  Pallas-Baba-Tabia  Battery — Is  on  the  same  hill  as  No.  10 
and  has  the  same  battery. 

12.  Dourmin-Bournu  Battery — Is  built  south  of  the  Namazie 
Battery  and  has  seven  9.5-inch  and  8.3-inch  guns.     Also  one 
field  gun. 

13.  Mouavin-Dourmin-Tabia  Battery — Is  on  the  hill  above  No. 
12  and  has  three  field  guns. 

14.  Cham-Bournu-Tabia  Battery — Is  north  of  No.  13  on  about 
the  same  level  and  has  two  5.9-inch  guns. 

15.  Lodas-Tabia  Battery — Is  built  on  a  small  hill  north  of  the 
village  Maitos  and  is  armed  with  two  5.9-inch  guns. 

16.  Porus-Tabia  Battery — Also  has  two  5.9-inch  guns.     It  is 
close  to  the  ruins  of  the  ancient  stone  fort  Bokkal-Kale,  from 
which  there  is  a  submarine  cable  that  connects  it  with  Nagara 
on  the  Asiatic  shore. 

17.  Bokkal-Tabia  Battery — Is  the  left  flank  of  the  defences  on 
the  European  side  and  it  has  two  5.9-inch  guns.    It  stands  on  a 
headland  near  the  village  Bokkal  and  is  close  to  the  lighthouse. 

All  the  forts  along  the  European  shore  are  connected  by  a 
high  road  that  is  kept  in  good  repair,  and  also  by  telegraph  and 
telephone  lines.  Gallipoli  is  a  city  of  50,000  inhabitants  and  has 
a  good  harbor.  This  was  the  first  part  of  Europe  occupied  by 
the  Turks.  The  land  defences  of  the  city  are  weak  and  obsolete. 
They  could  easily  be  turned  by  a  force  that  might  disembark  in 
Kisserosk  Bay.  The  Turks  have  often  planned  to  improve  these 
defences,  but  nothing  was  done  for  lack  of  money. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR  41 

B — ON  THE  ASIATIC  SHORE  OF  THE  STRAITS. 

The  defences  on  the  Asiatic  shore  of  the  Straits  have  been  con- 
siderably changed  since  1877.  The  principal  forts  are  as  fol- 
lows, viz.: 

1.  Kum-Kale  is  a  new  fort  located  east  of  the  old  castle  and  it 
commands  the  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles  at  its  entrance  into 
the  Aegean  Sea.    It  commands  the  area  reaching  to  Siddil-Bahr 
on  the  European  side.    It  is  armed  with  ten  guns  varying  from 
11-inch  to  5.9-inch  in  caliber.     It  also  has  six  field  guns  and 
three  47-mm.  Nordenfeldts. 

2.  Orchanie  Battery  stands  on  a  high  hill  southwest  of  Kum- 
Kale  and  has  seven  9.5-inch  guns  that  command  the  entrance  and 
approaches  to  the  Straits. 

3.  Dardanus  Battery  has  two  rapid  firing  5.9-inch  Krupp 
guns. 

4.  Cephas-Tabia  Battery  is  north  of  Cape  Cephas  lighthouse 
and  is  armed  with  three  47-mm.  Nordenfeldts. 

5.  Kamidie  Battery  is  on  the  shore  of  Sari-Siglarosk  Bay  and 
has  fifteen  guns  varying  from  11-inch  to  5.9-inch  caliber. 

6.  Chemenlek  Battery  has  four  heavy  guns,  four  47-mm.  Nor- 
denfeldts and  eleven  field  guns.     It  has  a  search-light  and  is 
connected  by  submarine  cable  with  Nazamie  battery  on  the  Euro- 
pean shore.    This  is  the  strongest  and  best  equipped  battery  on 
the  Aisiatic  shore.    There  is  a  large  ammunition  store  under  the 
ruined  castle  Chanak. 

7.  Medjid-Kavan-Tabia  Battery  is  barely  visible  from  the  sea. 
It  is  armed  with  nine  field  guns. 

8.  Medjid  Battery  is  armed  with  fifteen  heavy  guns. 

9.  Nagara  Battery  is  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Asiatic  de- 
fences of  the  Dardanelles  and  has  nine  guns  varying  from  10.2- 
inch  to  5.9-inch  caliber. 

10.  Abilos-Tabia  Battery  and 

11.  Maltepe-Tabia  Battery  are  both  situated  on  the  crest  of  a 
hill  near  Cape  Nagara  and  each  has  two  guns  of  medium  caliber. 

These  defences  were  considerably  strengthened  by  additional 
works  and  temporary  intrenchments  during  the  war.  The  gar- 
risons of  all  the  forts  were  reinforced  by  the  bulk  of  the  Turkish 
army,  while  the  equipment  of  all  the  forts  was  improved  by  the 
addition  of  numerous  search-lights.  The  Straits  were  filled  with 


42 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR, 


mines  and  barricades  of  steel  hawsers  were  kept  ready  to  com- 
pletely close  the  Straits  in  case  of  an  attack  by  the  Italians. 

The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  guns  and  the  gar- 
risons of  the  various  forts  on  the  shores  of  the  Dardanelles : 


No. 

Name  of  Fort. 

Number  of  Guns 

Officers 

Rank  and  File 

Companiea 

Battalions 

Regiments 

1 

Ertrogrul    

8 

4 

80 

1 

1 

?, 

Seddil-Bahr    

1? 

14 

240 

ft 

s 

Souan-Dere-Tabia       

3 

4 

Ildiz-Tabia  

14 

4 

80 

] 

B 

Nordenfeldt-Tabia   

7 

1 

6 

K:nn  id  ir    

6 

B 

80 

] 

8 

Medjid   

7 

9 

160 

'> 

1 

9 

Kamidie-Monavin-Tabia   

6 

11 

Pallas-Baba-Tabia    

4 

1 

20 

7 

Namazie  

17 

18 

180 

4 

1 

10 

Konidje-Su-Tabia  

4 

1 

20 

13 

Monavin-Dourmin-Tabia    

3 

^?, 

Dourmin-Bournu   

8 

14 

160 

8 

14 

Cham-Bournu-Tabia 

2 

1 

55 

If) 

Lodas-Tabia          .                

2 

15 

1 

16 

Porus-Tabia  

? 

15 

" 

17 

Bokkal-Tabia        

2 

3 

75 

Total  on  European  side  

107 

74 

1?80 

16 

4 

1 

1 

Hum-Kale    

19 

14 

240 

A 

?, 

Orchanie  

7 

4 

80 

1 

1 

3 

Dardanus   

? 

1 

flO 

4 

Cephas-Tabia     

3 

B 

Kamidie   

15 

1? 

?,?,0 

ft 

q 

Nagara   

9 

11 

140 

ft 

1 

11 

9 

10 

2 

10 

Abilos-Tabia                                                       . 

9 

10 

« 

Cbemenlek    

19 

14 

?,40 

:\ 

8 

Medjid    

15 

17 

300 

7 

Medjid-Kavan-Tabia   

9 

1 

?0 

I 

1 

Total  on  Asiatic  side  

10fl 

74 

1?,80 

L6 

1 

1- 

Qrand  total   

209 

148 

2560 

B£ 

B 

g 

THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  43 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Nagara  Battery  was  constructed 
on  the  ruins  of  the  village  Abides,  near  which  Xerxes  ordered  a 
bridge  to  be  built  for  the  passage  of  his  army  across  the  Straits. 

All  the  batteries  were  built  with  great  care,  and,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Kamidie  and  Namazie,  are  practically  invisible  from 
the  sea.  Their  positions  are,  however,  easily  detected  by  the 
stone  barracks  which  in  every  case  have  been  built  close  behind 
them  and  are  in  full  view  of  passing  ships. 

If  these  batteries  are  well  manned  and  efficiently  handled,  it 
seems  almost  impossible  for  any  war  ship  to  run  the  guantlet 
safely  besides  avoiding  the  mines  and  breaking  through  the  bar- 
ricades. These  107  guns  between  Cape  Cephas  and  Nagara  are 
of  the  latest  modern  types  and  they  should  stop  any  ship  im- 
peded by  the  strong  current  that  runs  at  the  rate  of  nearly  five 
miles  an  hour.  The  foregoing  is  merely  the  strength  on  a  peace 
footing  and  in  war  these  defences  are  much  more  formidable,  as 
was  the  case  during  the  threatened  passage  of  the  Italian  fleet. 

The  Sea  of  Marmora  joins  the  Straits  of  the  Dardanelles  with 
the  Bosphorus.  This  sea  is  170  miles  long  and  66  miles  wide  at 
its  narrowest  part.  The  Bosphorus  connects  with  the  Black  Sea. 
It  is  18  miles  long  and  from  100  to  300  feet  deep.  The  greatest 
width  is  3800  yards,  while  the  narrowest  part  is  only  700  yards 
across.  The  current  flows  at  a  rate  of  over  five  miles  per  hour. 
Its  width  makes  it  better  for  opposing  the  passage  of  a  hostile 
fleet,  but  from  an  artillery  point  of  view  it  is  not  as  strong  as 
the  batteries  along  the  Dardanelles. 

Beginning  at  the  Sea  of  Marmora  the  following  are  the  chief 
forts  of  the  Bosphorus: 

A — ON  THE  EUROPEAN  SHORE. 

A  disused  fort  called  Bumel-Kissar  stands  at  the  entrance  to 
the  Bosphorus.  It  is  connected  by  a  submarine  cable  with  Cape 
Kandidge  on  the  Asiatic  side.  Darius  witnessed  the  passage  of 
his  army  across  the  Straits  from  this  point.  It  was  here  also 
where  the  Crusaders  crossed  into  Asia. 

1.  Kirich-Bournu  Battery   is  a  new   construction,  but  it   is 
armed  with  four  old  pattern  6-inch  guns. 

2.  Telle-Tabia  Battery  is  situated  on  the  cape  of  the  same 
name  and  has  two  8.3-inch  howitzers  on  the  summit  of  the  hill, 


44  THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

two  6-inch  Armstrong  guns  shielded  and  lower  down,  while  on 
the  beach  near  an  old  Genoese  castle  there  are  two  Nordenfeldts 
and  a  search-light. 

3.  Rumel-Kavak  Battery  has  two  14-inch  Krupp  guns  and 
one  9.4-inch  howitzer. 

4.  Rumel-Kavak  Fort  is  armed  with  six  modern  guns. 

5.  Saritash  Battery  is  on  the  beach  and  is  armed  with  four 
9.4-inch  Krupps  and  two  Nordenfeldts. 

6.  On  Cape  Mavromolo,  500  yards  north  of  Saritash  Battery, 
there  is  a  modern  observation  station  and  four  howitzers. 

7.  Boyuk-Leman  Battery  has  four  9.4-inch  Krupp  guns,  a 
search-light  and   an  observation  station  with   an   ammunition 
magazine. 

8.  Karibje  Battery  is  located  on  the  cape  of  the  same  name 
and  has  four  heavy  guns. 

9.  Fort  Kilia  is  on  the  Black  Sea,  six  miles  from  the  entrance 
of  the  Bosphorus,  and  has  seven  6-inch  Krupp  guns. 

B — ON  THE  ASIATIC  SHORE. 

1.  Madjar  Battery  is  930  yards  north  of  Cape  Muk-Bournu. 
It  is  a  large  square  earthwork  on  the  sea  shore  and  it  is  armed 
with  twenty  Krupp  guns  varying  from  6-inch  to  11 -inch  in  cali- 
ber.   This  is  the  main  fort  on  the  Bosphorus. 

2.  Behind  this  and  higher  there  is  a  work  containing  two  Nor- 
denfeldts and  four  field  guns. 

3.  Still  higher  on  the  same  hill  are  four  9.4-inch  howitzers. 

4.  Anatole-Kavak  Battery  lies  opposite  Rumel-Kavak  Battery, 
in  Europe,  from  which  it  is  separated  by  a  distance  of  1200 
yards.    It  contains  eleven  Krupp  guns. 

5.  Immediately  above  the  last  named  there  is  an  earthwork 
containing  four  9.4-inch  guns  and  four  Maxims. 

6.  There  is  a  battery  of  two  9.4-inch  guns  on  the  beach  of 
Kichili  Bay. 

7.  Phil-Bournu  Battery  lies  southwest  of  the  Cape  of  that 
name  and  contains  three  6-inch  guns. 

8.  There  is  an  ancient  fort  on  Cape  Poras  that  has  a  number 
of  antiquated  pieces  of  ordnance. 

9.  Anatole-Phenar-Kissar  Battery  is  armed  with  new  pattern 
guns  of  various  calibers. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  45 

10.  At  Cape  Boyuk-Bournu,  jutting  out  into  the  Black  Sea, 
there  is  a  battery  of  two  field  guns,  while  on  a  headland  north 
of  the  mouth  of  the  river  Reva  there  are  four  field  guns. 

Many  of  the  batteries  along  the  Straits  of  the  Dardanelles  and 
Bosphorus  are  constructed  in  or  under  the  cliffs  and  in  many 
cases  have  inadequate  protection  from  splinters  of  rock,  etc. 

ADDITIONAL  DEFENCES  FOR  THE  WAR. 

These  permanent  fortifications  were  reinforced  by  mobile  de- 
fences of  the  navy.  The  Turkish  fleet  was  anchored  off  Nagara 
during  this  war  and  the  flotilla  of  torpedo  boats  and  the  vessels 
of  the  navy  were  expected  to  co-operate  with  the  army  in  de- 
fending the  passage  of  a  hostile  fleet  through  the  Straits  of 
Dardanelles. 

The  defences  of  the  Dardenelles  that  consisted  of  three  forts 
at  the  western  entrance  with  20  heavy  guns  and  80  heavy  guns 
in  the  forts  at  the  narrow  strait  between  Chanak  and  Nagara 
were  strengthened  with  120  additional  guns,  but  chiefly  of 
smaller  caliber.  These  forts  were  garrisoned  by  7000  men  and 
all  the  villages  and  buildings  around  these  forts  that  might 
obstruct  the  fire  of  the  guns  were  razed.  The  old  mine  fields 
forming  three  barriers  at  Kum  Kale,  Chanak  and  Nagara  were 
reinforced  by  two  additional  mine  fields  with  Whitehead  mines 
of  the  latest  construction  at  Kephes.  The  old  mines  were  not  re- 
liable, they  had  been  neglected  and  in  that  channel  with  depths 
ranging  from  8  to  20  fathoms  there  is  a  strong  current  that 
often  has  a  maximum  strength  of  five  miles  per  hour.  Twelve 
old  hulks  were  provided  and  made  ready  to  be  sunk  in  the  nar- 
rowest part  of  the  strait,  that  is  at  Chanak,  where  it  is  1300 
meters  in  width.  The  entire  Turkish  fleet  was  also  prepared  to 
defend  the  passage  through  the  Dardanelles.  Admiral  Fisher 
stated  that  in  view  of  the  topography  and  conditions  in  the 
Straits  of  Dardanelles  they  could  not  be  taken  or  forced  unless 
the  attacking  fleet  could  afford  to  sacrifice  twenty  obsolete  bat- 
tleships and  force  the  passage  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  which 
should  be  of  the  most  modern  type. 

At  Gallipolis  25,000  Turks  were  stationed  to  defend  any  at- 
tempt to  land  there. 

The  heavily  armed  forts  at  Cape  Karaburun  and  the  Nasiki 
peninsula  were  strengthened  and  several  batteries  of  rapid  fire 


46  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

guns  were  mounted  there  to  defend  the  approaches  to  Salonica,  a 
city  of  120,000  inhabitants.  The  entrance  to  the  bay,  two  miles 
wide,  was  mined.  The  channels  leading  into  Smyrna  were  de- 
fended by  two  forts  at  Sanjak  Kalessi,  six  miles  from  Smyrna, 
which  is  a  city  of  300,000  inhabitants.  These  were  strengthened 
and  a  new  earthwork  fort  was  constructed  with  twelve  6-inch 
guns  with  several  rapid  fire  batteries.  Twenty  thousand  Turks 
were  ready  to  prevent  any  landing. 

At  Mityleni  the  garrison  was  reinforced  by  2000  troops.  All 
the  other  important  islands  were  likewise  reinforced;  Lemnos, 
Rhodes,  Samos  and  Chios  each  receiving  1500  additional  troops 
with  artillery. 

The  Turkish  government  issued  rifles  to  all  Mohammedans  in 
the  islands  of  Aegean  Sea,  and  ordered  all  Italians  that  resided 
in  the  region  around  the  Dardanelles  to  leave,  and,  in  the  course 
of  November,  transported  many  to  other  parts  of  the  country. 

Any  attack  by  Italy  on  the  Turks  in  Europe  or  Asia  Minor 
would  involve  international  complications  as  all  powers  have 
possessions  there,  and,  besides,  the  great  strength  of  the  highly 
trained  Turkish  army  would  render  such  an  attempt  hopeless. 

The  Italian  government,  however,  notified  the  Austrian  and 
Russian  governments  of  intention  to  blockade  the  Straits  of 
Dardanelles  on  November  20,  1911.  The  Russian  government 
answered  in  a  note,  on  November  24,  that  the  neutrality  of  the 
Dardanelles  must  be  respected ;  and  based  this  claim  on  the  Pon- 
tus  treaty  of  1871,  which  was  further  strengthened  by  the  pro- 
tocol of  the  Declaration  of  London  of  1909,  that  stipulated  that 
the  approaches  to  neutral  ports  shall  not  be  blockaded.  The 
Declaration  of  London  was  not  ratified  by  the  powers.  Russia 
also  protested  against  the  Turkish  contemplated  design  of  plac- 
ing barriers  in  the  Straits  of  Dardanelles. 

On  November  27  Italy  replied  that  she  did  not  intend  to  block- 
ade the  Dardanelles,  but,  nevertheless,  the  Turks  continued  to 
strengthen  its  defences. 

The  Austrian  and  Russian  ambassadors  endeavored  to  mediate 
to  secure  peace,  to  which  Turkey  replied  that  she  had  no  objec- 
tion to  concluding  an  honorable  peace,  but  the  loss  of  the  two 
African  provinces  could  not  be  permitted  by  the  Young  Turk 
government  without  endangering  the  country's  constitution.  • 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  47 

ITALIAN  NAVAL  OPERATIONS  DURING  DECEMBER,  1911. 

The  second  squadron  remained  in  South  Italian  ports  while 
the  vessels  of  the  first  squadron  were  distributed  among  the  ports 
of  Cyrenaica,  and  seldom  visited  the  home  ports.  During  the 
first  part  of  December  the  Roma,  Regina-Elena,  San  Marco  and 
Agordat  were  at  Benghasi;  the  Napoli  at  Derna;  the  Vittorio- 
Emanuele,  Pisa,  Etna  and  Etruria  at  Tobruk,  with  12  torpedo 
vessels  and  the  Vulcano;  the  Marco  Polo  at  Horns,  and  the  train- 
ing ship  squadron  at  Tripoli.  These  vessels  co-operated  in  all 
the  engagements  with  the  army  on  shore,  by  landing  parties, 
their  naval  guns  and  by  bombarding  the  Turkish  forces  when- 
ever within  range  of  the  guns  of  ships.  The  two  old  battleships 
Italia  and  Lepanto  were  prepared  as  station  ships  to  relieve  the 
training  ship  squadron.  The  Italians  had  a  large  supply  of  am- 
munition for  the  43-cm.  (16.8-inch)  guns  of  these  ships. 

The  Vettor  Plsani,  the  Duke  of  Abruzzia's  flagship,  remained 
at  Tarento  and  Brindisi  until  the  middle  of  December.  Some 
destroyers  and  high  sea  torpedo  boats  of  this  division  cruised 
singly  along  the  Albanian  and  Grecian  coasts,  in  the  Ionian  Sea, 
the  Aegean  Sea  and  along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor. 

The  Liguria,  Partenope,  Dardo  and  Euro  co-operated  in  at- 
tacking Zuara,  Misrata  and  Argub  near  the  Tunisian  frontier, 

December  15  the  first  division  arrived  at  Tarento  and  the 
training  ship  division  at  Spezia.  All  ships  were  revictualed  and 
the  flag  officers  went  to  Rome  for  a  council  of  war. 

The  navy  was  active  in  the  Red  Sea,  where  the  squadron  was 
reinforced  by  the  Calabria  returning  from  the  Asiatic  station. 
It  was  reported  that  20,000  Arabs  were  organized  in  Arabia  to 
attack  the  Italian  colony  at  Erythrea,  and  to  reinforce  the  Turks 
in  Cyrenaica. 

The  Italian  cruisers  searched  all  the  Arabian  Red  Sea  ports 
for  Turkish  vessels  and  troops.  November  19  the  Puglia  and 
Calabria  destroyed  the  port  of  Akaba,  a  place  of  500  inhabitants, 
where  Turkish  troops  had  assembled.  During  the  passage  of  the 
British  king  and  queen  through  the  Red  Sea  en  route  returning 
from  the  coronation  ceremonies  in  India,  all  hostilities  were  sus- 
pended until  after  November  26.  November  30  the  Calabria  and 
Volturno  bombarded  the  quarantine  station  Sheik  Said  near  Pe- 
rim  and  Mocca,  40  miles  north  of  Perim,  where  5000  Turks  with 


48  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

field  artillery  were  preparing  to  cross  the  Red  Sea  and  attack 
Erythrea.  They  sank  all  their  sailing  craft,  including  a  large 
number  of  dhows. 

After  clearing  the  Red  Sea  of  the  Turks,  the  Italians  re-estab- 
lished the  lights  on  the  coast  of  Erythrea. 

ENGAGEMENTS  AT  TRIPOLI. 

November  26,  after  the  arrival  of  the  third  infantry  division, 
commonly  designated  as  the  third  army  corps,  the  Italians  at- 
tacked the  Turks  and  Arabs  and  regained  Forts  Messri,  Henni 
and  Scharaehat  that  had  been  occupied  by  the  Turks  after  the 
battles  on  October  23. 

After  this  repulse,  in  which  the  Italians  lost  16  killed  and  104 
wounded,  the  Turkish  main  body  withdrew  from  Ain  Zara  to  the 
southward.  The  Turks,  however,  continued  occasional  assaults 
until  December  4,  when  General  Frugoni  led  a  force  of  16  bat- 
talions of  Italian  infantry  with  five  batteries  of  field  guns  to  at- 
tack the  Turkish  intrenchments  at  Ain  Zara,  where  3000  Turks 
still  remained.  In  the  engagement  that  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  Ain  Zara  the  Italians  had  17  killed  and  94  wounded,  while 
they  estimated  the  Turkish  loss  at  several  hundred  killed.  The 
Italians  captured  eight  guns  that  had  been  rendered  unservice- 
able. 

The  Italians  followed  this  up  with  a  strong  reconnoisance  to 
the  borders  of  the  hill  country,  30  to  35  kilometers  south  and 
southeast  of  Tripoli.  Cavalry  and  aeroplanes  served  in  this  re- 
connoisance. 

The  oasis  on  the  east  side  of  Tripoli  was  bombarded  in  zones 
by  the  Re  Umberto,  Sicilia,  Partenope,  Fulmine  and  Cassiopea 
without  finding  any  enemy  therein,  so  that  the  93d  regiment  of 
infantry  was  sent  to  garrison  Tagiura,  about  15  kilometers  east 
of  Tripoli.  The  Italians  next  proceeded  to  intrench  the  newly 
acquired  positions.  A  battery  of  6-inch  guns  and  one  8-inch 
rifled  howitzer  that  had  been  sent  from  Italy  to  bombard  Aiu 
Zara  were  now  mounted  there  on  the  earthworks.  A  military 
railroad  was  constructed  to  connect  Ain  Zara  with  Tripoli. 

The  Italians  thus  found  ample  room  for  further  operations 
into  the  interior  and  the  fortifications  of  the  approaches  formed 
u  secure  base  for  conquest  of  the  region. 


THE  ITALIAN-TURKISH  WAR.  49 

ENGAGEMENTS  AT  BENGHASI  AND  DERNA  IN  DECEMBER. 

The  Arabs  and  Turks  estimated  at  15,000,  made  frequent  at- 
tacks by  day  and  night  on  the  strongly  intrenched  Italian  gar- 
rison in  the  southern  suburbs  of  Benghasi.  The  four  regiments 
of  infantry  acted  on  the  defensive  and  were  supported  by  the 
San  Marco  and  Agordat.  The  Italians  rarely  attempted  a  sortie. 
An  attack  of  20,000  Turks  was  repulsed  on  November  30  with 
considerable  loss.  Shortly  after  this  the  garrison  was  reinforced 
by  the  57th  infantry  regiment  from  Italy.  The  battleship  Regina 
Elena  also  arrived  from  Tobruk.  During  the  night  of  December 
14  and  15  the  Turks  attacked  in  great  force,  but  were  repulsed  by 
aid  of  the  fire  from  the  ships.  The  Italians  lost  several  field  guns. 

At  Derna  the  Turks  and  Arabs  were  etsimated  at  3500,  but 
they  were  being  constantly  reinforced  and  a  general  assault  on 
the  Italian  position  was  expected.  During  the  latter  part  of 
November  the  garrison  at  Derna  made  a  sortie  with  three  bat- 
talions of  infantry  and  150  sailors  from  the  Napoli.  In  an  en- 
gagement of  8  hours  the  Italians  lost  15  killed  and  37  wounded. 
Such  engagements  as  these  were  frequent.  November  30  Count 
Trombi  arrived  as  Governor  of  Derna  with  large  reinforcements, 
consisting  of  the  26th  infantry  regiment,  one  battalion  of  Alpine 
Chasseurs  and  one  battalion  of  the  20th  infantry,  by  which  the 
strength  of  the  garrison  was  increased  to  15,000  men. 

The  Italian  and  Turkish  forces  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  were 
constantly  reinforced.  The  arrival  of  the  third  army  corps  in- 
creased the  Italian  forces  to  120,000  men,  which  were  distributed 
as  f ollows :  At  Tripoli,  70,000 ;  at  Benghasi,  25,000 ;  at  Derna, 
15,000 ;  at  Horns,  5000,  and  at  Tobruk,  5000. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Turks  into  the  interior  enabled  them  to 
reinforce  their  troops  considerably.  The  cost  of  the  war  was 
defrayed  chiefly  by  freewill  offerings  of  all  Islam.  Turkish  of- 
ficers, and  men,  weapons,  ammunition,  and  all  kinds  of  supplies 
were  constantly  sent  across  the  Egyptian  and  Tunisian  frontiers, 
notwithstanding  their  neutrality. 

The  Italians  occupied  Sidi  Barrami  on  the  coast  between  To- 
bruk and  Solum  to  prevent  contraband  and  troops  from  entering 
across  the  Egyptian  frontier,  while  the  naval  blockaders  guarded 
the  coast  and  captured  several  sailing  ships  with  contraband. 

The  Italians  complained  of  this  violation  of  the  neutrality  not 


50  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

so  much  against  that  from  Egypt,  which  was  done  secretly,  but 
against  that  from  Tunis,  where  it  was  carried  on  openly.  The 
French  government  declared  that  it  did  all  in  its  power  to  stop 
the  transportation  of  contraband,  and  suggested  that  Italy 
should  strengthen  her  forces  along  the  frontier.  The  effect  of 
French  prohibition  stopped  the  caravan  trade  via  Delibat  to 
Tripoli. 

The  Turks  used  Delibat,  the  eastern  terminus  of  telegraph 
communication  in  Tunis,  for  despatches  to  Europe,  and  they 
built  a  telegraph  line  from  their  headquarters  south  of  Tripoli 
to  Quezzan,  five  kilometers  from  Delibat. 

The  Turkish  sick  and  wounded  were  tended  by  French  and 
German  Red  Cross  societies  and  the  Turkish  Red  Crescent  so- 
ciety, who  reached  the  Turks  and  Arabs  via  Tunisian  borders. 
The  English  Red  Cross  society  sent  their  supplies  to  the  Turks 
via  Egyptian  frontier. 

The  Italian  government  exercised  a  rigorous  censorship  over 
the  press  and  correspondents  of  the  newspapers  were  limited 
strictly  in  regard  to  their  reports.  These  restrictions  were  so 
rigidly  enforced  that  the  majority  of  prominent  correspondents 
left  Tripoli  and  returned  to  their  homes,  and,  excepting  a  few 
French  correspondents,  the  Italians  only  were  represented  and 
their  reports  were  revised  by  the  Italian  authorities. 

The  Italian  government,  however,  permitted  all  the  military 
and  naval  attaches  accredited  to  the  foreign  embassies  and  lega- 
tions at  Rome  to  visit  Benghasi,  Tripoli,  Derna,  Tobruk  and 
Horns  in  the  steamer  Bosnia  that  was  specially  provided  for  them 
on  condition  that  they  would  not  publish  anything  they  might 
see  on  the  four  weeks'  cruise  that  began  October  18,  1911. 

OPERATIONS  OK  THE  ITALIAN  NAVY  UNTIL  FEBRUARY  20,  1912. 

During  January,  the  Garibaldi,  Varese,  Etna  and  some  tor- 
pedo boats  were  at  Tobruk,  the  Ferrucio  at  Derna,  the  Etruria 
at  Benghasi,  the  Marco  Polo  at  Horns  and  the  Carlo  Alberto, 
fjiyuria,  Iride  and  several  high  sea  torpedo  boats  at  Tripoli.  The 
greater  part  of  the  fleet  that  returned  to  Italy  about  the  middle 
of  December  remained  in  Italy  refitting,  etc. 

As  the  Italian  patrol  of  the  Turkish  European  coasts  had  been 
to  a  great  extent  withdrawn  and  as  it  was  evidently  not  intended 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  51 

to  attack  such  ports,  the  Turkish  government  discharged  the  re- 
serves in  the  garrisons  of  the  islands  and  some  of  those  on  the 
mainland. 

In  the  Red  Sea  a  threatened  attack  on  the  colony  of  Erythrea 
caused  the  Italians  to  reinforce  the  naval  forces  there  so  that 
they  had  there  the  Piemonte,  Calabria,  Puglia,  Aretusa,  Vol- 
turno,  and  Staffeta,  with  the  four  large  destroyers  Artigliere, 
Granatiere,  Bersagliere  and  Garabaldino. 

The  Italian  naval  commander  ascertained  that  seven  small 
Turkish  gunboats  that  had  been  in  the  Persian  gulf  were  con- 
cealed near  the  Farsan  Islands  and  the  above  named  ships 
searched  for  them.  These  vessels  had  been  ordered  home,  but 
ran  out  of  coal  and  were  unable  to  proceed ;  as  the  Turkish  trans- 
port Kaiseri,  which  had  coal  for  these  gunboats,  had  been  cap- 
tured by  the  Italians.  The  Italians  were  ignorant  that  the  lack 
of  coal  had  prevented  these  gunboats  from  reaching  Suez,  and 
believed  that  they  had  entered  the  Red  Sea  to  transport  Arabs 
to  reinforce  the  Turks  or  to  attack  Erythrea. 

January  7  the  Italians  discovered  the  seven  gunboats  with  the 
steam  yacht  Fuad,  at  anchor  at  Kunfuda.  The  Italian  ships 
opened  fire  on  the  gunboats,  and,  after  three  hours'  firing  at 
4500  meters,  they  sank  all  except  three  that  were  beached.  The 
crews  deserted  the  beached  gunboats  and  the  Italians  completed 
their  total  destruction  the  next  morning,  getting  some  light  guns 
and  a  few  trophies  from  the  little  squadron.  The  Italians  bom- 
barded Kunfuda  and  captured  four  Arab  sailing  vessels  and  the 
yacht  Fuad,  which  they  towed  to  Massowah.  They  bombarded 
small  Arabian  Red  Sea  ports ;  Akaba  ( for  the  third  time  on  Jan- 
uary 19),  Djebana,  Sheik  Said,  Mocca  and  Midy.  The  auxiliary 
cruiser  Citta  di  Palermo  bombarded  a  camp  on  the  Sinai  penin- 
sula, but  these  bombardments  caused  very  little  damage  to  the 
Arabs,  as  most  of  the  shells  failed  to  explode. 

The  Italians  thereupon  declared  the  coast  blockaded  for  a 
distance  of  45  miles  around  Hodeida  in  the  Red  Sea,  a  seaport 
of  45,000  inhabitants. 

This  blockade  became  effective  January  26,  1912.  It  was 
caused  by  the  transportation  of  Turkish  troops,  money  and  sup- 
plies in  neutral  vessels  to  Hodeida.  The  Egyptian  mail  steamer 
Menzaleh  was  seized  with  750,000  francs  on  board  consigned  to 
Turkish  officials.  The  Volturno  found  20  Turkish  officers  on 


52  THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

board  the  British  steamer  Africa  and  the  Austrian  Lloyd  steam- 
er Bregnez.  The  blockade  of  Hodeida  was  assigned  chiefly  to 
the  two  large  armed  fast  mail  steamers  Duca  degli  Abruzzi  and 
Duca  di  Genova  that  had  been  sent  from  Italy  with  the  cruisers 
Liguria  and  Elba. 

In  the  bombardment  of  Djebana  the  Piemonte  damaged  the 
railroad  building  by  the  French  there  and  the  railroad  company 
sued  the  Italian  government  for  200,000  lires  for  the  damage  to 
French  property.  The  Italians  took  off  about  100  British  and 
some  French  residents  of  Hodeida. 

Early  in  February  the  Italians  supported  the  Arabian  leader 
of  the  insurrection  against  the  Turks,  Said  Idris,  200  of  whose 
followers  took  possession  of  Farsan  Island,  while  these  insur- 
gents put  the  Turkish  forces  of  Yemen  on  the  defensive  and 
greatly  relieved  the  Italians. 

OPERATIONS  AT  TRIPOLI  IN  JANUARY. 

The  Italians  were  frequently  attacked  at  Ain  Zara  by  the 
Turks  who  established  their  active  headquarters  at  Aziziah  with 
their  main  body  at  Gharian.  The  Italians  made  repeated  at- 
tempts during  January  and  early  in  February  to  capture  Zan- 
zur,  but  failed  with  heavy  losses.  The  failure  of  an  attack  with 
four  battalions  of  infantry,  on  December  17,  caused  the  relief 
of  Lieut.-General  Pecori-Giraldi  by  Lieut.-General  Camerana. 
The  Turkish  commander  who  defeated  the  Italians  was  Colonel 
Fara,  who  was  promoted  to  Major-General  for  his  victory.  De- 
tails of  this  action  were  suppressed,  but  the  Italians  lost  50  killed 
and  over  100  wounded. 

The  Turks  surrounded  Tripoli  exterior  to  the  circumference  of 
a  circle  with  a  radius  of  15  to  20  kilometers  extending  from 
near  the  village  of  Gargaresch  around  near  Ain  Zara  to  Bir-el- 
Turki  east  of  Ain  Zara.  The  natives  of  Gargaresch  affiliated 
with  the  Italians  and  the  Turks  captured  the  town  in  order  to 
punish  the  people  for  sympathizing  with  the  Italians.  On  Janu- 
ary 18  the  Turks  repulsed  an  attack  by  four  battalions  of  in- 
fantry to  recapture  the  place.  The  Italians  were  repulsed  and 
only  succeeded  in  taking  the  place  after  a  desperate  fight  two 
days  later.  The  Turks  then  withdrew,  but  repeatedly  renewed 
attacks  on  the  Italians  there.  The  Turks  repeatedly  attacked 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAE.  53 

Ain  Zara,  but  on  February  5  they  were  driven  out  of  their  posi- 
tion between  Ain  Zara  and  Gargaresch  by  long  continued  bom- 
bardment with  6-inch  siege  guns.  An  attack  on  Zanzur  on  Feb- 
ruary 22  with  four  battalions  of  infantry  and  three  field  batter- 
ies was  repulsed  by  the  Turks. 

At  Horns  the  Italians  were  obliged  to  remain  close  to  the  town. 
The  Turks  attacked  repeatedly,  but  were  always  repulsed  by 
shells  from  the  Marco  Polo. 

Zuara,  105  kilometers  west  of  Tripoli,  was  a  junction  of  the 
trade  route  between  Tunis  and  Gharian.  It  was  frequently  bom- 
barded by  the  Italian  ships,  but  landing  detachments  were 
obliged  to  re-embark  by  the  Turks. 

The  occupation  of  the  town  was  decided  upon  just  before 
Christmas  when  the  Pisa  convoyed  four  transports  with  the  10th 
infantry  brigade  to  Zuara.  Bad  weather  prevented  landing,  and 
after  waiting  several  days  the  expedition  returned  to  Augusta. 
The  shells  from  the  ships  destroyed  several  buildings  in  the  town 
but  the  energetic  Turkish  commander  repulsed  all  attempts  to 
land.  The  Italians  finally  abandoned  the  idea  of  landing,  as  it 
would  require  greater  sacrifices  than  the  possession  of  the  place 
warranted. 

In  Cyrenaica  the  Italians  extended  their  occupation  during 
January  and  February  at  Benghasi  for  a  distance  of  7  kilome- 
ters from  the  city  and  likewise  at  Derna  and  Tobruk.  Strong 
fortifications  were  constructed,  and  heavy  6-inch  siege  guns  were 
mounted  on  the  works.  At  Benghasi  the  works  were  connected 
by  a  military  field  railroad  ten  kilometers  long.  At  all  these 
places  the  Italians  acted  on  the  defensive  and  repulsed  the  con- 
stant attacks  by  the  Turks  by  aid  of  shell  fire  from  ships,  as 
these  defences  were  well  within  range  of  the  guns  of  the  ships  in 
the  harbors. 

Invasion  into  the  interior  was  not  attempted  and  efforts  were 
chiefly  directed  to  strengthen  the  defences  of  a  limited  region 
along  the  coast  and  along  the  captured  seaports.  The  Italians 
planned  to  prolong  the  war,  and  in  the  course  of  time  by  con- 
ciliatory conduct  towards  the  Arabs,  to  win  them  over  and  per- 
suade them  to  accept  the  Italian  conquest. 


54  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

AVIATION. 

The  military  aviators  rendered  good  service  as  scouts.  Lieu- 
tenant Rossi,  of  the  Italian  navy,  made  60  flights  at  Tobruk  and 
he  recommended  that  the  use  of  the  Cipelli  hand  grenades  should 
be  discontinued  because  they  are  too  difficult  for  a  single  aviator 
and  very  dangerous,  besides  which  they  rarely  hit,  and  seldom 
exploded  in  the  soft  sand  of  the  desert.  Most  all  of  the  aero- 
planes used  by  the  Italians  carry  the  aviator  only.  These  aviators 
are  obliged  to  ascend  to  heights  of  1000  meters  or  more  over  the 
enemy's  position  that  the  aeroplane  may  not  be  hit  by  rifle  bul- 
lets, notwithstanding  the  lack  of  proper  aiming  apparatus.  In 
a  flight  at  Tobruk,  Rossi  took  Captain  Montu  as  a  passenger  on 
February  1,  and  when  at  a  height  of  600  meters,  the  aeroplane 
was  hit  five  times  by  rifle  bullets  and  Captain  Montu,  himself, 
was  hit  and  slightly  wounded. 

The  Italian  military  aeroplanes  carry  the  aviator  only  and 
are  of  the  types  of  Bleriot,  Nieuport,  Etrich  and  Farman,  with 
50  horse-power  motors.  They  cost  about  $6000  each,  and  will 
serve  for  about  six  months.  It  is  contemplated  to  procure 
larger  aeroplanes  of  70  to  100  horse-power  and  capable  of  carry- 
ing several  passengers.  Upon  arrival  at  the  theater  of  the  war 
they  will  experiment  with  various  types  of  hand  grenades.  The 
Italian  aviators  instead  of  throwing  hand  grenades  substituted 
Arab  script  calling  upon  the  Arabs  to  surrender. 

Captain  Moizo  made  a  flight  to  scout  from  Tripoli  to  Ghariau, 
85  kilometers  south  of  Tripoli,  and  return,  and  on  February  12 
he  made  a  flight  from  Tripoli  to  Horns  and  return,  a  distance  of 
240  kilometers,  150  miles. 

CONTRABAND  OP  WAR  TRANSPORTATION. 

Solum,  on  the  coast  of  the  Egyptian-Tripolitan  frontier,  was 
the  chief  route  for  Turkish  volunteers  and  contraband  of  war 
to  enter  Cyrenaica.  The  railroad  terminus  at  Marsu  Matruk, 
300  kilometers  west  of  Alexander,  was  connected  by  a  good  auto- 
mobile road  with  Solum,  a  distance  of  200  miles,  and  thus  it  was 
possible  to  cover  the  distance  of  500  miles  from  Alexander  in 
one  day.  Caravans  then  conveyed  arms  and  ammunition  in  large 
quantities  from  Solum  to  the  Turkish  forces  in  Cyrenaica.  Sail- 
ing ships  loaded  with  contraband  also  landed  near  Solum,  where 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  55 

they  could  not  be  seized  by  Italian  bloekaders.  The  Egyptian 
telegraph  operators  also  received  telegrams  for  Constantinople 
via  Alexandria  and  communication  was  practically  uninter- 
rupted. 

These  conditions  were  changed  after  December  15  by  the 
Turkish  cession  of  Solum  to  Egypt  instead  of  to  Cyrenaica,  to 
which  it  had  always  belonged  theretofore.  Shortly  after  this 
cession  Egyptian  and  British  troops  occupied  Solum  and  sup- 
pressed the  contraband  trade.  Lord  Kitchener  directed  the 
strictest  measures  to  guard  against  any  violation  of  neutrality 
by  conveying  contraband  and  Turkish  troops  across  the  frontier 
beyond  Solum.  The  telegraph  operators  were  censored,  and  the 
British  cruiser  Suffolk  arrived  off  Solum  to  enforce  the  observ- 
ance of  strict  neutrality.  These  measures  resulted  in  stopping 
30  Turkish  volunteers  with  two  Russian  aviators  in  their  efforts 
to  reinforce  the  Turks  in  Cyrenaica.  But  these  measures  did 
not  prevent  a  large  caravan  of  175  camels  to  enter  Cyrenaica 
from  Egypt,  presumably  via  Fayum.  This  brought  a  large  num- 
ber of  officers  and  men  to  aid  the  Turks. 

The  Italians  protested  at  Paris  against  the  contraband  trade 
and  open  violations  of  neutrality  across  the  Tunisian  frontier. 
This  protest  was  answered  by  a  statement  that  Italy  openly  pro- 
cured camels  and  provisions  for  her  troops  from  Tunis  and  also 
purchased  flying  machines  in  France  for  her  forces  in  Tripoli. 
The  misunderstanding  between  Italy  and  France  was  such  that 
the  Italians  finally  ordered  the  seizure  of  two  of  the  larger 
French  steamers  plying  between  Marseilles  and  Tunis,  on  which 
Turkish  officers  were  suspected  of  being  passengers.  The  French 
steamers  Carthage  and  Manouba  were  seized  off  the  coast  of  Sar- 
dinia, outside  of  Italian  waters,  and  were  taken  to  Cagliari  where 
they  were  detained  four  days  and  released.  On  board  the  Car- 
thage they  found  the  French  aviator  Duval  with  an  aeroplane 
that  the  Italians  claimed  was  intended  for  Turkish  military 
service.  On  board  the  Manouba  there  were  29  persons  who 
claimed  to  belong  to  the  second  detachment  of  the  Red  Crescent 
society,  while  Italian  officers  claimed  they  were  military  com- 
batants. The  Manouba  was  obliged  to  land  these  29  persons  be- 
fore proceeding  on  her  voyage  to  Tunis. 

The  Italians  were  finally  convinced  that  the  aviator  Duval  did 
not  intend  to  go  into  Turkish  service  and  he  sailed  to  Tunis.  The 


56  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

29  persons  of  the  Red  Crescent  society  were  detained,  and,  after 
considerable  correspondence  and  debates  in  the  French  Assem- 
bly, they  were  finally  released  by  the  Italians  to  the  French  gov- 
ernment. Upon  arrival  at  Marseilles  these  29  persons  were  thor- 
oughly examined  and  found  to  be  all  surgeons,  nurses  or  sani- 
tary attendants,  and,  with  one  exception,  they  were  allowed  to 
proceed  to  Tunis  and  thence  to  the  Turkish  headquarters.  The 
one  officer  who  was  not  allowed  to  proceed  had  large  sums  of 
money  in  his  possession  and  was  not  solely  on  duty  with  the  Red 
Crescent  society. 

The  French  government  earnestly  endeavored  to  stop  all  con- 
traband trade.  January  17,  the  Russian  steamer  Odessa  arrived 
at  Sfax  from  Prevesa  and  the  Tunisian  officials  found  a  large 
consignment  of  arms  arid  ammunition  concealed  in  the  coal  bunk- 
ers. This  cargo  of  360  tons  of  war  material  was  seized  by  the 
French  Tunisian  officers. 

January  25,  the  destroyer  Fulmine  seized  the  French  mail 
steamer  Favignano  in  Tunisian  waters  and  made  a  thorough 
search  with  force  without  finding  any  contraband  on  board.  This 
episode  made  considerable  excitement  among  the  Tunisians,  and 
caused  such  an  animosity  against  the  Italians  that  a  large  num- 
ber of  Italian  residents  in  Tunis  left  the  country. 

The  French  sent  the  armored  ship  Henry  IV  and  four  torpedo 
boats  from  Biserta  to  the  southeastern  border  of  Tunis  to  stop 
contraband  trade,  and  enforce  the  obligations  of  neutrality. 

ITALIAN  NAVAL  OPERATIONS  DURING  FEBRUARY  UNTIL  MARCH  15. 

The  Turkish  armored  coast  defense  ship  Awn-Illah  (Help  of 
God)  and  destroyer  Ankara  were  lying  at  Beirut,  and  the  Ital- 
ians feared  these  ships  would  interfere  with  the  transportation 
of  Italian  troops  to  the  Red  Sea. 

Rear- Admiral  Thaon  di  Revel  arrived  at  Beirut  with  the  Fer- 
ruccio  and  Garibaldi  early  in  the  morning  of  February  24.  The 
Garibaldi  steamed  in  close  and  fired  a  blank  shot.  The  Turkish 
commander  sent  a  boat  with  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  Garibaldi, 
called  the  Ankara  to  slip  her  chain  and  anchor  in  his  lee  close  to 
the  mole,  and  made  preparations  to  defend  his  ship. 

The  boat  returned  with  a  written  demand  upon  the  Wall  of 
Beirut  for  the  delivery  of  the  two  Turkish  ships  in  the  harbor 


THE   ITALIAN-TUEKISH   WAE. 


57 


58  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

before  9  a.  m.,  when  unless  a  reply  was  received  he  would  pro- 
ceed to  attack  the  two  ships  and  he  would  be  governed  by  Article 
2  of  the  IXth  Convention  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference. 

The  Italian  cruisers  proceeded  to  the  eastward  in  St.  George's 
Bay  awaiting  reply  from  Wali. 

The  Wali  received  the  written  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the 
two  ships  at  8.30  a.  m.,  and  was  in  the  act  of  giving  his  consent ; 
when,  at  9  a.  m.,  no  answer  having  been  received  by  the  Italian 
admiral,  the  two  ships  opened  fire  on  the  Awn-Illah  at  6000  me- 
ters, which  replied  slowly  for  about  twenty  minutes  without 
making  any  hits.  At  9.35  a  fire  broke  out  on  board  the  Awn- 
Illah  and  ten  minutes  later  the  Turks  hauled  down  the  flag  and 
abandoned  the  ship  with  the  surviving  members  of  the  crew  of 
220  men.  The  Garibaldi  stood  close  in  and  at  600  meters  fired 
with  the  76-mm.  battery  on  the  Ankara  without  inflicting  any 
damage.  The  Garibaldi  then  discharged  a  torpedo  at  the  Awn- 
Illah,  but  this  deviated  when  half-way  and  ran  in  among  a  lot  of 
lighters  moored  within  the  mole  and  exploded,  causing  six  light- 
ers to  sink;  ten  minutes  later  the  Garibaldi  fired  a  second  tor- 
pedo that  struck  the  Awn-Illah  amidships  and  caused  her  to  sink 
until  she  grounded  and  laid  aground  with  decks  awash.  The 
Awn-Illah  lost  three  officers  and  55  men  killed  with  eight  officers 
and  100  men  wounded. 

Stray  shots  from  the  Italian  cruisers  did  great  damage  in  the 
city;  66  civilians  being  killed  in  the  city  and  several  hundred 
being  wounded.  A  great  many  buildings  were  damaged,  among 
them  were  the  Banque  Ottoman,  the  German  Palestine  Bank,  the 
Salonica  Bank,  and  the  buildings  and  warehouses  of  the  custom 
house,  some  of  which  caught  fire  and  were  completely  destroyed. 

The  Italians  withdrew  at  11  a.  m.,  out  of  sight  to  the  north- 
ward. At  1.45  p.  m.,  the  two  ships  returned  and  the  Ferruccio 
stood  close  in  and  fired  upon  the  Ankara,  which  was  sunk  by  gun 
fire  in  the  course  of  three  minutes.  The  Italian  ships  then  sailed 
to  the  westward. 

s  In  consequence  of  the  Italian  action  at  Beirut  the  Turkish 
government  issued  an  order  to  expel  all  the  Italians  residing  in 
the  Wilayets  of  Beirut,  Aleppo,  and  Damascus  within  14  days 
after  February  28,  1912;  and  that  all  Italians  residing  in  dis- 
tricts that  might  in  the  future  be  attacked  by  Italian  naval  ships 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  59 

should  be  expelled  from  those  regions.  This  affected  60,000 
Italian  residents  in  those  regions. 

The  expulsion  of  the  Italians  from  the  Wilayets  mentioned 
was  strictly  enforced.  Those  who  did  not  leave  voluntarily  were 
compulsorily  transported. 

After  February,  Italian  torpedo  boats  again  patrolled  Turk- 
ish Mediterranean  coasts,  and  the  Italian  press  stated  that  hos- 
tile operations  would  be  conducted  in  the  Aegean  Sea.  It  was 
stated  that  the  Italians  had  only  officially  declared  their  inten- 
tion to  avoid  attacks  on  the  Albanian  coast,  and  did  not  purpose 
to  avoid  all  hostilities  against  other  Turkish  coasts. 

In  the  meanwhile,  as  the  Italian  forces  did  not  make  any  im- 
portant progress  in  the  conquest  of  Tripoli,  and  the  friendly 
offices  of  the  great  powers  to  re-establish  peace  had  failed,  it 
seemed  highly  probable  that  the  threats  of  hostilities  in  the 
Aegean  Sea,  published  by  the  Italian  press,  would  be  attempted. 
The  Turks  therefore  decided  to  put  all  places  liable  to  attack  in 
the  Aegean  Sea  in  thorough  defence.  Measures  for  this  had  been 
suspended  during  the  previous  month,  because  they  were  given 
to  understand  that  the  scene  of  war  would  be  limited  by  the  Ital- 
ians to  Africa. 

The  Turks  began  to  strengthen  the  defences  of  the  western 
approaches  to  the  Dardanelles  at  Kum  Kale  and  Sedil  Bahr. 
The  mine  fields  were  reinforced  and  improved;  350  guns  were 
added  to  the  fortifications,  chiefly  taken  from  the  forts  of  the 
Bosphorus.  The  troops  were  drilled  daily  at  target  practice  and 
40,000  infantry  and  cavalry  were  mobilized  in  the  Dardanelles 
district. 

The  passage  of  merchant  ships  through  the  Dardanelles  at 
night  was  prohibited,  and  because  of  the  mine  fields  all  were 
compelled  to  take  pilots.  Turkish  torpedo  boats  constantly  pa- 
trolled the  approaches  and  the  Turkish  fleet  was  stationed  at 
Nagara. 

At  Smyrna  four  large  merchant  ships  were  heavily  laden  with 
stones  and  held  ready  to  be  sunk  in  the  narrowest  part  of  the 
harbor  channel  at  about  six  miles  from  the  city. 

Two  torpedo  boats  that  had  been  stationed  at  Smyrna  were 
withdrawn  to  the  Dardanelles. 

An  attack  on  Salonica  was  not  expected  so  much  because  the 
commerce  of  that  port  was  carried  on  chiefly  by  the  Italian  col- 


60  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

ony,  and  Austrians  were  largely  interested.  Nevertheless  the 
Turks  strengthened  the  fortifications  and  mine  fields  and  rein- 
forced the  garrisons. 

The  Italian  fleet  in  the  meanwhile  had  completed  all  its  refit- 
tings  during  the  winter  and  assembled  at  Tarento  and  Tobruk. 
Vice- Admiral  Aubrey  died  March  4,  and  Vice- Admiral  Faravelli 
succeeded  as  commander-in-chief .  He  in  turn  was  relieved  by 
Vice-Admiral  Biale. 

The  ten  Italian  cruisers  in  the  Bed  Sea  bombarded  several 
Arabian  ports ;  Midy,  on  February  29 ;  Dubab  (near  Perim) ,  on 
March  4,  and  Shiek  Said  on  March  6.  Midy  was  at  the  same 
time  attacked  and  captured  by  the  followers  of  the  insurgent 
Said  Idriss,  to  whom  the  Turkish-Arabian  garrison  of  60  men 
surrendered. 

In  consequence  of  the  co-operation  of  the  Said  Idriss  with  the 
Italians,  the  ruler  Imau  Yahia  proclaimed  a  "holy  war,"  and 
called  upon  all  the  inhabitants  of  Yemen  to  lay  aside  their  in- 
ternal grievances  and  rally  to  the  support  of  Turkey,  to  destroy 
Said  Idriss,  and  energetically  oppose  armed  resistance  against 
the  Italians. 

After  the  blockade  of  Hodeida,  the  Turks  established  commu- 
nications between  European  Turkey  and  Southern  Yemen  via 
Aden. 

THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  approved  estimates  in  the  Italian  Parliament,  in  March, 
1912,  show  that  for  the  period  of  five  months  ending  February 
29,  1912,  the  current  war  expenses  amounted  to  $41,495,000,  of 
which  $5,790,000  was  for  the  navy  and  $35,705,000  for  the  army ; 
besides  which  $2,045,800  was  expended  for  special  purposes; 
$18,914,000  of  the  amount  expended  for  the  army  included  the 
cost  of  mobilization  and  conduct  of  the  war — transportation  of 
troops,  maintenance  of  personnel,  purchase  of  horses,  ammuni- 
tion, and  war  material — for  the  troops  in  Africa ;  and  $11,966,- 
000  was  expended  to  replace  the  personnel  and  war  material 
transported  to  Africa  in  the  standing  army  in  Italy,  and  for  or- 
ganizing additional  forces  in  Italy. 

The  $5,790,000  expended  for  the  navy  was  for  the  extraor- 
dinary expense  of  maintenance,  transportation,  the  increased 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  61 

complements  of  ships  and  subsistence  with  cost  of  fuel  and  mate- 
rial consumed. 

The  special  sum  of  $2,045,800  was  for  harbor  improvements 
at  Tripoli,  Horns,  Benghasi  and  Derna,  as  well  as  for  telegraph, 
telephone,  and  sanitary  service  in  North  Africa.  This  sum  also 
defrayed  the  cost  of  laying  new  cables  from  Syracuse  to  Tripoli, 
and  Syracuse  to  Benghasi. 

The  expenses  of  the  army  and  navy  thus  estimated  at  $42,- 
140,000  will  be  covered  by  the  saving  in  the  budget  of  1910-11, 
some  $11,172,000,  and  that  of  1911-12— estimated  at  $14,504,- 
000 — together  with  $16,464,000  to  be  deducted  from  the  regular 
budgets  in  the  fiscal  years  1912-13  to  1917-18.  The  apparently 
low  cost  of  the  war  has  been  maintained  by  the  economical  ad- 
ministration of  the  finances,  and  this  expense  amounts  to  about 
$260,680  per  day.  But  an  accurate  estimate  of  the  total  cost  of 
the  war,  of  course,  cannot  be  given  until  after  the  war  is  over, 
because  there  are  many  details  that  are  not  considered  in  the 
present  estimates.  Expert  financiers  estimate  that  the  war  has 
in  the  period  ending  February  29,  1912,  cost  a  total  of  $57,900,- 
000  or  at  a  daily  rate  of  $386,000. 

The  Italian  finances  were  thus  in  favorable  condition,  especial- 
ly as  the  administration  received  a  large  surplus  by  economy  in 
the  budgets  during  the  recent  years.  The  Italian  people  were 
willing  to  make  great  sacrifices  for  this  war,  so  that  there  was 
no  lack  of  money  on  the  part  of  Italy  to  still  further  prosecute 
the  conquest  of  Tripoli. 

The  Turks  spent,  up  to  the  beginning  of  February,  about 
twenty  million  francs,  chiefly  for  establishing  the  new  coast  de- 
fences. February  1,  the  war  minister  received  an  appropriation 
of  $4,436,320  for  coast  defences. 

The  friendly  offices  of  neutral  powers  to  re-establish  peace  be- 
tween the  belligerents  failed.  On  March  9  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives of  Germany,  Austria,  England,  France,  and  Russia 
took  a  united  step  for  this  purpose  with  the  Italian  government 
at  Kome.  They  asked  confidentially  upon  what  terms  Italy  would 
agree  to  suspend  hostilities.  The  Italian  government  replied 
March  15,  according  to  the  Corriere  della  Sera,  as  follows : 

Italy  demands  that  Turkey  shall  recognize  Italy's  absolute 
sovereignty  over  the  African  provinces  and  withdraw  all  Turk- 
ish officers  and  troops  from  Africa,  strictly  forbidding  Turkish 


62  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR 

officers  to  lead  the  Arabs  in  opposing  the  Italians ;  and  Italy  will 
then  cease  hostilities  in  all  parts  of  the  Turkish  empire  and  re- 
duce the  imposts  on  Turkish  goods  to  the  former  rates.  Italy 
will,  on  the  other  hand,  recognize  the  religious  Caliphat  and  give 
amnesty  to  all  natives.  Italy  will  assume  that  part  of  the  Turk- 
ish debt  apportioned  to  Tripoli,  and  will  purchase  the  Turkish 
government  property  situated  in  Tripoli  from  the  Turkish  gov- 
ernment. Italy  further  promises  to  agree,  with  other  powers, 
to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish  empire. 

The  Italian  parliamentary  discussion  proves  that  the  nation 
fully  agreed  with  the  chief  demands  of  the  Italian  government. 

It  also  appears  that  Russia  had  assembled  troops  on  Trans- 
Caucasian  frontier,  had  recalled  the  Russian  Ambassador  Tsch- 
arykow — who  was  in  Constantinople  for  many  years — and  re- 
placed him  by  Von  Giers,  the  former  minister  in  Bucharest.  The 
Russian  press  also  reported  that  a  Russian  fleet  was  ready  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  Bosphorus  in  case  the  Italians  forced  the  passage  of 
the  Dardanelles. 

The  Sultan  presented  the  Shiek  of  Senoussi  with  a  sword  set 
with  diamonds,  a  decoration,  and  other  precious  gifts  in  grati- 
tude for  his  support  of  the  war  against  the  Italians. 

Turkey  replied  to  Italy's  claim  by  reasserting  her  claim  to 
/  full  sovereignty  over  her  African  provinces,  and  the  Arabians 
were  determined  to  continue  their  resistance  to  the  Italian  con- 
quest under  all  conditions.  The  Arabian  representatives  in  Con- 
stantinople declared  that  they  will  continue  the  war  even  if 
Turkey  yields  the  annexation  of  these  provinces  to  Italy. 

During  the  middle  of  March  the  Arabians  in  Tripoli  and  Cyre- 
naica  elected  delegates  to  the  Turkish  Parliament  in  Constanti- 
nople, and  declared  that  the  Italian  proclamation  of  annexation 
of  these  two  provinces  to  Italy  was  null  and  void. 

MILITARY  OPERATIONS  UP  TO  THE  MIDDLE  OF  MARCH,  1912. 

The  Turks  determined  to  vigorously  prosecute  the  war  in 
Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  and  incessantly  attack  the  Italians  at  all 
points.  At  Tripoli  the  Italians  were  kept  constantly  alarmed  by 
these  attacks  by  day  and  night.  The  Italians  also  failed  after 
repeated  attempts  to  capture  Zanzur,  which  was  occupied  by  the 
Turks  in  force,  and  which  they  fortified  with  artillery  and  ma- 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  63 

chine  guns.  In  attacks  against  Zanzur  the  Italians  used,  with 
but  little  effect,  two  dirigible  balloons  arranged  for  throwing 
various  kinds  of  bombs  and  hand  grenades. 

The  Italians  collected  3000  burden-bearing  camels  and  300 
riding  camels  for  the  camel  corps  in  Tripoli.  A  battalion  of 
Askaris  and  a  camel  riding  detachment  arrived  from  Erythrea 
late  in  February,  and  was  vigorously  attacked  by  Arabs  on 
March  4  at  Bir-el-Turki,  the  Askaris  were  routed,  and  only  man- 
aged to  escape  into  Tripoli  under  cover  of  darkness  with  heavy 
losses. 

A  Turkish  attack  on  Ain  Zara  was  repulsed  on  March  10. 
Malarial  fever  broke  out  in  the  camp  at  Ain  Zara,  and  the  gar- 
rison was  relieved  by  other  Italian  troops.  A  portion  of  the  camp 
adorning  a  swamp  was  abandoned,  and  an  advanced  intrench- 
ment  was  captured  by  the  Turks  and  gave  rise  to  a  report  that 
Italians  had  abandoned  Ain  Zara. 

A  narrow-gauge  railroad  from  Tripoli  to  Ain  Zara  was  com- 
pleted as  far  as  Fornaci,  which  is  7  kilometers  from  Tripoli.  The 
Italians  built  a  field  construction  railroad  to  the  stone  quarries 
at  Gargaresch  for  stone  to  build  the  breakwater  at  Tripoli. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  AFRICA  IN  MARCH. 

At  dawn  of  February  27,  the  Italian  garrison  at  Horns  sur- 
prised the  Turks  on  the  Mergheb  heights,  about  four  kilometers 
from  the  town  and  practically  commanding  the  town.  The  bulk 
of  the  Turkish  troops  had  been  decoyed  from  the  heights  to  op- 
pose a  feigned  landing  of  Italians  from  a  squadron  of  transports 
that  appeared  off  Sliten,  about  20  miles  east  of  Horns.  The  Ital- 
ians meanwhile  intrenched  their  position  on  Mergheb  heights  &o 
that  when  the  bulk  of  the  main  body  of  the  Turks  returned  from 
Sliten  that  evening,  the  Italians  defeated  them  in  their  efforts  to 
retake  the  heights.  Subsequently  the  heights  were  strongly  for- 
tified and  the  Turks  could  not  dislodge  the  Italians  from  their 
commanding  position. 

There  were  many  fierce  combats  at  Benghasi  from  March  8  t'.» 
March  12.  After  these  were  repelled  General  Ameglio  led  a 
force  of  seven  battalions,  with  cavalry  and  artillery,  to  the  oasis 
at  Fogat,  where  he  captured  500  Arabs  after  a  desperate  resist- 
ance. For  this  brilliant  victory  Major-General  Ameglio  wat: 
promoted  to  lieutenant-general. 


64  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

Attacks  by  the  Turks  at  Derna  on  March  3,  and  at  Mirsa  To- 
bruk  on  March  11  were  repulsed  with  difficulty. 

In  these  engagements  in  Cyrenaica  during  the  month  ending 
March  15,  1912,  the  Italians  lost  193  killed  and  350  wounded. 

There  was  no  probability  of  any  decided  advance  by  the  Ital- 
ians into  the  interior  in  the  immediate  future.  The  commander  - 
in-chief,  Lieutenant-General  Canera,  convinced  the  government 
at  Rome  that  successful  advances  into  the  interior  can  only  bfr 
made  very  gradually,  and  must  be  accompanied  by  railroad  con- 
struction that  will  secure  every  step  that  may  be  gained.  The 
chief  of  staff,  Major-General  Gastaldello,  who  originally  advo- 
cated vigorously  pushing  the  campaign  into  the  interior,  was 
relieved  and  replaced  by  Major-General  Ciancio. 

There  was  no  probability  of  any  substantial  increase  to  rein- 
force the  100,000  troops  in  Africa,  March  15. 

The  reserves  serving  in  Africa  were,  however,  relieved  by 
men  of  the  active  army. 

A  German  Eed  Cross  detachment  succeeded  in  reaching 
Gharian  about  March  1.  This  detachment  consisted  of  three 
surgeons  and  12  nurses,  two  of  whom  died  of  typhoid  fever  en 
route  via  Tunis.  They  attended  the  sick  and  wounded  in  the 
Turkish  camp  at  Gharian. 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS  IN  APRIL. 

At  the  beginning  of  April,  1912,  the  bulk  of  the  Italian  naval 
forces  was  in  the  home  ports  undergoing  repairs  and  recruiting 
as  in  peace.  Several  divisions  of  torpedo  boats  and  the  four 
auxiliary  cruisers,  the  Duca-di-Genova,  Duca-Degli-Abruzzi, 
Citta-di-Palermo  and  Citta-di-Messina,  cruised  along  the  Turk- 
ish Mediterranean  coasts  and  searched  merchant  ships  of  all 
nationalities  for  contraband  of  war.  The  naval  forces  stationed 
off  the  north  coast  of  Africa  participated  in  small  engagements 
with  the  land  forces  on  the  coast;  among  other  smaller  engage- 
ments the  Etna  bombarded  Hoeifa,  a  small  place  near  Benghasi. 

Vice-Admiral  Faravelli  was  obliged  to  give  up  the  command 
on  account  of  a  severe  nervous  ailment,  and  he  was  succeeded 
on  April  9,  1912,  by  Vice-Admiral  Viale,  who  had  shortly  be- 
fore this  assumed  command  of  the  second  squadron.  Vice- 
Admiral  Amero  d'Aste  took  command  of  the  second  squadron. 


THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  65 

After  the  training  of  the  new  Italian  recruits  was  completed, 
the  reserves  of  1887  were  relieved. 

The  fourth  division,  comprising  three  Garibaldis,  were  in  the 
harbors  of  Cyrenaica,  partly  at  Tobruk  and  partly  in  the  Gulf 
of  Bomba.  It  is  said  that  Bomba,  which  is  55  nautical  miles  west 
of  Tobruk,  will  be  the  future  naval  port  on  the  African  Medi- 
terranean coast.  The  reason  for  this  change  is  stated  to  be  that 
the  magnificent  harbor  of  Tobruk  lacks  adequate  supply  of 
potable  water,  and  that  there  is  an  ample  supply  of  potable 
water  at  Bomba,  which  can  also  be  easily  defended  by  means  of 
the  islands  of  Menelaus  and  Bomba  that  command  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  bay.  The  depths  of  water  and  anchorages  are 
about  the  same  at  Tobruk  and  Bomba,  but  the  serviceable  area 
of  the  harbor  at  Bomba  is  considerably  greater.  The  anchorage 
at  Bomba  is  only  70  kilometers  from  Derna,  with  which  it  could 
readily  be  connected  by  a  railroad.  In  case  Bomba  should  be 
selected  as  the  Italian  naval  port,  Tobruk  would  serve  for  a  base 
for  light  naval  forces. 

As  soon  as  the  report  of  the  occupation  of  Bomba  was  cir- 
culated a  large  portion  of  the  Turkish-Arabian  forces  besieging 
Tobruk  was  withdrawn  to  Bomba. 

The  schoolship  squadron  of  three  Sardegnas  reinforced  by 
two  armored  cruisers  under  Vice-Admiral  Borea  Ricci  resumed 
operations  against  Zuara.  This  force  was  joined  by  the  armored 
cruisers  Carlo  Alberto  and  Marco  Polo,  with  the  auxiliary 
cruisers  Citta-di-Catania  and  Citta-di-Syracusa,  six  torpedo 
boats,  three  naval  tugs  and  three  transports  having  the  two  bat- 
talions of  grenadiers  on  board,  that  sailed  from  Tripoli  west- 
ward along  the  coast  on  April  8,  1912,  for  Zuara.  En  route  the 
latter  force  bombarded  coast  places  and  finally  anchored,  April 
9,  2000  meters  distant  from  the  coast  in  the  newly  surveyed 
harbor  at  Zuara. 

The  naval  vessels  began  to  bombard  the  town  and  fired  shells 
all  day  at  intervals  of  five  minutes  until  night.  The  next  morn- 
ing 20  armed  boats  put  off  from  the  three  transports  and,  fa- 
vored by  good  weather,  made  a  feint  at  landing.  The  armored 
cruisers  at  the  same  time  vigorously  bombarded  the  town.  This 
bombardment,  however,  caused  no  serious  damage,  but  with  the 
feigned  lauding  had  the  effect  of  deceiving  the  enemy  and  pre- 
venting them  from  opposing  the  landing  of  the  Garioni  division 


66  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

of  infantry  at  a  point  about  40  kilometers  northwest  of  Zuara, 
This  division  of  about  10,000  men  had  embarked  at  Augusta  in  7 
transports  during  the  night  of  April  7,  and  under  the  convoy  of 
the  schoolship  division  arrived  during  the  night  of  April  10  at 
the  peninsula  of  Macabez  on  the  Tunisian  border.  With  the 
support  of  the  warships,  including  a  number  of  torpedo  vessels, 
Agordat,  Iride,  and  6  high-sea  torpedo  boats,  that  had  sailed 
from  Tripoli  and  had  met  the  convoy  at  sea  en  route.  The  navy 
immediately  sounded  out  a  channel  and  a  landing  place  in  this 
difficult  locality  that  enabled  the  army  to  begin  landing  at  3 
a.  m.  and  complete  the  disembarkation  the  same  day  without 
any  disturbance  by  the  enemy. 

By  noon  the  next  day  a  detachment  of  naval  brigade  and 
Askaris  also  took  possession  of  the  small  fort  Forwa,  or  Bu 
Kamez,  at  the  southern  end  of  the  Macabez  peninsula  about  35 
kilometers  from  Zuara. 

The  Turkish-Arabian  forces  did  not  appear  until  after  the 
Italians  had  secured  possession  of  this  fort  and  that  attack  was 
repulsed.  The  Italians  then  still  further  fortified  their  positions 
on  the  peninsula  and  prepared  for  their  advance  upon  Zuara 
from  this  new  base. 

A  small  bay  6  miles  long  and  l*/2  miles  wide  served  as  a  good 
anchorage  for  the  Italian  vessels,  and  this  place  has  been  es- 
tablished as  a  torpedo  boat  station  for  the  Italian  torpedo  craft. 

April  12  the  Italian  dirigible  airship  P-2  and  P-3  arrived 
from  Tripoli.  These  airships  had  reconnoitered  the  Turkish- 
Arabian  positions  at  Zuara,  and  gave  the  Italians  at  Fort  Bn 
Kamez  written  descriptions  of  the  enemy's  strength  and  posi- 
tions at  Zuara.  The  airships  then  returned  to  Zuara,  where  by 
means  of  four  small  anchors,  they  were  anchored  close  to  the 
Italian  warships,  from  which  they  were  supplied  with  gas  and 
benzine.  They  then  returned  to  Tripoli,  120  kimoleters  distant, 
after  an  absence  from  Tripoli  of  about  12  hours. 
*4  The  transportation  of  contraband  of  war  from  Tunis  via  the 
coast  road  Ben  Gardane  was  thus  cut  by  the  Italian  occupation 
of  Bu  Kamez.  This  obliged  the  contraband  trade  to  take  the 
more  difficult  and  longer  route  via  Dehibat-Nalut,  about  150 
kilometers  further  in  the  interior. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAB.  67 

THE  BOMBARDMENT  OP  THE  DARDANELLES. 

Although  reports  of  Italian  operations  in  the  Aegean  Sea  had 
subsided  the  Turks  continued  to  maintain  their  defences  in 
readiness,  especially  in  regards  to  the  mine  fields  in  the  Dar- 
danelles. The  Turkish  fleet  remained  inactive  in  the  Straits  of 
Dardanelles,  off  Nagara. 

April  13  the  Italian  first  squadron,  consisting  of  the  Vittorio 
Emanuele,  Roma,  Napoli  and  three  armored  cruisers  of  the  Pisa 
class,  sailed  from  Tarento  with  the  Vettor  Pisani,  flagship  of  the 
Duke  of  Abruzzia,  and  a  number  of  flotillas  of  torpedo  boats. 
The  press  reported  that  this  fleet  had  sailed  for  Tripolitan 
waters  to  relieve  the  naval  vessels  operating  there,  but  the  fleet 
went  tn  t.hft  Aegean  Sea  to  make  a  naval  demonstration  on  the . 
Turkish  coasts.  Simultaneously  the  second  squadron  sailed 
from  Tobruk  and  Augusta  for  the  same  destination.  This  force 
comprised  the  flagship  Regina  Margherita,  Benedetto  Brin,  St. 
Bon,  E.  Filiberto,  three  armored  cruisers  of  the  Garibaldi  class, 
three  auxiliary  cruisers  and  three  naval  colliers. 

The  fleet  united  during  the  night  of  April  17  near  the  island 
of  Stampalia,  west  of  Rhodes,  and  steamed  the  next  morning  at 
a  speed  of  twelve  knots  to  the  northern  part  of  the  Aegean  Sea, 
with  the  flotillas  of  torpedo  destroyers  in  advance.  The  third 
division  under  Vice- Admiral  Amero  d'Aste  remained  in  the 
southern  part  of  the  Aegean  Sea. 

The  main  body  of  the  Italian  fleet  arrived  in  the  northern 
extremity  of  the  Aegean  Sea  during  the  night  of  April  18,  and 
cut  the  cables  between  Imbros  and  the  Dardanelles  as  well  as  that 
from  Lemnos  to  Salonica  and  Tenedos.  At  dawn  the  fleet  was 
off  Enos.  At  6.30  a.  m.,  Vice- Admiral  Viale  steamed  thence 
southward  towards  the  western  entrance  of  the  Dardanelles  with 
the  Pisa  and  Amalfi  well  advanced  in  order  to  entice  the  Turk- 
ish squadron  out  of  the  Dardanelles.  About  9  a.  m.  a  Turkish 
torpedo  chaser  was  sighted  off  the  entrance,  but  immediately 
withdrew  within  the  straits  upon  the  approach  of  the  Garibaldi 
and  Varese.  The  outer  Turkish  forts  then  opened  fire  from  the 
four  coast  forts  of  the  Dardanelles.  Kum  Kale  and  Orchauie  on 
the  Asiatic  side,  and  Seddil-Bahr  and  Ertogrul  on  the  European 
side.  These  partly  modern  fortifications  mounted  18  heavy 
Krupp  guns  of  8-inches  to  11-inches  caliber. 


68  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR 

The  Italian  ships  returned  the  fire  at  a  range  of  about  8000 
meters  and  fired  for  a  period  of  two  hours.  The  three  ships  of 
the  first  division  bombarded  the  two  forts  on  the  European  side 
and  the  five  ships  of  the  second  and  fourth  divisions  engaged 
the  forts  on  the  Asiatic  side.  Turkish  reports  estimate  that  .the 
Italians  fired  342  projectiles.  The  forts,  especially  Fort  Or- 
chanie,  were  severly  damaged.  The  barrack  buildings  were  hit 
frequently,  and  in  the  fort  Seddil-Bahr  alone  the  Turks  suffered 
15  men  killed  and  18  wounded. 

The  Turkish  fire  was  ineffective,  about  150  Turkish  projectiles 
were  fired.  The  Italian  official  report  states  that  the  Italian 
ships  sustained  no  damage,  and  they  expressly  denied  the  Turk- 
ish reports  that  the  Varese  had  been  set  on  fire  by  the  Turkish 
projecitles. 

_  The  Turks  closed jtlie_.JDardaiielles_to_- all  ship_p^n^ ugon_the 
appearance  of  the  Italian  fleet,  and  all ..the openings  in  the  mine 
fields  were  ciose3. 

While  the  main  body  of  the  fleet  was  engaged  at  the  Darda- 
nelles, the  third  division  was  active  in  the  south.  The  battle- 
ship Emanuele  Filiberto  arrived  at  5  a.  m.  with  the  torpedo-boat 
Ostro,  off  Bathi,  the  chief  port  of  the  island  of  Samos  which  has 
10,000  inhabitants,  and  without  any  notice  immediately  opened 
fire  on  the  infantry  barracks  for  1200  men,  and  completely  de- 
stroyed them.  A  Turkish  gunboat  that  was  in  the  harbor  was 
sunk,  the  Italians  claim,  by  a  torpedo  fired  from  the  Ostro,  while 
the  Turks  claim  she  was  sunk  by  her  own  crew.  The  Italians 
departed  immediately  after  sinking  the  gunboat. 

The  Regina  Margherita  and  Benedetto  Brin,  each  with  a  tor- 
pedo boat,  cut  the  cable  between  Rhodes  and  Marmarice  at  both 
cable  landings. 

April  19  the  main  body  of  the  Italian  fleet  started  back  to 
Italy  leaving  the  third  division  with  the  Pisa,  Amalfi  and  a  num- 
ber of  flotillas  of  torpedo  boats  to  operate  on  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor  and  continue  to  destroy  the  cable  communications. 
Among  other  places  attacked  they  destroyed  the  telegraph  sta- 
tion at  Chios  and  that  at  Tschesme  opposite  Chios.  They  de- 
stroyed the  radio  station  at  Guelemich,  opposite  Rhodes,  that 
formerly  held  communication  with  the  radio  station  at  Derna, 
besides  which  they  destroyed  a  telegraph  station  at  Smyrna. 
These  cable  and  telegraph  stations  were  partly  the  property  of 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  69 

the  Turkish  government,  and  partly  belonged  to  the  Eastern 
Telegraph  Company. 
/yX  The  Italian  fleet  bombarded  the  Dardanelles  the  day  the  House 

r 

/of  Deputies  opened  its  sessions  in  Constantinople  with  the  newly 
elected  delegates.  The  address  from  the  Turkish  throne  on  this 
occasion  was:  "The  unjustifiable  war  waged  by  the  Italians 
still  continues  notwithstanding  the  earnest  desire  for  peace. 
We  also  desire  peace,  but  we  cannot  make  peace  except  upon  the 
condition  that  the  maintenance  of  our  sovereign  rights  shall  be 
preserved  intact  effectively." 

The  Italian  press  designated  the  naval  demonstration  a  pro- 
test against  the  address  from  the  throne,  as  the  tenor  of  that 
address  was  anticipated. 

^  Since  sixty  steamers  with  an  average  of  4000  register  tons 
passed  through  the  Dardanelles  daily,  neutral  trade  was  badly 
crippled  by  closing  the  Straits  of  Dardanelles.  '  French  and 
Russian  shippers  complained  to  their  ambassadors  in  Constanti- 
nople, and  demanded  damages  from  the  Turkish  government  for 
stopping  the  commerce.  The  ambassadors  and  foreign  govern- 
ments, however,  delayed  action  because  the  Turks  declared,  on 
April  19,  that  the  Dardanelles  would  be  open  to  commerce  as 
soon  as  there  appeared  to  be  no  immediate  danger  of  further 
attacks  by  the  Italians. 

The  reopening  of  the  Dardanelles  was,  however,  still  post- 
poned, because  some  Italian  ships  and  destroyers  continued  to 
operate  in  the  Aegean  Sea. 

As  the  Turks  had  long  expected  such  an  attack  by  the  Italians 
they  were  fully  prepared  to  resist  it,  and  consequently  the 
Italian  attack  did  not  cause  any  serious  damage  nor  induce  a 
panic  among  the  people. 

Speculators  attempted  to  raise  the  price  of  provisions,  where- 
upon the  authorities  in  Constantinople  published  a  decree  that 
ample  provisions  were  available  in  the  government  depots,  and 
that  the  supply  of  provisions  in  the  markets  was  ample.  All 
persons  concerned  in  efforts  to  raise  the  price  of  provisions 
would  be  summarily  tried  by  martial  law. 

April  16  the  representatives  of  the  great  powers  interrogated 
the  Sublime  Porte  to  ascertain  under  what  conditions  Turkey 
would  consider  negotiations  for  peace.  The  Turkish  reply  was 


70  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

in  substance  that  which  was  expressed  in  the  address  from  the 
throne  to  Parliament. 

Rear-Admiral  Williams  having  retired  from  the  duty  of  re- 
organizing the  Turkish  fleet,  the  British  Bear- Admiral  Limpus, 
on  the  active  list,  was  appointed  to  relieve  him,  and  he  arrived 
at  Constantinople  about  the  end  of  April  with  his  staff  of  British 
officers  to  train  the  Turkish  navy. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  RED  SEA. 

The  blockade  in  the  Red  Sea  was  extended  to  about  double  its 
former  extent,  and  was  declared  to  embrace  the  east  coast  of 
Arabia  on  the  Red  Sea  for  a  distance  of  83  nautical  miles,  from 
latitude  14°  30'  N.  to  15°  50'  N.,  and  included  the  ports  of 
Hodeida,  2000  inhabitants,  Loheija,  of  45,000  inhabitants,  and 
Kamaran  Island.  Neutral  ships  were  allowed  five  days  after  the 
declaration  of  the  blockade  during  which  to  leave  those  ports. 
Neutral  ships  engaged  in  transporting  pilgrims  to  Mecca  were 
allowed  to  visit  the  sanitary  station  on  Kamarau  Island  upon 
condition  that  those  vessels  should  pass  the  southern  coasts  of 
that  island  under  the  escort  of  an  Italian  blockading  vessel.  The 
Italians  made  much  of  the  fact  that  pilgrimages  to  Mecca  were 
not  interrupted  by  the  Italian  blockaders. 

After  the  Calabria  returned  to  Italy,  the  Italians  had,  after 
the  middle  of  April,  the  following  naval  forces  in  the  Red  Sea : 
The  four  protected  cruisers,  Piemonte,  flagship,  Puglia,  Liguria, 
and  Elba;  the  four  gunboats,  Aretusa,  Caprera,  Volturno  and 
Oovernolo,  the  surveying  ship  Staffetta  and  the  four  destroyers, 
Artigliere,  Bersaglicre,  Granatiere  and  Oaribaldino. 

ITALIAN  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  AFRICA. 

During  April  the  Italian  military  operations  were  compara- 
tively quiet.  The  TujkighjvArabian  forces  attacked  all  the  coast 
places  occupied  by  the  Italians^  butwere  invariably  repulsed 
without  J>enf*trqfl|nff  the  Italian  lines.  A  fanatical  attack  at 
Mirsa  Tobruk  was  a  desperate  affair,  but  badly  conducted  and 
disastrously  repulsed.  Enver  Bey  claimed  a  victory  at  Derna, 
but  this  was  disputed  by  the  Italians,  whose  lines  were  not  pene- 
trated. The  Italians  did  not  make_any  advances  into  the  interior 
and  such  an  advance  did  not  appear  probable  soon. 
-  — 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAE.  71 

The  expedition  against  Zuara  that  has  been  related  under  the 
naval  operations  was  the  most  important  of  all  the  Italian  oper- 
ations in  Africa  in  April. 

Aeroplanes  and  airships  made  frequent  reconnoitering  flights, 
and  at  times  threw  bombs  upon  the  enemy  with  contradictory 
reported  results. 

The  railroad  from  Tripoli  to  Ain  Zara  was  put  in  operation 
March  19,  and  the  field  railroad  to  Gargaresch  was  being  built. 

The  Turkish- Arabian  forces  in  the  interior  were  constantly  re- 
inforced, and  it  is  estimated  that  they  had  from  15,000  to  20,000 
troops  before  Tripoli.  In  Cyrenaica  the  Turks  had  about  40,000 
troops,  but  they  were  outnumbered  there  by  the  Italians.  In 
Cyrenaica  the  Arabs  were  temporarily  weakened  by  the  depar- 
ture of  numbers  to  cultivate  their  fields  in  the  interior.  The 
Arabs  were  still  enthusiastic  for  continuing  the  war,  and  the  re- 
ports of  their  being  weary  of  the  war  are  not  well  founded. 

Twenty-three  thousand  Italian  reservists,  of  the  year  1888, 
were  relieved  from  active  war  service  in  Africa;  but  there  was 
some  delay  in  getting  these  reserves  home  again,  and  there  was 
consequently  some  dissatisfaction  in  regard  to  these  reserves  in 
Italy.  New  troops  were  being  assembled  during  April  at  Naples 
to  replace  these  reserves  in  Africa. 

In  the  Red  Sea  the  Arabian  insurgent  Said  Idriss  still  co-oper- 
ated with  the  Italians  in  the  operations  against  the  Turks  in  that 
region.  Late  reports  from  Turkish  sources  claimed  that  Said 
Idriss  had  been  badly  defeated  by  the  Turks,  but  this  lacked 
confirmation. 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS. 

On  April  17  the  Italian  navy  established  a  rendezvous  on  the 
island  of  Astropalia,  which  has  about  2500  inhabitants,  as  a  base 
for  all  the  auxiliary  vessels  of  the  Italian  navy  operating  in  the 
Aegean  Sea.  The  auxiliaries  comprised  transports,  colliers,  dis- 
tilling ships,  tank  ships,  and  ammunition  ships.  The  Italians 
took  possession  on  April  28,  a  naval  force  from  the  Pisa  and 
Amalfi  of  250  men  landing,  and  capturing  the  Turkish  garrison 
of  seven  men.  The  large  open  bay  on  the  southern  coast  of  the 
island  was  made  a  temporary  naval  base,  and  all  the  vessels 
seized  by  the  Italian  torpedo  boats  in  the  Aegean  Sea  from  Crete 
to  Enos  were  brought  here  for  action  by  prize  courts. 


72  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

The  exact  results  of  the  Italian  naval  bombardment  on  April 
19,  at  the  Dardanelles,  are  disputed.  It  is,  however,  established 
that  the  damage  inflicted  by  the  heavy  naval  guns  at  7000  me- 
ters on  the  forts  was  severe,  as  the  Turkish  batteries  were  fre- 
quently hit  and  the  Italians  fired  more  projectiles  than  the 
Turks.  The  Italians  may  have  sustained  some  slight  injury  to 
the  rigging  of  their  ships,  but  no  serious  damage. 

But  the  immediate  effect  of  the  Italian  naval  demonstration 
was  of  much  greater  importance  and  interest  to  the  commerce  of 
Russia  from  the  Black  Sea  ports. 

The  necessity  of  England's  neutrality  was  emphasized  in  Par- 
liament because  of  the  vast  number  of  British  subjects  among  the 
Mahomedans  and  their  interests,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  Eng- 
land's long  traditional  friendship  with  Italy. 

The  British  trade  was  seriously  damaged  by  closing  the  Dar- 
danelles, but  Viscount  Morley  pointed  out  that  Turkey  was  jus- 
tified by  the  treaties  of  Paris  in  1856,  of  London  in  1871,  and 
Berlin  of  1878,  to  close  the  Dardanelles  as  long  as  the  Italian 
naval  forces  theatened  the  security  of  Constantinople. 

April  20  the  Russian  government  protested  to  the  Sublime 
Porte  against  closing  the  Dardanelles  by  the  Turks  in  violation 
of  the  Berlin  treaty,  and  to  the  great  injury  of  Russian  com- 
merce. This  act  seriously  crippled  the  export  trade  of  the  Black 
Sea  that  amounts  to  about  $315,000,000  annually,  and  which 
sum  represents  about  43  per  cent  of  the  entire  export  trade  of 
Russia.  Shipments  of  grain,  ore,  coal  and  petroleum  were  stop- 
ped. The  grain  trade  was  severely  affected,  the  loss  caused  at 
Odessa  alone  is  estimated  at  300,000  roubles  with  a  total  loss  of 
one  and  one-half  million  roubles.  This  grain  was  consigned  to 
Italy,  southern  France,  Switzerland,  Belgium,  England,  and 
western  Germany.  The  delayed  exportation  of  coal  was  very 
serious,  this  trade  had  only  recently  been  developed  on  the  Don, 
and  was  urgently  needed  because  of  the  coal  strikes  in  England. 

At  the  end  of  April  20  freight  steamers  were  obliged  to  wait 
in  the  Black  Sea  ports  with  four  passenger  steamers  of  the  Rus- 
sion  Steamship  Company,  one  steamer  of  the  Russian  volunteer 
fleet,  and  15  sailing  ships.  Six  passenger  steamers  and  one  freight 
steamer  were  prevented  from  entering  at  this  date.  During  the 
middle  of  May  there  were  about  150  steamers  laden  with  grain, 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  73 

coal,  ore,  naphtha,  lumber,  etc.,  laid  up  in  the  Russian  Black  Sea 
ports  waiting  for  passage  through  the  Dardanelles. 

The  expense  incurred  by  each  of  these  vessels  amounted  to 
between  200  and  400  roubles  daily. 

The  Turkish  government  replied  to  the  Russian  protest  that 
the  Dardanelles  could  not  be  opened  as  long  as  the  Italian  naval 
vessels  were  in  the  vicinity,  but  at  the  beginning  of  May  they 
yielded  to  the  pressure  of  the  powers,  and  after  long  delays  final- 
ly reopened  the  Dardanelles  on  May  19. 

Sixty  mines  had  to  be  removed  from  the  mine  fields  in  the 
Straits  of  Dardanelles  before  it  would  be  safe  for  vessels  to  at- 
tempt to  pass.  These  mines  were  removed  with  great  difficulty 
and  required  ten  working  days  to  clear  a  channel.  One  of  the 
mine-laying  vessels,  the  tug  Semendar,  was  blown  up  while  work- 
ing with  the  mines  in  the  Dardanelles.  Eight  civilian  employees 
and  15  military  persons  were  drowned  by  this  accident. 

The  passenger  steamer  Texas  of  the  American  Archipelago 
line  struck  a  mine  in  going  out  of  the  harbor  of  Smyrna,  and  the 
explosion  of  the  mine  caused  the  ship  to  sink  so  rapidly  that  only 
one-half  of  the  people  on  board  were  rescued  by  boats  from  ves- 
sels that  immediately  went  to  her  assistance. 

The  Italians  then  decided  to  continue  pressure  upon  Turkey 
by  seizing  the  other  islands  in  the  Aegean  Sea,  especially  the 
island  of  Rhodes. 

This  island  is  about  ten  miles  from  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor. 
It  had  26,000  inhabitants,  including  17,000  Greeks.  The  Turkish 
garrison  consisted  of  about  1000  infantry  and  artillery.  This 
garrison  was  strengthened  by  a  landwehr  force  of  10,000  native 
Mahomedans.  Stores  of  provisions  and  ammunition  magazines 
were  in  the  interior  of  the  island.  Major  Abdullah  had  com- 
mand of  the  Turks. 

CAPTURE  OP  THE  ISLAND  OF  RHODES. 

The  Italian  expeditionary  army  for  the  conquest  of  Rhodes 
consisted  of  about  9000  troops,  three  regiments  of  infantry,  of 
which  two  were  sent  from  Benghasi  and  one  from  Tobruk;  one 
battalion  of  chasseurs  that  had  been  stationed  at  Tripoli  with 
several  small  detachments  of  light  field  artillery,  cavalry,  sani- 
tary detachments  and  train.  The  latter  including  a  balloon  park 


74  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

and  aviation  apparatus.  Lieuteuant-General  Ameglio,  recently 
promoted  for  his  distinguished  services  at  Benghasi,  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  expeditionary  army. 

The  first  and  third  divisions  of  the  fleet  were  designated  to  co- 
operate with  the  army  expeditionary  corps  in  taking  possession 
of  Rhodes.  The  first  division  under  the  command  of  Vice- Ad- 
miral Viale  left  Tarento,  April  30,  for  Rhodes  via  the  provisional 
base  at  Astropalia.  A  number  of  transports  were  assembled  at 
Tobruk  with  the  third  division  of  the  fleet  and  flotillas  of  tor- 
pedo boats  to  convoy  the  expeditionary  army.  The  waters  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  island  of  Rhodes  were  in  the  meanwhile  patrolled 
by  torpedo  boats,  and  a  considerable  number  of  Turkish  sailing 
vessels  were  seized  as  prizes.  On  May  1  they  cut  the  cable  from 
Rhodes,  Scarpanto,  and  Candia,  so  that  Rhodes  was  thereafter 
without  cable  communication  with  the  mainland.  Turkish  re- 
ports were  transmitted  by  means  of  signals,  but  this  method  of 
communication  was  frequently  interrupted,  especially  at  night, 
by  the  Italian  searchlights. 

The  Italian  army  convoyed  by  the  third  division,  under  the 
command  of  Vice- Admiral  Amero,  left  Tobruk  at  noon  May  2, 
and  arrived  off  the  city  of  Rhodes  during  the  night  of  May  4. 

While  the  vessels  of  the  first  and  third  divisions  made  a  dem- 
onstration against  the  city,  the  transports,  accompanied  by  tor- 
pedo boats,  went  to  Kalithea  Bay,  ten  miles  south  of  the  city,  on 
the  east  coast  of  the  island.  The  troops  were  landed  May  4  be- 
tween 4  a.  m.  and  2  p.  m.,  without  opposition,  and  at  2  p.  m. 
began  to  advance  upon  the  city  overland  from  the  southward.  A 
light  detachment  of  Turkish  troops  that  had  left  the  city  at  noon 
to  oppose  the  invaders  were  met  on  Smith  Plateau  and  quickly 
dispersed,  while  at  the  same  time  they  were  exposed  to  a  bom- 
bardment by  11  Italian  ships. 

The  Italian  troops  halted  about  2  kilometers  from  the  city  at 
7  p.  m.,  and  passed  the  night  in  that  position.  The  Italian  war- 
ships displayed  their  searchlights  on  the  city  during  the  entire 
night.  The  losses  during  the  skirmishes  with  the  advancing  army 
were  very  slight.  The  Italians  officially  reported  seven  wounded. 
During  the  night  the  Turkish  troops  withdrew  in  small  detach- 
ments to  the  west  coast  of  the  island  via  Trianda. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  had  landed  at  Kalithea  Bay  Vice-Ad- 
miral  Viale  sent  an  officer  to  the  Wali  of  Rhodes  and  demanded 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  75 

a  surrender  of  the  island.  The  Wali  declared  he  could  not  resist 
the  admiral  and  had  no  authority  over  the  Turkish  garrison ;  and 
he  therefore  declined  under  protest.  The  Admiral  again  de- 
manded the  surrender  of  the  city  the  next  morning  with  an  ulti- 
matum that  if  not  granted  within  one  hour  he  would  proceed  to 
bombard  the  city.  The  representative  of  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment thereupon  yielded,  and  the  Italian  army  and  navy  took 
possession  at  10  a.  m.,  May  5. 

The  Wali  of  Rhodes — who  was  also  governor  of  the  entire 
archipelago  from  Tenedos  to  Scarpanto — was  captured  on  May  7 
in  the  harbor  of  Lindos  by  the  Italian  destroyer  Ostro  as  he,  with 
other  Turkish  officials,  was  about  to  leave  the  island.  He  and 
his  companions,  together  with  117  other  Turkish  prisoners,  were 
sent  to  Tarento  May  11. 

The  Turkish  garrison  was  prevented  from  escaping  from  the 
island  by  the  watchfulness  of  the  Italian  torpedo  boats,  and  they 
rendezvoused  in  the  vicinity  of  Psithos,  a  region  hemmed  in  by  a 
mountain  range  that  crosses  the  island,  and  at  about  18  kilome- 
ters southwest  of  the  city. 

May  15  General  Ameglio  took  the  offensive  against  the  Turks 
at  Psithos.  He  led  troops  from  two  regiments  from  the  north- 
east and  east  towards  Psithos.  Italian  troops  were  landed  from 
the  naval  vessels  at  Kalavarda,  30  kilometers  southwest  of 
Rhodes,  and  at  Malona  Bay,  33  kilometers  south  of  Rhodes. 

The  Turks  were  thus  attacked  from  three  different  sides  while 
the  battleship  St.  Bon  bombarded  the  only  other  available  road 
of  escape  by  firing  over  the  hills. 

A  desperate  battle  that  lasted  nine  hours  was  fought,  by  which 
the  Turks  were  dispersed,  leaving  83  dead  and  26  wounded 
among  the  ravines  of  the  hills.  The  Italians  took  possession  of 
Psithos  and  passed  the  night  there.  The  next  morning  the  Turk- 
ish commander  surrendered.  The  Turkish  garrison  of  983  men, 
including  33  officers,  were  prisoners  of  war.  In  view  of  their  dis- 
tinguished bravery,  the  Turkish  officers  were  permitted  to  retain 
their  swords.  The  bulk  of  the  Italian  forces  then  returned  to  the 
city  of  Rhodes.  The  Italians  officially  reported  a  total  loss  dur- 
ing the  fight  of  May  16  as  only  4  dead  and  26  wounded. 

The  island  of  Rhodes  was  declared  to  be  blockaded  with  the 
exception  of  the  port  of  the  city  of  Rhodes,  commerce  with  which 
could  be  maintained  under  the  surveillance  of  Italian  authorities. 


76  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

The  former  Italian  consul  at  Salonica,  Bivalda,  was  appointed 
governor  of  Rhodes. 

SEIZURE  OF  TWELVE  TURKISH  ISLANDS  IN  THE  AEGEAN  SEA. 

In  the  period  from  May  8  to  May  20  the  vessels  of  the  first 
division  took  possession  of  the  small  islands  of  the  Aegean  Archi- 
pelago between  Crete,  Rhodes  and  Samos.  They  hoisted  the  Ital- 
ian flag  over  these  islands  and  made  prisoners  of  all  Turkish 
officials  and  the  small  Turkish  garrisons  they  found  on  these 
islands. 

Among  others  these  islands  are :  Kaltria,  Carpantos,  Kasos, 
Episcopi,  Nysiros,  Kalimnos,  Leros,  Patmos,  Kos,  and  Smyni. 
These  islands  were  captured  without  bloodshed.  All  officials  and 
military  personnel  were  conveyed  as  prisoners  to  Italy. 

May  18  the  Regina  Margherita  bombarded  the  small  Asia 
Minor  port  Marmarice,  opposite  Rhodes,  where  Turks  had  as- 
sembled and  established  a  depot. 

The  continued  presence  of  the  Italian  warships  in  the  Aegean 
Sea,  and  threats  published  in  Italian  papers  that  Italy  would 
take  possession  of  other  larger  islands,  induced  the  Turkish  gov- 
ernment to  reinforce  those  islands  and  complete  their  defences. 
All  persons  who  could  not  participate  in  the  defence  of  these 
islands  were  removed  to  the  mainland,  and  additional  troops 
were  sent  to  reinforce  the  garrisons.  Mytileni,  which  had  a  gar- 
rison of  3000,  received  a  reinforcement  of  2000  troops,  who  were 
conveyed  thither  in  small  detachments  by  small  boats  from 
Aivali.  The  garrison  of  Chios  was  in  like  manner  reinforced  by 
several  thousand  troops. 

The  ports  in  Syria :  Beirut,  Mersina,  Acre,  Jaffe  and  Haida, 
were  reinforced  and  fortified. 

BANISHMENT  OF  ITALIANS  PROM  ALL  TURKISH  DOMINIONS. 

May  20  the  Turkish  government  decreed  the  banishment  of  all 
Italians  from  Turkish  dominions;  about  50,000  persons,  12,000 
of  whom  were  in  Constantinople.  The  decree  excepted  clericals, 
widows,  cripples  and  laborers  (about  2000  men),  and  required 
all  others  to  leave  within  14  days. 

The  decree  of  banishment  was  handed  to  the  German  ambas- 
sador, representing  the  Italian  government  in  Constantinople, 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  77 

on  May  22.  This  decree  was  based  upon  the  manner  in  which 
the  Italians  conducted  the  war,  and  especially  protested  against 
the  Italians  for  taking  Turkish  civilian  officials  as  prisoners  of 
war  to  Italy.  It  also  based  its  necessity  upon  the  fear  of  an  out- 
break by  the  populace,  which  was  much  embittered  against  the 
Italians  for  the  war  and  the  government  was  not  able  to  protect 
Italians  residing  in  Turkey. 

A  number  of  Italian  ship  captains  were  arrested,  as  they  might 
serve  as  pilots  for  the  Italian  navy. 

v  The  En^liili  nnfl  FmiHh  pvnnn  pnMi°hQri  protests  against  the 
Italian  seizure  of  these  12  islands  in  the  Grecian  Archipelago, 
and  claimed  that  this  act  materially  changed  the  map  of  Europe 
and  strengthened  the  Triple  Alliance  in  the  balance  of  power 
among  the  European  states.  Russia,  France  and  England  were 
weakened  by  these  acquisitions  by  Italy,  and  control  of  the  great 
commercial  route  through  the  Mediterranean  was  passing  to 
Italy  and  the  Triple  Alliance. 

The  press  demanded  that  efforts  should  be  made  to  stop  the 
war  and  further  encroachments  by  Italy. 

The  Italians  proceeded  to  make  their  possession  of  these  isl- 
ands secure  and  permanent.  A  fortnightly  mail  service  was  es- 
tablished from  Brindisi  via  Patras,  Pireaus  and  Astropalia  to 
Rhodes.  The  Italian  Chamber  at  the  same  time  established  mail 
steamer  service  between  Italy  and  North  African  ports  as  fol- 
lows: 

Syracuse  to  Tripoli,  three  times  every  week. 

Syracuse  to  Benghasi,  twice  a  week. 

Palermo,  Trapani,  Tripoli,  once  a  week. 

Genoa,  Sicilian  ports  and  North  African  ports,  once  a  week, 
and  Venice  and  North  African  ports,  once  a  week. 

Telegraphic  communication  was  re-established  by  radio  sta- 
tions and  cables  as  previously  mentioned. 

There  was  no  activity  of  any  importance  by  the  navy  on  the 
north  coast  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  during  May.  The  school- 
ship  division  and  a  few  ships  of  the  navy  cruised  on  the  coast, 
but  on  May  25  the  schoolship  division  left  Zuara,  or  rather  the 
new  base  Sidi  Ali,  to  recruit  in  Italian  home  ports. 

April  28  the  Italian  transport  Domenico  with  1275  reservists 
en  route  home  was  stranded  on  Cape  Spartivento,  but  torpedo 
boats  and  other  vessels  rescued  the  transport. 


78  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

ITALIAN  MILITARY  CAMPAIGN  IN  TRIPOLI  AND  CYRENAICA. 

3"  During  the  period  from  April  15  to  May  15,  1912,  there  were 
engagements  at  all  the  places  occupied  by  the  Italians  on  the 
coast  of  Africa,  but  the  Italians  held  their  positions  throughout 
without  making  any  advances  in  the  conquest  of  the  country. 
The  summer  opened  with  intense  heat  and  violent  sandstorms. 
An  advance  into  the  interior  was  "not  contemplated  for  this 
season. 

The  expeditionary  corps  that  landed  at  Sidi  Ali  secured  their 
position  on  the  line  to  Fort  Forwa,  also  known  as  Bu  Kamesh. 
The  occupation  of  Sidi-Said  temporarily  stopped  the  contraband 
trade,  and  the  torpedo-boat  harbor  was  completed.  A  radio  tele- 
graph station  was  erected  and  regular  communication  was  estab- 
lished with  Tripoli  by  means  of  dirigible  balloons. 

The  constantly  increasing  Turkish- Arabian  forces,  which  were 
well  supplied  with  artillery,  opposed  the  Italians  all  along  the 
coast.  Major  Fethi  Bey,  formerly  Turkish  military  attache  at 
Paris,  was  in  supreme  command  of  the  Turkish- Arabian  forces. 
There  were  many  desperate  attacks  by  the  Turks,  which  were 
invariably  repulsed,  but  often  with  great  difficulty. 

During  the  latter  part  of  April  the  Italians  made  several  ad- 
/  vances  to  the  southwestward,  but  were  compelled  to  return,  and 
even  lost  territory  they  had  previously  held. 

Zuara  was  still  held  by  the  Turks,  but  the  caravan  trade  was 
considerably  reduced  via  the  Tunisian  frontier. 

At  Tripoli  sandstorms  caused  considerable  damage.  One  aero- 
plane was  destroyed  and  all  the  others  were  damaged,  and  the 
Italians  barely  held  their  positions.  The  defences  at  Tadjura, 
east  of  Tripoli,  were  strengthened. 

May  2  the  Italians  at  Horns  surprised  the  Turks  and  captured 
the  heights  southeast  of  Lebda.  The  Italians  lost  four  officers 
and  61  men  killed  and  wounded  in  this  affair,  but  they  repulsed 
the  Turks  and  have  managed  to  retain  this  advantageous  posi- 
tion, which  was  strongly  fortified. 

The  spirit  of  the  Turkish-Arabian  troops  was  enthusiastic  for 
the  war.  There  were  between  300  and  400  trained  Turkish  offi- 
cers in  the  field.  They  had  ample  supplies  of  ammunition  and 
they  were  not  hampered  for  commissariat.  The  prospects  of  the 
crops  were  good  this  year. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAK,  79 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS,  JUNE,  1912. 

During  the  month  of  June  the  first  squadron  of  the  Italian 
fleet  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Rhodes  and  the  new  base  at  Astro- 
palia.  The  third  division  had  returned  to  Italy  during  the  last 
of  May.  The  fourth  division,  which  had  been  undergoing  re- 
pairs since  the  end  of  April,  had  not  completed  that  work,  by 
the  middle  of  June.  The  guns  of  the  Garibaldi,  Varese,  Ferruc- 
cio  and  the  Carlo-Alberto  were  replaced  by  new  guns,  as  they 
had  fired  more  than  the  limited  number  of  projectiles  from  the 
older  guns.  The  Italian  Naval  guns  are  like  those  of  the  British 
Navy,  made  on  the  wire  wound  system,  and  they  have  an  en- 
durance of  only  60  rounds  with  service  charges,  and  after  hav- 
ing been  fired  60  times  they  must  be  replaced  or  be  relined  in  the 
gun  factory.  The  American  and  German  guns  are  built-up 
guns  and  have  a  much  greater  endurance,  their  limit  being  at 
about  200  rounds. 

The  Italian  torpedo  boats  disquieted  the  East  coast  of  the 
Aegean  Sea.  They  repeatedly  entered  the  Gulf  of  Smyrna  and 
the  Gulf  of  Xeros,  northwest  of  the  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles, 
without  opposition.  Their  appearance  caused  a  panic  among 
the  inhabitants  of  the  coast  and  a  concentration  of  the  Turkish 
coast-defence  forces.  Considerable  excitement  was  caused  by 
the  operations  of  the  Italian  torpedo  boats  in  the  bay  of  Scala- 
nova,  south  of  the  Gulf  of  Smyrna,  where,  in  pursuing  Turkish 
merchant  vessels,  the  Italians  bombarded  several  coast  towns. 

An  attack  on  Smyrna,  and  the  occupation  of  the  island  of 
Chios  were  threatened,  and  the  Italian  press  clamored  for  some 
decisive  blow  to  make  Turkey  yield.  This  demand  was  inexpe- 
dient, as  several  of  the  European  powers  intimated  their  serious 
objection  to  any  further  acquisition  of  islands  in  the  Aegean 
Sea  by  the  Italians,  and  were  determined  by  all  means  to  pre- 
vent the  closing  of  the  Straits  of  Dardanelles  again.  The  Turk- 
ish government  notified  the  powers  that  they  would  completely 
close  the  Dardanelles  if  the  Italians  took  possession  of  any  of 
the  larger  islands  north  of  Samos. 

During  the  first  part  of  June  the  Italians  transported  a  con- 
siderable number  of  troops  from  Tripoli  to  ports  of  Cyrenaiea, 
where  they  would  be  more  available  for  operations  in  the 
Aegean  Sea. 


80  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

For  the  defence  of  Smyrna  and  the  adjacent  region  an  in- 
fantry division  was  sent  from  Constantinople  and  the  reserves 
were  called  out,  so  that  in  the  five  districts  of  Konia,  Uschak, 
Aidin,  Smyrna  and  Denizli  there  were  80,000  Turkish  troops. 

All  Italian  subjects  were  compelled  to  leave  the  Island  of 
Chios,  where  martial  law  was  declared  because  of  the  attitude 
of  the  Greeks  and  the  comparatively  small  garrison  of  about 
1000  Turks. 

Thirty  thousand  Turkish  troops  were  concentrated  for  the 
land  defences  of  the  Dardanelles  at  Gallipoli,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Risa  Pasha. 

The  Turkish  naval  forces  remained  inactive  at  anchor  in  the 
Dardanelles.  About  June  1st  the  crews  of  these  ships  demanded 
to  be  led  against  the  foe,  but  the  ministry  declined  to  permit  the 
navy  to  engage  the  Italian  navy. 

^  The  occupation  of  the  twelve  Turkish  islands  by  the  Italians 
was  agreeable  to  the  Greek  inhabitants.  The  Italians  established 
a,  republican  form  of  government  in  these  islands.  The  admin- 
istration of  the  government  was  chiefly  given  to  the  Greek  resi- 
dents and  each  of  the  small  islands  had  a  garrison  of  only  15 
Italians  with  one  officer,  who  carefully  refrained  from  interfer- 
ing with  the  administration,  but  were  available  in  case  the  civil- 
ian authorities  required  their  services.  The  Italians  organized 
a  police  militia  similar  to  that  of  the  Italian  Carabineers.  There 
were  400  Italians  on  the  Island  of  Kos. 

Rhodes  was  an  exception  to  this  system  and  was  governed  by 
Italian  officials  exclusively.  The  central  point  of  administra- 
tion of  the  group  of  small  islands  was  at  Astropalia  (otherwise 
named  Stampalia),  which  was  also  the  Italian  naval  base.  The 
mail  was  carried  to  the  different  islands  by  Italian  navy  petty 
officers  and  Italian  postage  stamps  were  used.  The  system ^of 
taxation  was  that  which  had  previously  prevailed  and  all  tax 
receipts  were  turned  into  the  Italian  Treasury.  There  was  no 
change  in  custom  duties,  except  that  all  imports  from  Italy  were 
admitted  free  of  duty.  The  Italian  war  ships  seldom  visited  the 
captured  islands,  except  Rhodes  and  Astropalia. 

The  forty-second  regiment  of  infantry  sailed  from  Genoa  the 
last  of  May  to  reinforce  the  Italian  garrisons  on  the  captured 
islands. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAE.  81 

The  Italians  raised  the  blockade  of  Rhodes,  but  no  vessels 
were  allowed  to  arrive  or  depart  between  sunset  and  sunrise. 
Martial  law  prevailed.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  June,  1912,  stated 
in  the  British  Parliament  that  Rhodes  had  not  been  annexed  by 
Italy  and  was  merely  occupied  temporarily.  During  June  the 
cable  between  Rhodes  and  Candia  was  replaced  by  the  steamer 
Citta  di  Milano. 

In  the  Red  Sea,  the  Italian  war  ships  bombarded  the  Arabian 
port  Havza  on  May  26th  and  Mokka  on  June  3rd.  The  destroy- 
ers Artigliere  and  Garabaldino  returned  to  Italy  during  June. 

In  Tripolitan  waters  the  Etruria  repeatedly  bombarded  an 
Arabian  camp  near  Benghasi  and  the  Marco-Polo  shelled  a  camp 
near  Derna.  The  Marco-Polo  also  conducted  an  expedition  for 
the  capture  of  the  port  of  Misratah.  She  sounded  the  channel 
off  Buseheifa  and  planted  buoys  for  the  transports.  This  was 
the  last  of  the  North  African  ports — except  Zuara — that  still  re- 
mained in  possession  of  the  Turks.  Nine  transports  arrived  off 
Buseheifa  on  June  14th,  convoyed  by  the  school  ship  division  of 
three  vessels  of  Sardegna  class  and  six  torpedo  destroyers.  The 
war  ships  landed  the  naval  brigade  at  Ras  Zerek  and  shelled  the 
Arabians,  who  disputed  the  landing.  The  auxiliary  cruisers 
Duca  di  Genova,  Citta  di  Messina  and  Citta  di  Siracusa,  with 
three  transports,  made  a  demonstration  near  Sliten  to  divert  the 
Turkish- Arabians  from  Buseheifa.  General  Camerana  landed 
at  Cape  Zuruk  on  June  16th,  about  seven  miles  east  of  Misratah, 
where  he  was  attack  by  5000  Turkish- Arabians,  who  were  re- 
pulsed on  July  2nd.  On  July  9th  the  Italians,  supported  by 
shell  fire  from  the  ships,  attacked  the  Arabians  vigorously  and 
succeeded  in  capturing  the  town  of  Misratah  of  9000  inhabi- 
tants. By  July  20th,  after  a  series  of  hard-fought  engagements, 
they  cleared  the  fertile  oasis  around  this  town  of  all  hostile  na- 
tives. In  the  campaign  to  capture  Misratah  the  Italians  lost  9 
killed  and  121  wounded. 

THE  BANISHMENT  OF  ITALIANS  FROM  TURKISH  DOMINIONS. 

The  Turkish  decree  of  banishment  of  all  Italians  from  all 
Turkish  dominions  caused  a  bitter  protest  from  the  Italian 
press.  The  German  diplomatic  agents  were  accused  of  neglect- 
ing Italian  interests  in  Turkey,  of  which  they  had  taken  charge 


82  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  protest  was  carried  into  the 
Italian  Parliament,  but  the  Prime  Minister,  Giolotti,  promptly 
stopped  all  consideration  of  the  subject,  because  of  the  agree- 
ment with  the  ministry  that  during  the  war  the  exigencies  of  the 
war  would  not  be  discussed  by  the  parliament,  as  it  might  aid 
and  abet  the  enemy.  The  charge  against  the  German  diplomatic 
agents  was  vehemently  refuted. 

The  Italians  were  banished  without  any  noticeable  incidents, 
but  the  period  fixed  for  their  expulsion  was  prolonged  by  the 
Turks  from  June  3rd  to  June  18th.  This  banishment  was  neces- 
sary  because  the  bombardment  of  defenceless  coast  towns 
aroused  such  a  bitter  animosity  among  the  people  that  the  gov- 
ernment could  not  protect  the  Italians  from  the  mob. 

The  Italians  recalled  all  their  officials  that  still  remained  with- 
in the  Turkish  dominions  and  the  home  authorities  were  in- 
structed to  provide  for  the  reception  of  all  banished  Italians  at 
the  expense  of  the  government  and  as  soon  as  possible  to  give 
them  employment  by  the  government.  The  king  subscribed  the 
sum  of  100,000  lires  for  the  relief  of  the  banished  Italians. 

EXPENSES  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  expense  of  the  war  did  not  require  any  war  loans  for  the 
Italians,  who  could  have  maintained  the  war  without  extra  war 
loans  much  longer,  because  previous  to  the  war  there  had  been 
an  accumulation  of  surplus  funds  annually  for  some  years  by 
economy  in  the  annual  budgets. 

During  the  middle  of  June  the  Turkish  government  decreed 
extra  war  taxes  that  increased  the  ground  tax,  income  tax  and 
industrial  tax  25  per  cent.  The  tax  for  exemption  from  mili- 
tary service  was  raised  from  $233.00  to  $380.00,  while  exemption 
from  the  reserves  was  raised  from  $150.00  to  $187.00.  The  taxes 
on  salt  and  spirits  were  likewise  increased  A  tax  of  three  per 
cent  was  levied  on  the  salaries  of  all  Turkish  officials.  The  extra 
war  taxes  levied  amounted  to  over  ten  million  dollars.  The 
Turkish  finances  were  in  a  critical  condition,  and  in  the  event  of 
necessity  for  a  mobilization  of  the  entire  army  the  Turkish 
Treasury  would  be  bankrupt,  especially  as  France  had  refused 
to  loan  any  more  money  to  the  Ottoman  government  until  after 
peace  shall  have  been  concluded. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR,  83 

In  a  publication  by  the  Naval  Transportation  Bureau  at  Na- 
ples the  expense  for  transportation  of  men  and  material  from 
the  beginning  of  the  war  to  January  1st,  1912,  amounted  to  13,- 
500,000  lires  =  $2,605,500.00,  and  the  value  of  the  material 
transported  in  that  period  was  about  80  million  lires  =  $16,000,- 
000.00.  The  f  olloAving  is  a  list  of  the  transportations : 

In  October,  13  convoys  with  50  steamers. 
In  November,  21  convoys  with  59  steamers. 
In  December,  21  convoys  with  43  steamers. 
Total  in  3  months,  55  convoys  with  152  steamers. 

In  that  period  they  transported  a  total  of  101,389  men,  15,000 
horses  and  mules,  12,000  head  of  cattle,  60,000  cwt.  of  meal,  40,- 
000  cwt.  of  hay  and  30,900  cwt.  of  biscuit,  etc. 

OPERATIONS  ON  LAND  IN  NORTH  AFRICA. 

During  the  period  from  May  15th  to  June  20th  there  were 
constant  engagements  at  the  seat  of  war  in  North  Africa.  May 
19th  a  strong  Italian  force  of  five  battalions  with  mountain  ar- 
tillery and  machine  guns,  marched  towards  El  Atel,  on  the  Tuni- 
sian caravan  road  southwest  of  Sidi  Ali.  They  were  repulsed 
by  the  Arabians  and  vigorously  attacked  by  the  Arabian  cav- 
alry upon  their  retreat.  Positions  remained  unchanged. 

The  Italians  started  another  expedition  on  the  same  route  on 
May  31st,  and,  after  gaining  some  success,  they  were  finally  com- 
pelled to  return  to  Sidi  Ali. 

June  8th  the  Italians  at  Tripoli  made  an  attack  in  force  to 
capture  the  oasis  of  Zanzur.  This  expedition  left  Tripoli  at  day- 
light and  was  composed  of  14  battalions  of  infantry,  one  brigade 
of  cavalry  and  a  mountain  battery,  a  total  of  12,000  men  under 
the  command  of  General  Camerana.  The  Turks  occupied  the 
heights  of  Abd-el-Gilil  and  the  eastern  border  of  the  oasis.  The 
Italians  were  supported — at  long  range — by  the  guns  of  the  Ital- 
ian war  ships  off  the  coast.  The  oasis  is  15  kilometers  =  9.3  miles 
west  of  Tripoli,  and,  after  a  hard-fought  engagement,  the  Ital- 
ians intrenched  and  secured  a  position  on  the  heights  after  re- 
pelling a  flank  attack  by  a  fresh  brigade  that  arrived  from  Bu 
Meliana.  The  main  body  then  returned  to  Tripoli,  leaving  the 
Arabians  still  in  possession  of  the  oasis. 


84  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

Near  Lebda  the  Arabians  attacked  the  Italians  on  Mergheb 
heights  on  May  30th,  June  8  and  June  12,  but  they  were  re- 
pulsed with  heavy  losses  on  both  sides.  On  June  12  the  Italians 
made  a  counter  attack  and  completely  routed  the  Arabians. 

There  were  numerous  skirmishes  at  all  other  places  and  dur- 
ing this  period  the  Italians  simply  managed  to  hold  their  posi- 
tions without  making  any  advances  into  the  interior. 

The  cable  from  Benghasi  to  Syracuse  was  opened  for  business 
on  June  10th. 

GENERAL. 

During  June  and  July,  1912,  the  bulk  of  the  Italian  fleet  re- 
mained in  the  home  ports.  The  armored  cruiser  San  Giorgio 
joined  the  fleet  in  June  after  having  been  floated  and  undergo- 
ing repairs  for  nearly  nine  months.  The  remarkable  skill  with 
which  the  Italians  floated  this  ship  was  a  most  creditable  per- 
formance, a  feat  that  would  not  have  been  possible  twenty  years 
ago.  Her  commanding  officer  was  dismissed  from  the  Italian 
Navy  for  having  run  his  ship  aground  on  the  rocks. 

The  Italian  press  reported  that,  in  accordance  with  the  unani- 
mous wish  of  all  the  great  powers,  Italy  would  in  the  future  re- 
frain from  further  operations  in  the  Aegean  Sea  and  devote  her 
active  hostilities  more  to  Africa.  The  Italians  did  not  seize  any 
more  of  the  Turkish  islands  in  the  Aegean  Sea,  but  continued  to 
cruise  and  menace  the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor. 

On  the  Tripolitan  coast  the  Carlo-Alberto,  Iride  and  Ardea 
participated  in  engagements  at  Sidi  Ali,  near  Zuara,  while  the 
Etruria  co-operated  with  the  land  forces  at  Benghasi. 

The  Italians  substituted  the  army  personnel  in  Africa  by  re- 
lieving 60,000  reservists  with  an  equal  number  of  active  service 
men  belonging  to  conscription  of  four  years  later. 

Out  of  92  chartered  merchant  steamers  two  were  used  as  hos- 
pital ships  and  seven  were  armed  as  auxiliary  cruisers  for  the 
navy.  The  remainder  were  all  used  for  the  transportation  of 
troops  and  war  material.  A  royal  decree  in  June  allotted  the 
monthly  sum  of  $1,400,000  for  war  expenses  for  the  navy  and 
$4,000,000  for  the  Italian  armies. 

Considerable  discontent  prevailed  in  the  Turkish  army  against 
the  Young  Turk  administration.  This  took  such  proportions 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  85 

that  orders  were  issued  forbidding  Turkish  army  officers  from 
taking  any  part  in  political  discussions.  The  troops  in  Albania 
mutinied  and  were  quelled  with  difficulty.  The  Turks  were  an- 
noyed by  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  islands 
that  Italy  had  taken  and  occupied  in  the  Aegean  Sea.  The  peo- 
ple of  Patmos  Island  instructed  their  delegates  to  seek  annexa- 
tion to  Greece  or  independence. 

The  Italians  were  anxious  to  annex  at  least  some  of  the  islands 
that  they  occupied  in  the  Aegean  Sea,  more  especially  Astro- 
palia  and  Rhodes.  They  urged  that  in  making  peace  these  two 
islands  should  be  ceded  to  Italy  in  compensation  for  the  baniflh- 
ment  of  Italians  from  Turkish  Dominions.  The  seizure  of  these 
islands,  in  their  opinion,  did  not  violate  the  Berlin  Treaty,  since 
that  treaty  had  been  practically  annulled  by  Austria's  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia,  and  besides  these  islands  were  seized  as  a  result 
of  operations  of  war  and  had  been  acquired  in  accordance  with 
international  law. 

England  was  anxious  to  keep  Russia  and  Germany  out  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea.  Italy  is  recognized  as  a  Mediterranean  Sea 
power  and  enjoys  the  most  friendly  relations  with  England.  The 
British  Prime  Minister  stated  that  Italy's  friendship  was  prized 
most  highly  and  he  did  not  object  to  Italian  measures  to  im- 
prove her  strategical  position  in  the  Mediterranean. 

The  seizure  and  permanent  occupation  of  these  islands  was, 
however,  thought  to  increase  the  preponderance  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  the  annexation  of  these  islands  was  opposed  by 
France. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  AFRICA  DURING  JULY. 

On  the  Tunisian  frontier  at  Bu  Kamez  the  Italians  had  some 
serious  engagements  with  the  Arabs.  At  one  time  their  position 
on  the  peninsular  was  very  precarious,  and  was  only  relieved  by 
timely  co-operation  of  the  navy.  These  engagements  around 
Sidi  Ali  lasted  for  nearly  two  weeks  without  cessation,  but  the 
Italians  finally  stormed  the  Turkish-Arabian  position  and  gained 
a  great  victory  with  security  of  their  position  on  this  frontier. 
In  these  battles  the  Italians  lost  18  killed  and  114  wounded.  The 
Turks  lost  158  killed  and  200  wounded.  There  were  minor  en- 
gagements in  Cyrenaica  without  any  effect.  The  Turks  cap- 


86  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

tured  a  quantity  of  telephone  material,  which  they  used  to  their 
advantage. 

During  the  relief  of  the  reservists  the  officers  were  granted 
leaves  of  absence  alternately  to  visit  their  homes  and  no  serious 
operations  were  contemplated  at  that  period. 

The  war  caused  anxiety  in  diplomatic  circles  and  the  en- 
tangling nature  of  conflicting  interests  presented  some  knotty 
problems.  The  principles  of  neutrality  tend  to  make  both  bel- 
ligerents to  antagonize  all  neutrals.  The  temptation  to  violate 
the  obligations  of  neutrality,  coupled  with  sympathy  for  one  bel- 
ligerent, nearly  caused  a  conflict  between  France  and  Italy  since 
the  Turks  managed  to  smuggle  contraband  of  war  through 
French  Tunisian  territory.  The  friendship  of  England  was 
manifested  by  a  strict  observance  of  neutrality  on  the  Egyptian 
frontier  in  striking  contrast  to  the  open  smuggling  through 
Tunis. 

Germany  was  anxious  to  maintain  her  influence  with  Turkey 
because  of  her  commercial  interests  in  Asia  Minor  and  Syria, 
and  especially  in  the  Bagdad  railroad  and  similar  enterprises. 
The  Germans  had  great  influence  with  the  Turks  and  Germany 
was  the  most  favored  nation.  This  position  conflicted  with  the 
interests  of  Austria  and  Italy  in  the  triple  alliance.  Russia  pro- 
tested against  the  blockade  of  the  Dardanelles  by  Turkey,  which 
caused  great  losses  to  her  Black  Sea  commerce.  The  Kaiser  and 
the  Czar  had  a  meeting  in  July,  which  was  followed  by  a  visit 
to  Russia  by  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  to  co-operate, 
it  is  said,  in  reference  to  Russia's  protest  against  closing  the 
Dardanelles.  The  results  of  these  two  conferences  are  not  known, 
but  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  is  reported  to  have  been 
strengthened,  and  that  the  French  and  Russian  navies  are  al- 
lied for  future  events  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Black  Sea. 

England  and  Germany  also  became  somewhat  involved  by 
conflicting  interests  and  agitators  in  both  England  and  Germany 
stirred  up  such  a  bitter  feeling  between  these  two  governments 
that  war  seemed  imminent.  England  concentrated  her  navy  in 
the  North  Sea  and  apparently  abandoned  the  Mediterranean  to 
France.  Germany  increased  her  federated  armies  by  providing 
for  two  additional  army  corps  and  by  doubling  the  active  fleet 
in  commission,  instead  of  keeping  a  large  part  in  reserve  as 
theretofore.  The  Reichstag,  though  composed  of  a  majority  in 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR  87 

opposition  to  the  government,  almost  unanimously  approved  the 
government's  proposals  to  increase  the  German  army  and  navy. 

OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ITALIAN  FLEET  DURING  JULY  AND  AUGUST. 

The  first  squadron  cruised  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Turkish  isl- 
ands in  the  Aegean  Sea,  while  the  second  squadron  remained  in 
home  ports  completing  repairs,  replacing  their  guns  which  had 
been  fired  to  the  limit  of  their  endurance,  and  preparing  to  re- 
lieve the  first  squadron  during  August. 
I  The  Italian  Admiral  took  measures  against  any  possible  ef- 

V  forts  by  the  Turkish  fleet  to  recapture  any  of  the  islands  occu- 
pied by  the  Italians.  Some  of  the  ships  cruised  in  the  northern 
part  of  the  Aegean  Sea. 

THE  RECONNOISSANCE  OF  THE  DARDANELLES. 

In  order  to  ascertain  the  preparedness  of  the  Turkish  fleet  to 
attack  the  Italians,  the  Italian  Admiral  decided  to  reconnoiter 
the  Dardanelles  and  also  ascertain  the  condition  of  the  defences. 
July  14th  the  flagship  Vettor  Pisani,  with  the  destroyers  Nenibo 
and  Borea  and  five  high-sea  torpedo  boats,  each  of  200  tons — 
Spica,  Perseo,  Astore,  Climene  and  Centauro — left  Stampalia 
for  the  northern  part  of  the  Aegean  Sea.  At  Leros,  one  of  the 
small  islands  occupied  by  the  Italians,  the  five  torpedo  boats 
were  stripped  of  all  equipment  clear  for  action.  They  were  re- 
painted in  a  somewhat  lighter  color  than  before  and  a  third  of- 
ficer was  assigned  to  each  one,  in  addition  to  the  regular  comple- 
ment. Life  preservers  were  placed  on  deck,  to  be  available  in 
case  a  torpedo  boat  should  be  sunk  by  gun  fire,  that  the  crew 
might  float  thereon  with  the  current,  that  flows  at  a  rate  of  about 
four  miles  per  hour  out  of  the  Straits  of  Dardanelles,  and  they 
could  then  be  picked  up  by  the  vessels  of  the  squadron  that  were 
cruising  off  the  entrance  to  the  Straits.  July  17th 'the  squadron 
steamed  to  the  sparsely  inhabited  island  of  Strati  (Bozaba), 
which  lies  out  of  the  usual  track  of  commerce  and  on  an  unfre- 
quented channel.  Here  Captain  Millo  joined  the  flotilla  of  five 
torpedo  boats,  and,  with  the  Spica  as  his  flagship,  took  command 
of  the  flotilla  to  personnally  conduct  the  expedition.  The  flotilla 
left  Strati  in  the  afternoon  of  July  18th  for  the  entrance  to  the 


88 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 


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THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  89 

Straits  of  Dardanelles,  distant  about  60  miles,  and  where  they 
arrived  at  11.30  p.  m.  The  Vettor  Pisani  and  the  Nembo  and 
Borea  remained  off  the  coast  out  of  sight  of  the  land,  prepared 
when  necessary  to  make  a  demonstration  before  the  outer  forts. 
The  five  torpedo  boats  proceeded  in  column  at  a  speed  of  12 
knots,  which  was  increased  to  15  knots  on  account  of  the  cur- 
rent. Upon  entering  the  Straits  they  first  hugged  the  Asiatic 
shore,  and  then,  to  avoid  the  barricade  of  mines,  they  went  to 
the  European  side  of  the  channel.  Fine  weather,  smooth  sea, 
and  a  dark  night  favored  the  Italians,  so  that  they  passed  in 
through  the  entrance  between  Cape  Helles  and  Kum  Kaleh, 
which  is  here  about  two  miles  wide,  without  having  been  ob- 
served. They  escaped  observation  for  some  time,  though  the 
Turks  had  four  search-lights,  two  on  each  cape.  One  of  the  four 
was,  however,  not  in  action  at  the  time.  At  12.40  a.  m.  the  As- 
tore  was  picked  up.  by  the  search-light  on  Cape  Helles,  just  after 
the  flotilla  had  passed  in.  The  alarm  was  given,  guns  were  fired 
and  signal  rockets  were  sent  up  all  along  the  shores  of  the  Dar- 
danelles. Fort  Seddil-Bahr  opened  fire  on  the  flotilla. 

Captain  Millo  increased  speed  to  20  knots  and  then  to  23 
knots,  while  the  boats  proceeded  in  close  order  and  as  near  the 
European  shore  as  possible,  so  that  the  beams  of  the  search- 
lights might  not  reveal  them  too  clearly  because  of  the  difficulty 
of  depressing  the  beams  to  illuminate  the  surface  close  to  the 
beach  at  the  bluffs.  At  Suandere,  about  6.5  miles  northeast 
of  Seddil-Bahr,  they  were  again  exposed  to  heavy  gun  fire,  but 
none  of  the  shots  took  effect.  The  flotilla  proceeded  up  the  long 
stretch  through  the  Straits  for  eleven  miles  under  fire  from  field 
guns  and  small  arms  all  along  the  Straits  to  Kilid  Bahr,  while 
search-lights  revealed  their  position  plainly.  At  Killid-Bahr  the 
leading  boat  was  stopped  by  a  barricade  of  steel  hawsers 
stretched  across  the  Straits  that  effectually  closed  the  passage. 
During  the  two  or  three  minutes  that  the  Spica  was  stopped  at 
the  barricade,  the  lights  on  shore  and  numerous  search-lights  re- 
vealed the  batteries  on  both  sides  and  Captain  Millo  discerned 
the  Turkish  fleet  of  seven  ships  at  anchor  about  six  miles  to  the 
northward.  Among  these  ships  they  made  out  the  Turkish  ship 
Peik-i-Schewket. 

As  it  was  useless  to  try  to  pass  through  this  strongly  defended, 
narrow  passage,  and  the  cross  beams  of  the  search-lights  made 


90  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

it  impossible  to  distinguish  any  further  details  concerning  the 
Turkish  fleet,  the  flotilla  went  about  and  steamed  at  full  speed 
for  the  entrance  to  the  Straits,  at  first  in  close  order  and  later  in 
dispersed  order.  At  1.30  the  flotilla  rejoined  the  Vettor-Pisani, 
having  escaped  without  any  loss.  None  of  the  crews  were 
wounded  and  the  torpedo  boats  were  only  very  slightly  dam- 
aged. The  Spica  had  several  shots  through  her  funnels,  while 
the  Astore  and  Perseo  received  some  shots  in  their  hulls. 

The  Turkish  fleet  took  no  part  in  defending  the  Straits,  and 
for  this  neglect  the  Turkish  Admiral  was  relieved  of  his  com- 
mand and  Tahor  Bey  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief. 
Every  man  in  the  Italian  flotilla  was  highly  rewarded  for  this 
gallant  expedition.  Captain  Millo  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
Rear-Admiral,  passing  over  25  officers  who  were  senior  to  him, 
and  he  was  appointed  Chief  Inspector  of  Torpedoes.  All  the 
lieutenants  in  the  flotilla  were  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Capitaine 
de  Corvette  (Lieutenant  Commander).  Distinguished-service 
medals  were  presented  in  person  by  the  King,  who  also  presented 
each  boat  with  a  special  flag. 

After  this  experience  the  Turks  narrowed  the  open  spaces 
through  the  barricades  and  mine  fields,  without  interfering  with 
the  passage  of  merchant  vessels  through  the  Straits  with  pilots. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  RED  SEA. 

In  the  Red  Sea  the  Italian  naval  forces  attacked  the  fortified 
positions  and  forts  at  Hodeida  with  the  Piemonte,  Caprera  and 
Aretusa  on  July  27th  and  August  12th.  In  the  last  bombard- 
ment the  Italians  destroyed  a  Turkish  powder  magazine. 

The  Italians  were  remarkably  successful  in  maintaining  radio- 
communication  direct  between  the  Marconi  station  at  Caltano- 
Pisa,  and  the  station  at  Massowah  Red  Sea.  The  radiograms 
traversed  a  portion  of  the  Sahara  desert  and  were  transmitted 
for  a  distance  of  2,350  miles. 

ON  THE  TRIPOLITAN  COAST. 

The  school  ship  division,  consisting  of  three  ships  of  Sardegna 
class,  two  destroyers  and  six  high  sea  torpedo  boats,  convoyed  a 
fleet  of  seven  transports,  with  the  Tassoni  division  of  infantry, 
from  Augusta  August  3rd  to  take  possession  of  Zuara.  The 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  91 

navy  conducted  the  landing  of  this  force  on  August  5th  at  a 
point  about  two  miles  east  of  Zuara.  The  naval  landing  force 
constituted  the  van  in  landing  and  the  guns  of  the  fleet  bom- 
barded the  coast.  The  troops  were  landed  by  the  ship's  boats 
and  12  coral  fishing  smacks. 

The  recently  organized  Naval  Academy  division,  consisting  of 
the  naval  cadet  school  ship  Etna  and  the  naval  apprentice  school 
ships  Flavino  Gioja  and  America  Vespucci,  under  the  command 
of  Admiral  Bono,  had  in  the  meantime  relieved  the  troops  of  the 
garrison  in  the  Italian  positions  west  of  Zuara,  so  that  they 
could  operate  against  Zuara  from  the  westward  simultaneously 
with  the  attack  from  the  eastward  and  southward.  The  Carlo- 
Alberto  followed  this  movement  and  supported  the  march  of 
General  Lequio  along  the  coast. 

Upon  arrival  of  the  Italian  forces  from  all  three  directions 
found  the  city  deserted.  The  occupation  of  Zuara  thus 
completed  the  Italian  possession  of  the  entire  coast  of  Tripoli 
and  Cyrenaica.  The  Turkish-Arabian  forces  had  all  withdrawn 
from  the  vicinity  of  the  coast,  but  they  still  held  the  Italians  in 
check  against  any  prolonged  excursions  into  the  interior. 

INTERNAL  DISORDERS  IN  TURKEY. 

The  crews  of  the  Turkish  fleet  participated  with  the  army  in 
the  political  affairs  of  the  country.  The  discontent  among  the 
troops  in  Albania,  protesting  for  political  rights  and  denouncing 
special  privileges,  spread  and  caused  the  formation  of  the  Mili- 
tary League,  to  which  the  majority  of  the  naval  officers  also  be- 
longed. This  league  protested  against  the  Young  Turk  govern- 
ment and  claimed  that  they  had  adopted  unconstitutional  meas- 
ures, especially  during  the  elections;  that  they  had  introduced 
politics  in  the  army  by  which  mediocre  political  favorites  had 
been  advanced  to  the  detriment  of  more  efficient  officers;  that 
unnecessary  bloodshed  be  avoided  in  dealing  with  the  discon- 
tented troops  in  Albania,  and  finally  they  held  the  Young  Turk 
government  responsible  for  the  disastrous  war  because  they 
HAD  NEGLECTED  TO  PREPARE  FOR  PROPER  DE- 
FENCE OF  TRIPOLI  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE  BEFORE  THE 
WAR. 


92  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR 

This  Military  League  was  most  potent  in  causing  the  down- 
fall of  the  Young  Turk  government  on  July  17th  and  the  dis- 
solution of  parliament  on  August  5th.  On  August  4th  the  league 
sent  a  delegation  of  officers  in  the  destroyer  Nemune-i-Hamie  to 
Constantinople  to  demand  the  dissolution  of  Parliament.  The 
destroyer  anchored  in  range  of  the  Parliament  House  and  three 
other  vessels  were  ready  to  follow  her  the  next  day  when  their 
demand  was  conceded.  The  officers  also  telegraphed  from  the 
fleet  at  Nagara  that  a  naval  officer  should  be  appointed  Minister 
of  the  Navy  and  they  threatened  to  bring  the  fleet  to  Constan- 
tinople if  that  was  not  done. 

The  new  Minister  of  Marine — a  naval  officer — issued  an  order 
to  all  officers  to  refrain  from  political  agitation,  and  he  was  sup- 
ported in  this  by  the  Military  League.  As  soon  as  Parliament 
was  dissolved  the  new  government  proclaimed  martial  law  to 
prevent  any  uprising  of  the  Young  Turks.  This  was  strictly  en- 
forced in  Constantinople,  Salonica,  Adrianople  and  Smyrna. 
These  decisive  measures  compelled  the  Young  Turk  party  to 
give  up  all  idea  of  resistance. 

The  Central  Committee,  of  the  Young  Turks,  assured  the  new 
government  that  they  would  refrain  from  any  further  agitation. 
The  league  was  disbanded  and  August  14th  the  army  officers 
swore  allegiance  and  promised  to  refrain  from  political  discus- 
sion. All  officers  of  the  navy  and  the  provinces  took  the  same 
oath  to  refrain  from  politics. 

Cholera  prevailed  in  Constantinople  and  caused  considerable 
distress  among  the  people. 

These  internal  disorders  interrupted  the  negotiations  for 
peace  for  which  Italian  and  Turkish  plenipotentiaries  had  met 
at  Lausanne,  Switzerland.  The  fall  of  the  Young  Turk  govern- 
ment, which  could  not  make  any  peace  that  involved  the  loss  by 
Turkey  of  the  two  African  provinces,  without  risking  their  con- 
trol of  the  government,  removed  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  con- 
clude peace.  The  financial  condition  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  mobilized  Turkish  army  created  a  strong  demand  for  peace 
by  yielding  to  the  demands  of  Italy. 

OPERATIONS  DURING  AUGUST  AND  SEPTEMBER,  1912. 

The  vessels  of  the  first  squadron  of  the  Italian  navy  were  re- 
fitting in  the  home  ports  when  the  second  squadron  sailed  from 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  93 

Tarento  on  August  22  for  the  coast  of  Syria.  The  appearance 
of  this  fleet  on  August  7th  and  28th  off  Jaffa,  Haifa  and  Beirut 
caused  great  anxiety  among  the  inhabitants  of  those  ports.  The 
fleet,  however,  merely  searched  neutral  ships  for  contraband  of 
war  and  captured  several  Turkish  sailing  ships,  after  which  they 
proceeded  along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  to  the  islands  in  the 
Aegean  Sea  that  were  occupied  by  the  Italians,  and  thence  to  the 
African  ports  of  Cyrenaica  and  Tripoli. 

The  Piemonte  and  the  four  large  destroyers  left  the  Red  Sea 
so  that  the  remaining  Italian  naval  forces  were  the  cruisers 
Liguria,  Elba  and  Puglia,  the  torpedo  vessels  Aretusa  and  Ca- 
prera  and  the  special  ships  Staff  eta  and  Governolo. 

The  Greeks  on  the  Aegean  Islands  that  had  hitherto  been  un- 
der Turkish  dominion  endeavored  to  free  themselves  from  Turk- 
ish control.  The  two  small  islands  about  six  miles  west  of  Samos, 
Nicaria  and  Furni,  with  about  15,000  inhabitants,  succeeded  in 
overpowering  the  Turkish  garrisons  and  declared  their  inde- 
pendence. They  sent  delegates  to  Athens  and  submitted  a  me- 
morial to  the  European  powers  for  recognition  of  their  inde- 
pendence. The  struggle  of  the  Greeks  for  independence  on  the 
island  of  Samos  was  supported  by  the  Independence  party  in 
Crete,  who  sent  an  armed  expedition  of  600  men  from  Crete  to 
Samos.  They  attempted  to  overthrow  the  Turkish  garrison  of 
900  men  and  proclaim  independence.  This  attempt  was  tem- 
porarily frustrated  by  the  English  and  French  cruisers  Diana, 
Medea  and  Bruix  that  were  cruising  in  that  vicinity.  Notwith- 
standing this,  about  300  Cretans  managed  to  land  on  Samos  to 
assist  the  people  against  the  Turks. 

During  September  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Italian  ar- 
mies in  Africa,  Lieutenant  General  Caneva,  was  recalled  and 
promoted  to  be  General  of  the  army.  The  two  Corps  Command- 
ers, Lieutenant  General  Briceolla,  in  Cyrenaica,  and  Lieutenant 
General  Ragni,  in  Tripoli,  were  given  independent  command  of 
their  respective  districts  and  in  charge  of  both  military  and 
civil  administrative  duties. 

September  17th  there  was  a  battle  at  Derna,  in  which  the  at- 
tacking Turkish- Arabian  forces  were  repulsed,  leaving  111  killed 
on  the  field.  The  Italians  lost  61  killed  and  113  wounded. 

September  20th  the  Italian  troops  in  Tripoli,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant  General  Ragni,  finally  succeeded  in  captur- 


94  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR 

ing  the  Oasis  of  Zanzur,  after  a  desperate  battle  that  lasted  ten 
hours  and  in  which  the  Italians  lost  200  killed.  The  Turkish- 
Arabian  forces  retreated  to  Zavia,  a  place  not  far  from  the  coast, 
and  about  24  miles  west  of  Tripoli. 

September  13th  the  Etna  bombarded  the  Arabian  position  at 
Zuagla,  near  the  ruins  of  ancient  Tripoli. 

The  "Popolo  Romano"  published  a  statement  that  at  the  be- 
ginning of  September  there  were  95,000  Italian  troops  in  North 
Africa,  and  in  the  captured  Aegean  Sea  islands.  In  Italy  there 
were  150,000  troops  in  the  army,  besides  25,000  Carabinieri  and 
135,000  recruits. 

The  Italian  War  Minister  published  a  statement  that  up  to 
the  beginning  of  July  the  Italians  had  captured  88  Turkish  of- 
ficers, 227  non-commissioned  officers  and  1,436  private  Turkish 
soldiers. 

The  Turks  captured  Captain  Moizo,  the  commander  of  the 
Italian  aviation  corps,  on  September  10th  as  his  motor  failed 
while  in  flight  over  the  enemy's  territory  between  Zuara  and 
Tripoli. 

The  negotiations  for  peace  continued  during  September  in 
Switzerland,  and  probabilities  of  peace  were  so  promising  that 
the  Turks  dispersed  the  army  that  had  been  assembled  at 
Smyrna  during  August  and  those  extra  forces  were  sent  to  their 
regular  headquarters  and  reserves  were  ordered  to  their  homes. 

These  peace  negotiations  were  expedited  by  the  threatened 
war  of  the  Balkan  States  against  Turkey.  The  second  squadron 
cruised  during  the  latter  part  of  September  in  the  Aegean  Sea 
off  Chios,  Mityleui  and  Haifa  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Smyrna 
with  the  object  of  bringing  pressure  on  the  Turks  to  yield  to 
Italian  demands  and  conclude  peace. 

This  demonstration  prevented  the  Turks  from  reinforcing 
their  European  armies  by  the  troops  that  had  been  ordered 
shortly  before  to  return  to  their  headquarters  from  Smyrna. 

October  3rd  the  Coatit  bombarded  a  Turkish  camp  on  the 
shore  of  the  Bay  of  Kalamaki,  on  the  south  coast  of  Asia  Minor, 
because  the  Turks  had  fired  upon  her  as  she  was  towing  a  prize 
out  of  the  harbor.  The  Coatit  also  shelled  an  infantry  battalion 
on  the  beach  of  the  Bay  of  Scalanaova,  which  was  in  act  of  cross- 
ing over  from  Kapomicali  to  the  Island  of  Samos.  The  Coatit 
fired  about  200  projectiles  against  the  fleeing  Turkish  troops 


THE    ITALIAN-TUEKISH   WAR.  95 

and  inflicted  severe  losses.  The  Commander  of  the  French 
cruiser  Bruix  is  reported  to  have  protested  against  this  act  as  a 
violation  of  international  law. 

Since  the  peace  negotiations  were  delayed,  the  Italians  finally 
presented  an  ultimatum  fixing  the  period  for  acceptance  of  the 
Italian  demands  at  a  date  not  later  than  October  15th,  and  they 
at  the  same  time  began  to  prepare  an  expedition  against  Euro- 
pean Turkey  to  compel  the  Ottoman  government  to  yield.  These 
preparations  consisted  of  the  organization  and  transportation  of 
an  expeditionary  army  and  the  departure  of  the  first  squadron 
to  reinforce  the  second  squadron  in  the  Aegean  Sea.  The  first 
squadron  sailed  on  October  14th,  but  was  recalled  by  wireless 
the  next  day,  when  the  news  was  received  that  the  preliminaries 
for  peace  had  been  signed.  The  squadron  returned  to  Tarento. 

The  insurrection  on  the  Island  of  Samos  ended  finally  by  the 
withdrawal  of  all  the  Turkish  troops  from  that  island  to  Chios. 
The  Prince  of  Samos  also  fled  and  Sofulis,  the  leader  of  the  In- 
surrectionists, proclaimed  an  independent  republic. 

A  number  of  Italian  steamers  that  were  employed  as  auxiliar- 
iary  cruisers  were  relieved  from  naval  service.  Among  these  the 
Duca  di  Geneva  and  Duca  delgi  Abruzzi  had  rendered  most 
valuable  service. 

The  Italian  operations  in  the  African  campaign  were  likewise 
influenced  by  the  probabilities  of  peace.  At  Derna  only  they 
had  some  serious  battles.  Here  18  battalions  of  Italian  infantry 
made  vigorous  efforts  to  extend  the  area  of  the  territory  around 
that  port.  These  battles,  fought  on  September  14th,  October  7th 
and  October  llth,  resulted  in  an  extension  of  territory  in  pos- 
session of  the  Italians  to  include  a  rectangular  area  around  Der- 
na of  about  eight  square  miles,  four  miles  along  the  coast  and 
two  miles  back  into  the  interior,  where  a  line  of  intrenchments 
and  fortified  positions  were  built  on  hills  and  along  the  streams 
flowing  to  the  sea. 

The  Italians  occupied  Bomba  after  making  feints  at  neigh- 
boring points  on  both  flanks  of  that  port. 

In  Tripoli  everything  was  quiet  after  the  occupation  of  Zan- 
zur  and  on  September  8th  the  narrow-gauge  Italian  railroad 
from  Gagaresh  to  Zanzur,  about  14  miles  long,  was  opened  for 
traffic,  with  a  view  to  further  extension  to  Gharian  as  progress 
should  be  made  in  occupying  the  hinterland. 


96  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

The  war  had  prevailed  a  year  from  September  29th,  and  dur- 
ing that  period,  by  means  of  150,000  troops  in  Africa  and  at  a 
cost  of  $100,000,000.00,  the  Italians  had  succeeded  in  capturing 
and  occupying  the  principal  ports,  viz. :  Tripoli,  Horns,  Misra- 
tah,  Zuara,  Benghasi,  Derna,  Bomba  and  Tobruk.  At  Tripoli 
only  they  had  acquired  a  considerable  area,  that  extended  for 
about  24  miles  along  the  coast  and  about  eight  miles  into  the  in- 
terior. The  territory  occupied  at  the  other  ports  was  very  small 
and  averaged  only  about  ten  square  miles  at  each  port. 

At  the  end  of  September  the  Italians  had  about  110,000  troops 
in  Africa — about  45,000  at  Tripoli  and  vicinity,  15,000  at  Zuara 
and  Sidi  Ali,  6000  at  Horns,  10,000  at  Misratah,  10,000  at  Beng- 
hasi, 18,000  at  Derna  and  6000  at  Tobruk.  They  were  opposed 
by  about  40,000  Turks  and  Arabians,  half  of  whom  were  around 
Tripoli.  A  large  number  of  the  Arabians  were  absent  on  fur- 
lough to  till  the  soil.  The  Turkish-Arabians  had  their  own  field 
guns  and  constantly  received  supplies  from  across  both  the 
Tunisian  and  Egyptian  frontiers. 

In  the  year's  war  the  Italians  sustained  a  loss  of  about  4000 
killed  and  6000  wounded,  which  is  regarded  as  comparatively 
small.  From  a  military  point  of  view  the  result  is  regarded  as 
meagre,  primarily  due  to  a  misconception  of  the  relations  be- 
tween the  Turks  and  the  Arabian  inhabitants  of  the  African 
provinces.  In  the  beginning  the  Italians  were  greeted  by  many, 
such  as  the  Chief  of  the  Sennoussi  tribe,  as  liberators  from  the 
Turkish  yoke,  and  the  Italians  thought  a  small  force  would  suf- 
fice to  conquer  the  country  with  the  aid  of  those  who  were  dis- 
satisfied with  the  Ottoman  government.  The  Arabians  hesitated 
at  first  to  oppose  the  Italians,  but  their  failure  to  win  decisive 
victories  promptly  gave  the  Turks  time  to  organize  their  forces, 
appeal  to  their  religion  and  oppose  the  invasion  of  the  unbe- 
lievers. 

The  Italian  navy  proved  equal  to  every  demand  upon  it  and 
they  displayed  a  most  distinguished  efficiency.  In  every  oper- 
ation of  the  war  where  it  was  possible  for  the  Italian  navy  to 
operate  they  were  uniformly  successful. 

In  the  convoy  of  the  troops  and  the  landing  at  different  ports 
the  naval  landing  parties  invariably  led  and  successfully  cap- 
tured places  that  they  attacked  though  these  advanced  naval 
landing  parties  were  promptly  relieved  as  soon  as  the  navy 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR,  97 

could  convey  the  military  forces  ashore  by  their  boats  and  the 
lighters,  pontoons  and  fishing  smacks  they  took  with  every  expe- 
dition. 

The  navy  efficiently  blockaded  the  ports  and  maintained  com- 
mand of  sea,  so  that  the  military  operations  were  not  interrupted 
by  any  over  sea  attacks. 

The  Italian  navy  co-operated  in  the  defence  of  ports  when- 
ever they  were  attacked  and  the  gun  fire  from  the  ships  only 
enabled  the  Italians  to  repulse  the  desperate  fanatical  attacks  of 
the  Arabians. 

The  Turkish  navy  was  decidedly  inefficient  and  did  not  dis- 
ute  the  Italian  command  of  the  sea.  The  only  naval  action  in 
which  the  Turks  made  any  decided  resistance  was  at  Beirut, 
where  for  20  minutes  the  Turkish  Monitor,  the  coast  defence 
ship  Awn-Illah ,  replied  to  the  attack  by  the  two  armored  cruis- 
ers Ferruccio  and  Garibaldi.  In  those  20  minutes  the  Italians 
fired  so  efficiently  that  the  Turkish  Commander  was  obliged  to 
haul  down  his  flag  and  abandon  the  ship.  The  Turks  failed  to 
score  a  single  hit  and  did  no  damage  whatever  to  the  Italians. 
The  Garibaldi  fired  two  torpedoes,  both  of  which  were  accurate 
shots.  The  first  torpedo,  however,  fouled  the  moorings  of  six 
lighters  that  were  at  the  mole  and  it  exploded  and  destroyed 
those  lighters  and  left  a  clear  path  for  the  second  torpedo  that 
struck  the  Awn-Illah  amidship  and  exploded  and  sank  the  ship. 

In  the  operations  in  the  Red  Sea  the  Italian  navy  completely 
blocked  any  attack  on  the  Italian  colony  at  Erythrea  and  con- 
tributed greatly  to  the  conquest  of  the  African  provinces  by  de- 
priving the  Turks  of  the  reinforcements  they  expected  from 
Arabia. 

The  most  brilliant  exploit  in  the  war  was  the  reconnoissance 
of  the  Dardanelles  by  Captain  Millo  and  his  flotilla  of  five  tor- 
pedo boats. 

The  Italian  navy  covered  itself  with  glory  in  this  war.  The 
navy  did  not  suffer  any  losses  whatever,  except  among  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  naval  landing  brigades  at  different  ports  where 
they  were  the  first  to  land. 

The  Turkish  navy  was  not  permitted  to  venture  out  of  the 
Dardanelles  when  any  Italian  naval  vessels  were  in  the  Aegean 
Sea,  but  subsequent  events  in.  the  Balkan  war  proved  that  the 


98  THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

preparedness  of  the  Turkish  navy  was  underestimated  even  by 
the  Turks.  They  had  no  confidence  in  the  fleet. 

Italy  is  the  first  nation  to  use  aeroplanes  in  war,  and  they 
were  operated  by  Italian  naval  aviators  with  considerable  suc- 
cess, but  they  did  not  prove  to  be  as  formidable  as  weapons  as 
was  expected.  At  first  they  tried  throwing  the  Cipelli  bombs 
from  these  aeroplanes  and  the  "London  Illustrated  News"  had 
a  very  striking  illustration  of  a  retreat  by  Turkish-Arabian 
troops  being  pursued  by  a  flock  of  Italian  aeroplanes  that  filled 
the  background  of  an  artistic  picture  with  exploding  bombs. 
But  this  was  not  actually  seen,  but  only  dreamed  by  the  special 
artist  on  the  field. 

The  Italians  did  not,  as  far  as  could  be  authoritatively  ascer- 
tained, develop  a  reliable  hand  grenade  to  be  thrown  from  an 
aeroplane.  The  Germans  have  invented  a  peculiar  sighting  ap- 
paratus with  a  gun,  by  which  the  bombs  from  airships  can  be 
fired  with  some  greater  degree  of  accuracy,  but  these  bombs  were 
not  used  by  the  Italians. 

The  dirigible  airships  were  much  more  valuable.  The  Italians 
had  two  in  use  at  Tripoli  that  made  many  flights  for  consider- 
able distances  from  Tripoli  to  Zuara  and  return  and  also  from 
Tripoli  to  Gharian  and  return,  making  voyages  for  several  hun- 
dred miles.  In  these  dirigibles  photographs  were  taken  and 
these  reconnoissances  secured  accurate  reliable  information. 

This  experience  demonstrated  the  indispensable  necessity  of 
aeroplanes  and  dirigible  airships  in  war. 

In  wireless  telegraphy  the  Italians  were  also  very  successful, 
and  in  all  their  operations  they  used  this  method  of  communica- 
tion much  more  than  ever  before. 

The  Italians  also  used  automobiles,  auto  trucks  and  many  va- 
rieties of  motor  wagons  in  all  their  expeditions,  while  motor- 
cycles were  found  to  be  very  valuable. 

During  the  war  the  Italians  had  in  constant  service  39  battle- 
ships, cruisers  and  gunboats,  30  auxiliary  vessels  of  all  kinds,  23 
torpedo  boat  destroyers,  35  high  sea  torpedo  boats,  16  coast  tor- 
pedo boats,  two  hospital  ships,  one  ammunition  transport  and 
one  Vulcan  repair  ship;  besides  the  88  transports  which  were 
used  for  transportation  of  troops,  and  which  had  each  a  small 
detachment  of  officers  and  men  of  the  navy. 


THE    ITALIAN-TUEKISH    WAE.  99 

The  Italian  navy  did  not  have  the  necessary  number  of  naval 
personnel  to  man  all  these  ships  and  large  numbers  of  men  be- 
longing to  the  army  conscription  were  employed  in  the  navy, 
especially  those  well  adapted  for  sea  service. 

Throughout  the  entire  war  the  army  and  navy  co-operated 
with  thorough  harmony,  and  this  co-operation  was  most,  credit- 
able and  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  war. 

THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE  SIGNED  AT  LAUSANNE,  SWITZERLAND. 

Three  Envoy-plenipotentiaries  from  Italy  and  two  from 
Turkey  negotiated  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  Lausanne,  which  was 
signed  preliminarily  by  the  negotiators  on  October  15.  In  ac- 
cordance with  this  treaty,  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  issued  a  Firman 
on  October  17  granting  autonomy  to  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  with 
full  amnesty  to  all  the  people  of  the  Turkish  Islands  in  the 
Aegean  Sea  who  had  revolted  or  opposed  the  Ottoman  govern- 
ment. 

The  Sultan 's  Firman  stated  that  a  new  government  would  ad- 
minister affairs  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  which  would  respect 
the  religion  and  customs  of  the  people  as  before,  and  the  Sul- 
tan's Viceroy — Naib-es-Sultan,  Shemseddine  Bey — would  have 
charge  of  all  Ottoman  interests  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.  The 
current  laws  of  the  Sheriat  will  continue  in  force  and  the  neces- 
sary Cadi  (principal  judge)  will  be  designated  by  the  Sultan. 

The  King  of  Italy  signed  a  decree  October  17  granting  full 
and  entire  amnesty  to  all  inhabitants  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica 
who  had  taken  part  in  hostilities,  and  stating  that  all  the  inhabi- 
tants shall  be  permitted  to  enjoy  complete  liberty  in  the  Mahom- 
medan  religion  as  in  the  past ;  the  name  of  the  Sultan  shall  con- 
tinue to  be  pronounced  in  public  prayers  and  his  personal  rep- 
resentative shall  be  recognized.  The  emoluments  of  the  Sultan's 
Viceroy  shall  be  paid  from  local  funds.  The  rights  of  the  pious 
foundation  (Wakufs)  shall  be  respected  and  no  impediments 
shall  be  placed  between  the  Mussulmen  and  their  religious  lead- 
ers, the  Cadi  and  their  Naibis,  who  shall  have  incomes  from 
local  revenues. 

Another  decree  will  establish  a  commission,  a  part  of  which 
shall  be  notables  of  Tripoli,  to  propose  civil  and  administrative 
orders  inspired  by  liberal  ideals  and  in  keeping  with  local  uses 
and  customs. 


100  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

The  peace  plenipotentiaries  also  agreed  to  have  two  commis- 
sions, one  for  Tripoli  and  one  for  Cyrenaica,  who  shall  confer 
with  the  Arab  chieftans  to  persuade  them  to  submit  to  Italian 
sovereignty,  as  in  their  interest,  and  to  see  that  all  just  demands 
of  the  inhabitants  shall  be  granted.  These  two  commissions  were 
already  organized  during  the  middle  of  October  in  Cyrenaica. 

The  Arabian  Chief,  Said  Idriss,  was  also  pardoned.  After 
the  publication  of  these  edicts  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  Lausanne 
was  ratified  and  confirmed  on  October  18.  The  eleven  articles 
of  this  treaty  provide  essentially  as  follows : 

Immediate  cessation  of  hostilities. 

Recall  of  all  Turkish  troops  and  civil  functionaries  from  Tri- 
poli and  Cyrenaica. 

The  evacuation  of  all  Turkish  islands  occupied  in  the  Aegean 
Sea  by  the  Italians. 

The  exchange  and  release  of  all  prisoners  of  war. 

Complete  amnesty  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  Tripoli,  Cyrenaica 
and  of  the  Aegean  Islands. 

Italy  also  agreed  to  consent  to  a  commercial  treaty,  in  which 
higher  duties  will  be  imposed  by  Turkey  and  certain  monopolies 
will  be  granted. 

Italy  also  agreed  to  support  measures  to  leave  Turkey  her 
economic  independence,  with  the  right  to  act  in  commercial  mat- 
ters in  the  same  way  as  all  other  European  powers  without  be- 
ing restricted  by  capitulations  and  other  acts  now  in  force. 

Italy  agreed  to  suppress  all  Italian  postofftces  operating  in 
Turkish  dominions,  when  other  States  that  have  their  postof- 
fices  in  Turkey  shall  suppress  theirs. 

Italy  agreed  to  support  Turkey's  efforts  to  substitute  the  re- 
gime of  international  law  in  Turkey,  instead  of  the  hitherto 
prevailing  capitulary  regime. 

The  Ottoman  government  agreed  to  fully  reinstate  all  Italian 
subjects  who  had  been  faithful  employees  of  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment and  who  had  been  dismissed  on  the  outbreak  of  war  and 
to  grant  them  half  pay  during  the  months  they  had  been  absent 
on  account  of  the  war,  and  furthermore  that  this  enforced  ab- 
sence would  not  interfere  with  their  claims  for  pensions  and  liko 
claims. 

The  Italian  government  agreed  to  pay  annually  to  the  Turkish 
Treasury  a  sum  corresponding  to  that  which  the  two  African 


THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR  101 

provinces  had  paid  annually  to  the  Turkish  government  on  the 
average  during  the  three  years  before  the  war.  The  Italian  gov- 
ernment estimated  that  this  annuity  will  not  be  less  than  2,000,- 
000  lires  =  about  $400,000,  and  Italy  is  ready  to  pay  to  the 
Turkish  Administration  of  Public  Debt  the  corresponding  capi- 
talized sum  on  demand. 

Article  XI  required  that  hostilities  cease  on  the  date  of  signa- 
ture, October  18,  1912. 

The  sovereignty  of  Italy  over  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  was  rec- 
ognized by  Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia  on  the  date  of  signing 
the  preliminary  treaty,  October  15,  and  by  England  shortly  aft- 
erwards, while  France  delayed  in  order  to  define  the  Tunisian 
boundary  of  Tripoli. 

The  full  text  of  this  treaty  was  kindly  sent  to  the  writer  by 
the  Honorable  Philander  Knox,  Secretary  of  State,  Washing- 
ton, D.  C.,  and  the  exact  translation  of  the  treaty  and  accom- 
panying decree  of  the  King  of  Italy  and  the  Firman  of  the  Sul- 
tan of  Turkey  are  herewith  embodied  in  the  appendix. 

By  this  treaty  the  Italians  have  endeavored  to  conciliate  the 
Turks  and  Arabians  to  their  conquest  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica. 
The  Italians  were  most  anxious  to  retain  at  least  two  of  the 
Aegean  Sea  islands  and  their  conduct  towards  the  inhabitants 
of  those  islands  made  these  people  anxious  to  remain  under  the 
Italian  government.  But  the  Italians  realized  that  every  effort 
should  be  made  to  conciliate  the  Turkish- Arabians  so  that  they 
would  not  have  a  long  guerilla  warfare  to  disturb  them  in  their 
plans  to  develop  the  country.  Since  peace  was  concluded  the 
Arabians  have  submitted  without  any  further  attacks  on  the 
Italian  positions. 

Italy  avoided  any  sympathy  with  the  Balkan  States  and  that 
war  has  operated  to  establish  Italy's  sovereignty  over  Tripoli 
and  Cyrenaica  more  than  would  have  been  possible  by  forcible 
invasion  into  the  interior  by  the  Italian  armies. 

The  banishment  of  all  Italian  subjects  from  the  Dominions  of 
Turkey  was  a  great  hardship  and  created  a  bitter  hostility,  but 
the  treaty  has  softened  those  animosities  by  a  most  remarkable 
and  wise  provision  that  all  Italian  subjects  who  had  been  em- 
ployed by  the  Ottoman  government  and  who  had  been  dismissed 
on  account  of  the  war  and  consequent  hostilities  shall  be  fully 
reinstated  with  all  rights  to  pensions  et  cetera  as  if  they  had  re- 


102  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR. 

mained  in  service  and  furthermore  that  they  should  receive  half 
pay  during  the  time  they  were  absent.  This  clause  had  the  ef- 
feet  of  compelling  the  Ottoman  government  to  give  half  pay  to 
many  Italians  for  the  time  they  were  actually  fighting  against 
the  Ottoman  government. 

The  banishment  of  the  Italians  was,  however,  urgently  neces- 
sary, not  only  as  a  war  measure,  but  because  of  the  claims  of 
humanity  since  the  incidental  destruction  of  life  and  property 
by  Italian  bombardment  of  defenceless  ports  and  often  without 
any  notice  had  aroused  the  populace,  especially  at  Beirut  and  in 
Syria,  so  that  the  Turkish  government  was  unable  to  protect  the 
lives  of  Italians  against  the  infuriated  Turkish  mobs. 

The  bombardment  of  defenceless  ports  is  supposed  in  theory 
to  be  contrary  to  international  law,  but  in  the  conduct  of  war 
the  fact  that  a  port  is  defenceless  will  not  prevent  its  being  bom- 
barded if  the  Commander  of  the  attacking  force  finds  it  neces- 
sary to  bombard  it  in  order  to  compel  the  enemy  to  conclude 
peace.  The  Italians  did  not  act  in  any  exceptional  manner  and 
the  practice  of  bombarding  towns  whether  defended  or  not  is 
general.  Admiral  Sampson  bombarded  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico, 
without  any  previous  notice  on  May  12,  1898.  He  engaged  the 
fort  on  the  Morro  there  and  44  persons  were  killed  in  the  city, 
including,  among  other  non-combatants,  many  women  and  chil- 
dren, besides  destroying  many  buildings  by  projectiles  that  went 
over  and  beyond  the  Morro  into  the  city.  The  only  sure  protec- 
tion is  in  having  command  of  the  sea  by  an  efficient  navy  so  that, 
as  was  the  case  in  this  war,  the  Turkish  navy  did  not  venture 
near  any  Italian  port. 

These  moderate  demands  of  Italy  for  the  acquisition  of  Tri- 
poli and  Cyrenaica  are  wise  and  Italy  intends  to  develop  the 
country  so  that  the  desert  regions  will  bloom  as  a  prosperous, 
civilized  country. 

HARBOR  WORKS  IN  PORTS  OF  TRIPOLI  AND  CYRENAICA. 

The  Minister  of  Public  Works  has  published  the  details  for 
the  development  of  the  ports  of  the  African  coast. 

The  first  work  in  this  new  Italian  colony  will  be  extensive  har- 
bor works,  which  are  to  be  executed  in  three  periods.  These 
harbor  works  consist  of  building  breakwaters  and  quay  walls  and 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  103 

dredging  in  the  harbors  of  Tripoli,  Benghasi,  Derna  and  Horns. 
The  work  planned  for  the  first  two  periods  in  those  ports  has 
been  commenced  and  was  at  this  period,  March,  1913,  well  ad- 
vanced to  completion  and  will  be  available  for  use  by  the  end 
of  1913. 

The  works  planned  and  being  constructed  in  these  different 
ports  are  as  follows: 

AT  TRIPOLI. 

The  construction  of  a  breakwater  4000  feet  long  on  the  north- 
west side  of  the  harbor  to  connect  the  chain  of  reefs  that  run 
parallel  to  the  coast.  This  breakwater  will  provide  a  smooth 
harbor  against  the  prevailing  wind  and  sea.  It  is  proposed  to 
extend  this  to  be  5500  feet  long  in  the  future. 

2.  The  removal  of  rocks  within  the  harbor  and  for  dredging 
the  harbor  to  a  depth  of  25  to  28  feet. 

3.  The  erection  of  a  protecting  shield  on  the  south  side  of  the 
harbor  to  protect  it  from  the  sandstorms  that  come  from  the 
southeast  quadrant;  and  also  the  construction  of  a  dam  on  the 
north  side  of  the  harbor  to  shelter  it  from  the  seas  coming  from 
the  northeast. 

4.  The  construction  of  quay  walls  and  wharves  to  provide 
depths  alongside  of  from  13  to  25  feet  with  depths  in  places  up 
to  30  feet  and  final  dredging  to  give  a  uniform  depth  of  33  feet 
in  the  harbor. 

5.  The  equipment  of  these  quays  and  wharves  with  cranes, 
railroad  tracks,  magazines  and  roadways. 

6.  The  construction  of  a  marine  railway  or  a  dry  dock  with 
a  plant  for  repairing  ships  and  machinery. 

7.  The  completion  of  other  dependent  works,  such  as  the 
lighthouse,  bouys,  sanitary  station,  fresh  water  distilling  plant 
and  coal  depots. 

The  natural  conditions  at  Tripoli  will  permit  these  works  to 
be  done  at  a  comparatively  small  expense  and  this  port,  which 
was  heretofore  almost  inaccessible  for  commerce,  will  be  one  of 
the  safest  and  most  commodious  ports  in  the  Mediterranean.  Its 
area  will  be  about  double  that  of  Genoa. 

The  breakwater  at  Tripoli  was  completed  for  a  length  of  2000 
feet  in  February,  1913,  as  was  the  protecting  dam  or  shield  to 


104  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR 

prevent  sand  being  blown  into  the  harbor  by  sandstorms  in  the 
southern  part  of  the  harbor.  By  March  31st  2,500,000  lires  = 
$601,000  was  expended  on  the  Tripoli  harbor  works. 

In  their  flights  in  aeroplanes  the  aviators  discovered  the  wreck 
of  the  United  States  frigate  Philadelphia,  which  had  been  cap- 
tured by  the  Tripolitans  in  the  war  of  1812,  after  she  had  been 
run  upon  the  rocks  in  that  harbor  and  where  she  was  subse- 
quently so  gallantly  destroyed  by  Decatur  in  that  war.  The 
idea  of  the  removal  of  that  ship  was  seriously  considered,  but 
her  condition  would  not  warrant  the  expense  and  it  is  highly 
probable  that  after  having  been  lying  on  her  side  for  about  100 
years  she  would  not  float.  The  Italian  government  offered  the 
United  States  every  facility  to  raise  the  Philadelphia  if  they  de- 
sired to  do  so.  The  experience  of  aviation  for  observation  of  the 
bottom  of  sea  shows  that  submarines  are  clearly  visible  when 
submerged. 

AT  HOMS. 

For  a  greater  part  of  the  year  there  is  a  heavy  surf  at  Horns, 
but  the  Italians  began  to  build  a  breakwater  there  to  provide  a 
harbor  of  refuge  for  torpedo  boats  and  they  have  built  wharves 
for  coasting  steamers  that  have  been  established  along  the  en- 
tire coast. 

AT  MACABEZ. 

This  peninsular  is  destined  to  be  utilized  for  a  good  harbor 
instead  of  Zuara.  This  port  will  be  a  base  for  torpedo  boats  and 
they  have  dug  a  canal  there  which  will  eventually  be  2100  feet 
long  and  16  feet  deep. 

AT  MISURATAH. 

The  naval  administration  has  begun  to  build  an  artificial  har- 
bor at  Misuratah  by  constructing  two  breakwaters  perpendicu- 
lar to  the  coast  and  dredging  out  the  partially  enclosed  area. 

AT  BENGHASI. 

Here  it  is  proposed  to  construct  a  harbor  for  light  draft  coast- 
ing vessels.  The  present  plan  is  to  make  use  of  the  bay  south  of 
the  town  by  enlarging  the  small  bight  near  the  custom  house 
and  building  a  breakwater  from  the  Christian  cemetery  on  the 
northern  end  of  Buscaiba  point.  This  work  was  started  before 
peace  was  signed. 


THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR.  105 

AT  DERNA. 

The  hydrographic  and  local  conditions  at  Derna  are  similar 
to  those  at  Horns  and  a  heavy  surf  breaks  on  the  beach  during  a 
greater  part  of  the  year. 

A  quay  wall  was  begun  during  the  war  and  upon  completion 
of  the  proposed  harbor  works  a  small  harbor  will  be  enclosed  by 
a  breakwater  1000  feet  long.  The  depth  will  be,  when  dredged, 
about  14  feet. 

A  contract  was  signed  by  the  Italian  government  with  the 
Khedive  of  Egypt  and  English  authorities  for  the  construction 
of  an  extension  of  the  railroad  from  Alexandria  to  Derna.  This 
railroad  is  to  be  completed  within  three  years  and  the  work  is 
being  pushed  vigorously. 

AT  TOBRUK. 

The  most  excellent  natural  harbor  is  of  much  greater  military 
strategical  value  than  of  commercial  importance.  The  work  of 
developing  this  port  has  been  given  to  the  Italian  naval  minister, 
but  little  has  been  done  beyond  the  completion  of  the  lighthouse 
at  Bas-Allem-el-Nix,  which  was  started  by  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment. 

All  these  works  will  give  employment  to  large  numbers  of  the 
Arabian  inhabitants  and  prospects  for  peaceful  development  of 
these  African  colonies  were  very  encouraging. 

CONCLUSION. 

The  lessons  taught  by  this  war  should  not  be  ignored.  In  the 
first  place  we  find  the  Italians  thoroughly  prepared  to  make  use 
of  all  modern  inventions  that  might  be  useful  in  operations  of 
war.  Automobiles,  motorcycles,  motor  trucks  and  vehicles  of 
all  kinds  were  valuable.  Aeroplanes  and  airships  were  indispens- 
able. Wireless  telegraphy  was  absolutely  necessary,  both  for  mili- 
tary and  naval  services.  Search-lights  played  a  most  important 
role,  especially  for  the  Turks,  in  guarding  the  passage  of  the 
Dardanelles.  Torpedoes  proved  to  be  efficient  in  the  only  case 
where  there  was  opportunity  to  use  that  weapon,  viz.,  in  the  bom- 
bardment at  Beirut,  when  a  torpedo  sank  the  Turkish  armored 
coast  defence  ship  Awn-Illah. 


196  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

The  co-operation  of  the  Italian  army  and  navy  was  harmoni- 
ous and  much  more  so  than  in  previous  wars  where  this  lack  of 
co-operation  caused  disaster,  especially  when  the  French  at- 
tempted to  invade  Ireland  in  the  wars  during  the  period  of  the 
Directory.  The  urgent  necessity  of  a  National  Council  of  De- 
fence for  the  United  States  army  and  navy  to  secure  this  har- 
monious co-operation  of  the  two  services  is  emphasized  by  the 
creditable  experience  of  the  Italian  army  and  navy. 

The  Italian  navy  suffered  no  losses  during  the  war  because 
the  Turks  were  not  trained  in  target  practice.  The  accounts  of 
all  the  battles  show  that  the  Turkish  great  gun  fire  had  no  effect. 
The  Turks  did  not  score  a  hit  in  any  engagement.  The  Awn-Illah 
was  hit  so  frequently  in  20  minutes  that  the  Turkish  commander 
was  obliged  to  haul  down  his  flag  and  abandon  the  ship  while 
not  a  single  shot  hit  either  of  the  two  Italian  ships. 

The  brilliant  reconnoissance  of  the  Straits  of  the  Dardanelles 
by  Captain  Millo  and  his  flotilla  of  five  torpedo  boats,  in  which 
they  were  under  fire  of  over  one  hundred  guns  at  close  range  for 
a  period  of  about  two  hours  without  sustaining  any  serious  dam- 
age, is  proof  of  the  lack  of  training  in  the  Turkish  coast  de- 
fences. 

Modern  weapons  are  instruments  of  precision  and  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  have  skilled  gunners  to  operate  these  scien- 
tific instruments  of  precision.  It  costs  over  one  thousand  dollars 
to  fire  one  projectile  from  the  large  modern  guns  of  12-inch  cali- 
ber, and  it  is  a  criminal  extravagance  and  suicidal  to  waste  a 
single  shot  from  these  guns.  The  training  necessary  to  fire  these 
guns  with  perfect  accuracy  is  absolutely  necessary  and  this  is 
expensive ;  but  in  the  British  navy  they  know  this  and  the  Brit- 
ish Admiralty  authorizes  practically  unlimited  money  for  tar- 
get practice.  In  no  calling  in  life  do  men  allow  unskilled  labor 
to  handle  tools  of  precision.  Modern  weapons  are  as  intricate 
as  any  elaborate  clock  work  and  it  is  necessary  in  time  of  peace 
to  prepare  qualified  gun  pointers  if  the  gun  is  to  be  of  any  use. 

Germany  is  a  Nation  in  arms  in  recognition  of  the  necessity 
of  being  prepared  for  war.  The  other  great  European  powers, 
England,  Prance,  Spain,  Turkey,  Russia  and  Italy,  and  also  the 
United  States,  China  and  Japan,  have  been  at  war  during  the 
past  40  years,  but  Germany  has  had  no  war  because  she  is  so 
strong  in  her  armaments  and  preparedness  for  war  that  no  na- 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  107 

tion  will  dare  to  go  to  war  with  her.  It  is  therefore  absolutely 
necessary  in  time  of  peace  to  prepare  for  war,  if  peace  is  to  be 
maintained. 

The  most  conspicuous  lesson  of  the  war  is  the  well-known  nee-  I 
essity  of  having  command  of  the  sea.  Italy  had  long  coveted  the 
northern  coast  of  Africa  and  hesitated  long  to  attempt  to  take  it 
until  Italy  knew  that  she  could  depend  upon  the  efficiency  of  her 
navy  to  give  her  absolute  command  of  the  Mediterranean  against 
the  Turks,  from  whom  they  intended  to  take  the  African  pro- 
vinces, regardless  of  the  wishes  of  the  Arabian  inhabitants. 

This  command  of  sea  enabled  the  Italians  to  transport  invad- 
ing armies  to  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  and  proceed  to  take  islands 
in  the  Aegean  Sea  without  any  opposition  by  the  Turkish  navy. 

The  Italian  Nation  had  diligently  trained  her  navy  for  this 
degree  of  efficiency,  and  the  result  justified  the  expense. 

The  Turks  had  conquered  the  territory  in  Europe  and  their 
African  provinces  by  the  sword,  but  they  neglected  to  keep  the 
sword  bright  and  sharp  for  modern  times.  They  did  not  in 
peace  prepare  for  war  by  sea,  and  when  the  Italians  felt  strong 
enough  to  take  these  coveted  African  provinces  they  proceeded 
to  do  so. 

The  lesson  is  that  of  the  history  of  all  nations  in  all  the  world 
in  all  ages.  This  experience  is  merely  another  illustration  of  the 
infallible  teaching  of  our  Saviour,  viz. : 

' '  When  a  strong  man  armed  keepeth  his  palace,  his  goods  are 
in  peace. 

But  when  a  stronger  than  he  shall  come  upon  him,  and  over- 
come him,  he  taketh  from  him  all  his  armor  wherein  he  trusteth 
and  divideth  his  spoils." — St.  Luke  XI,  verses  21  and  22. 

Eternal  Vigilance  is  the  price  of  Liberty. 


APPENDIX 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
WASHINGTON,    D.   C. 

December  7,  1912. 
Commodore  W.  H.  Beehler, 

Acton,  Annapolis, 

Maryland. 
Sir: 

In  compliance  with  your  request  under  the 
date  of  November  25th,  I  take  pleasure  in  send- 
ing you  herewith  a  translation  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  between  Italy  and  Turkey  signed  at 
Lausanne,  on  October  18th  last,  and  a  transla- 
tion of  the  Imperial  Firman  of  the  Sublime 
Porte  published  on  October  17th  granting  auton- 
omy to  the  former  Turkish  Provinces  of  Tripoli 
and  Cyrenaica  ;  and  a  translation  of  the  Proc- 
lamation of  Peace  of  General  Ragni,  Commander 
of  the  Corps  of  Occupation  of  Tripolitania, 
communicating  the  Decree  of  the  King  of  Italy 
under  date  of  October  17th. 

I  am,  sir, 

Your  obedient  servant, 


Enclosures: 

Treaty  of  Peace,  Oct.  18; 

Firman,  Oct.  17; 

Proclamation  of  Peaco,  Oct.  17. 

765.67/412 


THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAB.  Ill 

TREATY     OF     PEACE 

—  BETWEEN  — 

ITALY    AND    TURKEY 

SIGNED  AT  LAUSANNE,  SWITZERLAND,  OCTOBER  18,  1912. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Italy,  and 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  Ottomans 

being  equally  desirous  of  putting  an  end  to  the  state  of  war  ex- 
isting between  the  two  countries,  have  appointed  as  their  pleni- 
potentiaries : 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Italy : 

Mr.  Pietro  Bertolini 

Great  Cross  of  the  Order  of  the  Saints 
Maurizio  and  Lazzaro,  Deputy  to  the  Parliament 

Mr.  Guido  Fusinato 

Great  Cross  of  the  Order  of  the  Crown  of  Italy 
Grand  Official  of  the  Order  of  the 
Saints  Maurizio  and  Lazzaro 
Deputy  to  the  Parliament 

Member  of  the  Council  of  State 

Mr.  Giuseppe  Volpi 

Commendatore  of  the  Orders  of  the 
Saints  Maurizio  and  Lazzaro  and  of  the 
Crown  of  Italy. 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  Ottomans : 
His  Excellency  Mehemmed  Naby  Bey 

Great  Cordon  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Osmanie 
Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  Ottomans 

His  Excellency  Roumbeyoglou  Fahreddin  Bey 

Grand  Official  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Medjidie 
Commander  of  the  Order  of  the  Osmanie 
Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  Ottomans 


112  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

Who,  after  having  exchanged  their  respective  Full  Powers, 
and  having  found  them  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon 
the  following  articles: 

ARTICLE  I. — The  two  governments  undertake,  immediately 
after  the  signature  of  the  present  Treaty,  to  take  the  necessary 
steps  for  the  immediate  and  simultaneous  cessation  of  hostilities. 
Special  Commissioners  will  be  sent  to  the  scenes  of  hostilities  to 
ensure  the  execution  of  the  above-mentioned  steps. 

ARTICLE  II. — The  two  governments  undertake,  immediately 
after  the  signature  of  the  present  Treaty,  to  send  orders  recall- 
ing their  officers  and  troops,  and  also  their  civil  functionaries, 
respectively,  the  Ottoman  Government  from  Tripoli  and  Cyre- 
naica,  and  the  Italian  Government  from  the  islands  occupied  in 
the  Aegean  Sea.  The  effective  evacuation  of  the  above-mentioned 
islands  by  the  Italian  officers,  troops,  and  civil  functionaries  will 
take  place  immediately  after  the  evacuation  of  Tripoli  and  Cyre- 
naica  by  the  Ottoman  officers,  troops,  and  civil  functionaries. 

ARTICLE  III. — Prisoners  of  war  and  hostages  will  be  ex- 
changed with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

ARTICLE  IV. — The  two  governments  undertake  to  grant  full 
and  complete  amnesty,  the  Royal  Government  to  the  inhabitants 
of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  and  the  Imperial  Government  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  islands  in  the  Aegean  Sea,  subject  to  Ottoman 
sovereignty,  who  may  have  taken  part  in  the  hostilities  or  may 
have  compromised  themselves  in  that  connection,  without  com- 
mitting crimes  against  the  civil  law.  In  consequence,  no  indi- 
vidual of  any  class  or  condition  shall  be  proceeded  against  or 
troubled  in  his  person  or  property,  or  in  the  exercise  of  his  rights 
on  account  of  political  or  military  acts,  even  of  opinions  ex- 
pressed during  the  hostilities.  Persons  detained  or  deported  for 
such  cause  shall  at  once  be  set  free. 

ARTICLE  V. — All  treaties,  conventions,  and  undertakings  of  all 
kinds,  sorts,  or  nature  concluded  or  in  force  between  the  two 
high  contracting  parties  previously  to  the  declaration  of  war 
shall  at  once  come  into  force  again,  and  the  two  governments 
shall  be  placed  in  regard  to  each  other,  as  shall  their  respective 
subjects,  in  the  identical  position  in  which  they  were  before  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR.  113 

ARTICLE  VI. — Italy  undertakes  to  conclude  with  Turkey,  at 
the  same  time  as  she  renews  her  commercial  treaties  with  other 
Powers,  a  commercial  treaty  based  on  European  public  law — 
that  is  to  say,  she  consents  to  leave  Turkey  all  her  economic  in- 
dependence, and  the  right  to  act  in  commercial  matters  and  mat- 
ters of  Customs  in  the  same  way  as  all  European  Powers  with- 
out being  bound  by  the  Capitulations  and  other  Acts  now  in 
force.  It  is  clearly  understood  that  the  said  Commercial  Treaty 
shall  not  come  into  force  except  in  so  far  as  commercial  treaties 
concluded  by  the  Porte  with  other  Powers  on  a  similar  basis 
shall  be  in  force.  Further,  Italy  consents  to  the  increase  from 
11  per  cent  to  15  per  cent  of  the  AD  VALOREM  Customs  duty  in 
Turkey,  as  well  as  to  the  creation  of  new  monopolies,  of  the  levy- 
ing of  consumption  surtaxes  on  the  five  following  articles:  Pe- 
troleum, cigarette  paper,  matches,  alcohol,  and  playing  cards. 
All  this  is  on  condition  that  the  same  treatment  be  applied  sim- 
ultaneously and  without  distinction  to  the  imports  from  other 
countries.  In  so  far  as  there  is  a  question  of  the  importation  of 
articles  which  are  the  object  of  monopolies,  the  Administration 
of  such  monopolies  is  bound  to  procure  goods  -of  Italian  origin, 
according  to  a  percentage  based  on  the  annual  importation  of 
these  goods,  provided  that  the  price  offered  for  the  supply  of 
such  monopoly  goods  shall  be  in  conformity  with  the  state  of  the 
market  at  the  moment  of  purchase,  taking  into  consideration  the 
qualities  of  the  goods  to  be  supplied  and  the  average  price  rul- 
ing during  the  three  years  preceding  that  in  which  war  was  de- 
clared for  similar  qualities.  It  is  further  understood  that,  should 
Turkey,  instead  of  establishing  new  monopolies  on  the  five  ar- 
ticles mentioned  above,  decide  to  levy  consumption  surtaxes  on 
them,  such  surtaxes  shall  be  imposed  in  the  same  degree  on  the 
similar  products  of  Turkey  and  all  other  nations. 

ARTICLE  VII. — The  Italian  Government  undertakes  to  sup- 
press the  Italian  postoffices  operating  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  at 
the  same  time  as  the  other  States  having  postoffices  in  Turkey 
shall  suppress  theirs. 

ARTICLE  VIII. — As  the  Porte  proposes  to  open  negotiations, 
at  a  European  conference  or  otherwise,  with  the  Great  Powers 
interested  for  the  cessation  of  the  capitulary  regime  in  Turkey, 
and  the  substitution  for  it  of  the  regime  of  international  law, 
Italy,  recognizing  the  good  grounds  for  these  intentions  of  the 


114  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAB, 

Porte,  declares  its  willingness  henceforth  to  give  the  Porte  its 
full  and  sincere  support  to  this  end. 

ARTICLE  IX. — The  Ottoman  Government,  being  desirous  of 
testifying  its  satisfaction  with  the  good  and  loyal  services  ren- 
dered to  it  by  Italian  subjects  employed  in  different  branches 
of  the  Administration,  whom  it  was  forced  to  dismiss  on  the  out- 
break of  hostilities,  declares  its  readiness  to  reinstate  them  in 
the  situations  which  they  gave  up.  Half  pay  will  be  given  to 
them  for  the  months  that  they  were  unemployed,  and  this  inter- 
ruption in  their  service  will  in  no  way  prejudice  employees  hav- 
ing the  right  to  a  retiring  pension.  Further,  the  Ottoman  Gov- 
ernment undertakes  to  use  its  good  offices  with  the  institutions 
with  which  it  has  relations  (the  Public  Debt,  Railway  Compan- 
ies, Banks,  &c.)  to  obtain  the  same  treatment  for  Italian  sub- 
jects who  were  in  their  service  and  found  themselves  in  a  similar 
position. 

ARTICLE  X. — The  Italian  Government  undertakes  to  pay  an- 
nually to  the  Caisse  of  the  Public  Debt,  on  account  of  the  Im- 
perial Government,  a  sum  corresponding  to  the  average  of  the 
sums  which,  in  each  of  the  three  years  preceding  that  of  the 
declaration  of  war,  had  been  assigned  to  the  service  of  the  Pub- 
lic Debt  out  of  the  receipts  of  the  two  provinces.  The  amount 
of  the  said  annuity  shall  be  determined  in  agreement  by  two 
Commissioners  appointed,  one  by  the  Royal  Government  and 
the  other  by  the  Imperial  Government.  In  case  of  disagreement 
the  decision  shall  be  referred  to  an  arbitral  court  composed  of 
the  said  Commissioners  and  an  arbitrator  appointed  by  agree- 
ment between  the  two  parties.  Should  no  agreement  be  reached 
on  this  point,  each  party  shall  designate  a  different  Power,  and 
the  choice  of  arbitrator  shall  be  made  jointly  by  the  Powers  thus 
selected.  The  Royal  Government  and  the  Administration  of  the 
Ottoman  Public  Debt,  by  the  intermediary  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, shall  have  the  right  to  demand  the  institution  for  the 
above-mentioned  annuity  of  a  corresponding  sum  capitalized  at 
the  rate  of  4  per  cent. 

As  regards  the  foregoing  paragraph,  the  Royal  Government 
declares  that  it  recognizes  at  once  that  the  annuity  cannot  be 
less  than  the  sum  of  2,000,000  Italian  lire,  and  is  ready  to  pay 
to  the  Administration  of  the  Public  Debt  the  corresponding  cap- 
italized sum  directly  a  demand  is  made  for  it. 

ARTICLE  XL — The  present  treaty  shall  enter  into  force  on  the 
day  of  its  signature. 


THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAR. 

TRANSLATION. 


IMPERIAL  FIRMAN  GRANTING  AUTONOMY  TO  TRIPOLI  AND  CYRENAICA. 


Since  my  Government  desires,  on  the  one  hand,  effectively  to 
aid  you  in  the  defence  of  your  country,  which  you  need,  and 
sees  the  impossibility  of  doing  so,  and  since,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Government  thinks  of  your  present  and  future  happiness 
and  desires  to  put  an  end  to  a  war  as  ruinous  to  yourselves  and 
your  families  as  it  is  disastrous  for  the  State, 

In  the  hope  of  restoring  peace  and  happiness  in  your  country 
and  relying  upon  Our  sovereign  rights,  I  grant  you  complete 
autonomy. 

Your  country  shall  be  governed  by  new  laws  and  special  regu- 
lations, and,  in  order  that  they  may  conform  to  your  customs 
and  practices,  you  must  enlighten  your  compatriots  with  your 
counsel  and  act  as  their  guides. 

Shemseddine  Bey,  a  high  dignitary  of  the  Empire,  formerly 
Imperial  Minister  of  Pious  Foundations,  decorated  with  the  Or- 
ders of  the  Medjidie  and  of  the  Osmanie,  has  been  invested  by 
Us  with  the  title  of  Naib-es-Sultan  (Viceroy)  near  you.  We 
entrust  to  him  the  protection  of  Ottoman  interests  in  your 
country. 

The  full  powers  which  I  delegate  to  him  are  for  a  period  of 
five  years;  at  the  end  of  that  time  his  mission  may  be  renewed 
by  Us  or  We  shall  designate  his  successor. 

Our  Imperial  desire  being  the  application  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Sheri  law  and  in  order  to  assure  the  realization  of  this  ob- 
ject, the  necessary  Cadi  (Principal  Judge)  shall  be  designated 
and  named  by  Us. 

The  aforesaid  Cadi  shall  proceed  to  the  nomination  of  Naibs 
(Judges  Substitute),  chose  among  the  native  Ulemas  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  the  Sheri. 

The  emoluments  of  the  Cadi  shall  be  paid  by  Us,  those  of  the 
Naib-es-Sultan  and  all  the  other  functionaries  of  the  Sheri  shall 
be  paid  from  the  revenues  of  the  country. 


118  THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR 

PROCLAMATION    OF    PEACE 
TRANSLATION 

PROCLAMATION 

We,  General  Ottavio  Ragni,  Grand  Officer  of  State,  Com- 
mander of  the  Corps  of  Occupation  of  Tripolitania,  communi- 
cate what  follows: 

Peace  has  been  concluded  between  Italy  and  Turkey. 

His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan  signed  yesterday,  October 
17th,  1912,  the  Firman  thereof  and  the  same  day  His  Majesty 
Victor  Emanuel  III,  King  of  Italy  by  grace  of  God  and  the  will 
of  the  Nation,  signed  the  following  decree : 

Considering  the  law  of  the  25th  of  February,  1912,  NR  83,  by 
which  Tripolitania  and  Cyrenaica  were  put  under  the  absolute 
and  entire  sovereignty  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  in  order  to 
hasten  the  pacification  of  the  aforesaid  provinces ;  having  heard 
the  Council  of  Ministers,  upon  the  proposal  of  the  President  of 
the  Council  and  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  we  have  de- 
creed and  do  decree: 

Art.  1.  Full  and  entire  amnesty  is  granted  to  all  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Tripolitania  and  Cyrenaica,  who  have  taken  part  in  the 
hostilities  and  became  compromised  thereby,  except  in  cases  of 
ordinary  crimes ;  in  consequence  no  individual  to  whatever  class 
or  condition  belonging,  shall  be  tried  and  molested  in  person,  or 
in  goods  or  in  the  exercise  of  their  rights  because  of  any  political 
and  military  acts  committed  or  opinions  expressed  during  hos- 
tilities. Persons  detained  and  deported  for  such  motive  are  to 
be  put  at  liberty  immediately. 

Art.  2.  The  inhabitants  of  Tripolitania  and  Cyrenaica  will 
continue  to  enjoy  the  most  complete  liberty  in  the  Mohammedan 
religion,  as  in  the  past;  the  name  of  His  Imperial  Majesty,  the 
Sultan,  as  Calif  shall  continue  to  be  pronounced  in  the  public 
prayers  of  the  mussulmen ;  and  his  personal  representative,  nom- 
inated by  him,  shall  be  recognized.  His  emoluments  shall  be 
taken  from  the  local  public  funds,  the  rights  of  the  pious  foun- 
dations (Wakufs)  shall  be  respected  as  in  the  past  and  no  impe- 


THE   ITALIAN-TURKISH   WAR  117 

diment  shall  be  put  between  the  mussulmen  and  their  chief  re- 
ligious leader  called  the  Cadi,  who  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
Sceich  Ul  Islam  and  their  Naibis  appointed  by  him  and  their 
emoluments  shall  be  taken  from  the  local  income. 

Art.  3.  The  aforesaid  representative  is  also  recognized  as 
guardian  of  all  the  interests  of  the  Ottoman  State  and  Ottoman 
subjects,  such  as  remained  in  the  two  provinces  after  the  law 
of  the  25th  of  February,  1912. 

Art.  4.  By  another  decree  there  will  be  nominated  a  com- 
mission, a  part  of  whom  shall  be  Notables  of  Tripoli,  to  propose 
for  the  two  provinces  such  civil  and  administrative  orders  as  are 
inspired  by  liberal  ideals  and  in  keeping  with  the  local  uses  and 
customs.  We  order  that  the  present  decree,  stamped  with  the 
Seal  of  State  be  placed  with  the  official  collection  of  decrees  and 
laws  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  ordering  everyone  therein  con 
cerned  to  observe  it  and  have  it  observed. 

Given  at  San  Rossore,  the  17th  of  October,  1912. 
Signed :    VITTOEIO  EMANUBLE  III. 

Countersigned:  GIOLITTI,  DI  SANGIULIANO,  FINOC- 
CHIARO  APBILE,  FACTA,  TEDESCO, 
SPINGARDI,  LEONADI  CATTOLICA, 
CREDARO  SACCHI,  NITTL 


118  THE    ITALIAN-TURKISH    WAE. 


CHIEFS,  NOTABLES  AND  ALL  PEOPLES  OF  TRIPOLITANIA. 

Hear :  Everything  fixed  by  the  will  of  God,  Lord  of  the  Uni- 
verse, is  fulfilled  on  the  appointed  day. 

Peace  is  concluded. 

Now  that  the  two  Sovereigns,  by  complete  accord,  have  deter- 
mined that  hostilities  should  cease  between  the  armies,  it  would 
be  useless  and  criminal  to  keep  the  country  in  a  state  of  anarchy 
and  affliction. 

Let  every  one  re-enter  his  own  land  and  return  to  his  accus- 
tomary  work  under  the  just  rule  of  the  Benign  Government  of 
His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Italy. 

All  must  co-operate  according  to  their  capacity  and  power 
with  the  Government  authorities  to  repair  the  ravages  of  war 
and  to  promote  the  progress  and  prosperity  of  the  country  un- 
der the  protection  of  careful  justice,  dedicating  every  activity 
to  work,  trade  and  fruitful  cultivations. 

Given  in  Tripoli,  the  18th  of  October,  1^12. 

IL  TENENTE  GENERALE, 

Commander  of  the  Corps  of  Oc- 
cupation of  Tripolitania. 

0.  RAQNI. 


:<          S 


I 


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